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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The current international trade regime is flawed, unjust, and in need of redress. 
It largely ignores concerns for global economic justice, and fails those most in need of a 
strategy to help them move out of extreme poverty; it exacerbates inequalities, both 
between states on the world stage and within individual countries, and it creates a 
competitive pressure on producers to use the differing legal standards and enforcement 
between countries to externalize important environmental, social, human rights and 
cultural costs that harm others now, or in the future.  
 There are two models, which have generally been presented as ideal alternatives 
to the present system. The first of these is a move towards eliminating all barriers to 
free trade in a self-regulating free-market approach to trade. This is a model that has 
had a strong influence on international trade policy over the past thirty years, and has 
shaped many features of the current system. The other main model has a strong state-
centric focus that favors unilateral protectionism as a tool to advance individual state 
interest, and develop or protect domestic industry. This model has been a strong 
influence on trade policy since the development of the modern state.  
Both these models, while having their strengths, fall short of addressing the 
important concerns of global justice. What is needed is a model that focuses on 
regulating and facilitating international trade in the best interests of all participants.  
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The model I propose is one that is influenced by John Rawls’ conception of social 
justice, the idea that achieving a just society is dependent on ensuring the institutions 
and basic social structures of a society are based on embedded principles of justice. 
Rawls argues that a fair background framework for a society, permits individuals to 
pursue their own ends as they see fit, under conditions that in most cases, support 
maintenance of a just society. 
This proposal is intended as the basis of a new, more just approach to 
international trade, and it is intended as a proposal that could be implemented in global 
society as it actually exists. The project takes a cosmopolitan approach to obligations of 
justice, in that it accepts that obligations of justice extend between all members of 
global society, but it is not necessarily part of a larger project of global justice, and thus 
the principles are limited to those that are relevant specifically to international trade. 
The project will be based around principles of justice, but although influenced by Rawls’ 
conception of justice, Rawls’ principles are not adopted directly.  
Rawls suggests principles for justice in international society, in The Law of 
Peoples. There justice is seen to be very different in international society than is his 
conception in A Theory of Justice for a single self-contained society. In A Theory of 
Justice Rawls carefully outlines his conceptions of the economic institutions that would 
be required in society to support his principles of justice. In The Law of Peoples Rawls 
claims that a fair background framework for trade would need to be worked out using 
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the concept of the original position with the veil of ignorance,1 but, unlike A Theory of 
Justice, he does not work out what it would look like. Rawls argues that his liberty 
principle and difference principle do not make sense in the context of international 
society, he argues against a cosmopolitan conception of the obligations of justice in 
international society, and his principles of justice, which he calls the “Law of Peoples,” 
are arguably a much thinner and less comprehensive conception.  
There are several important commentators on global justice who critique Rawls’ 
conception of global justice in The Law of Peoples, but claim that his principles of justice 
stated in A Theory of Justice, which he developed for a single, mostly self-sufficient 
society (really a single country or state), ought to be applied to global society. The 
principles of justice in international trade defended here should be considered, in a 
sense, to be similar to criteria that Rawls uses in constructing his economic institutional 
order in A Theory of Justice, in that they are meant to apply to a society committed to 
justice for all its members, but they are created in response to the need for criteria, for a 
fair background framework for international trade, which, Rawls argues, would emerge 
from the 2nd original position, in The Law of Peoples. 
I will propose a model of trade that would be structured according to principles 
of justice in international trade. These principles would focus on addressing the key 
justice critiques of the current international trade system. The principles are these:  
                                                          
1 See Chapter 1 for detail. 
4 
 
 
1) Reduction of extreme poverty and satisfaction of basic needs for all people 
should be the most important goal of international trade regulation, in a world 
where resources exist to do this. 
2) Trade regulation ought to work towards limiting and reducing harmful inequality 
at all levels (both between states and within populations). 
3) Trade regulations should ensure that negative externalities of trade are 
compensated for fairly. The poorer countries or the poor within countries should 
not bear a disproportionate share of the negative consequences of international 
trade. 
A more just conception of international trade would be one that respected the 
interests of all those with a stake in its regulation and facilitation. Although I will argue 
that international trade needs to be an active part of ending the most extreme global 
poverty and limiting inequalities that lead to injustice, I will also defend the idea that to 
do this, trade policy needs to move beyond the rigid ideological positions that have 
often tended to dominate trade theory. There is likely no simple solution for all 
situations; instead a just conception of international trade would be based on principles 
that would guide decision making and policy relative to the particular issues and 
concerns of particular situations.  
The principles of just international trade that I propose are not proposed with 
the assumption that they are part of a larger ideal-world system (perhaps non-
capitalist). I assume a world order that is substantially similar to the current situation. 
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The important condition that this proposal does assume, however, is a disposition 
towards achieving justice in relations of international trade. 
Narrative Description of Chapters 
Chapter One 
 The first chapter looks at how Rawls derives his principles of justice in A Theory 
of Justice, and his argument for how they ought to apply to the economic institutions of 
a just society. Then I examine Rawls’ argument in The Law of Peoples for his principles of 
justice in international society and also for his process of deriving them. I look at Rawls 
consideration of international trade in The Law of Peoples, and consider the fair 
background framework he suggests would be chosen in the 2nd original position to 
support it. I point out relevant differences between the two positions, which apply to a 
proposal for a just international trade regime.  
 I also consider my proposed principles of justice in trade in relation to Rawls’ 
principles of justice, and discussion of economic institutions in society in both A Theory 
of Justice, and The Law of Peoples. This chapter finishes with an examination of the 
positions of both Charles Beitz and Iris Marion Young, who support the argument that 
Rawls’ restriction of strong obligations of justice to the boundaries of states is arbitrary 
and would facilitate injustice at the international level. 
Chapter Two 
 Chapter Two explores Peter Singer’s utilitarian critique of the current 
international trade regime, including the particular critiques that directly relate to my 
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proposed principles of justice in international trade. I also consider his argument for 
cosmopolitan obligations of global justice, and his critical discussion of positions which 
consider that citizens of the same states have obligations to each other which take 
precedence over obligations to others in the global society. The treatment of Singer’s 
position finishes by outlining his criticisms of Rawls’ position in The Law of Peoples in 
relation to his positions on justice in A Theory of Justice, particularly as they relate to 
trade. 
 I then examine Thomas Pogge’s argument for global justice based human rights. I 
outline his argument that the current world order is responsible for causing much of the 
suffering and death that directly results from extreme poverty, and explain several of his 
arguments for how and why. Thomas Pogge has made extensive arguments for why 
Rawls conception of justice in The Law of Peoples is flawed and for how it is illogical 
from the perspective of the positions Rawls supports in A Theory of Justice, and 
throughout his body of work on justice, I examine some of those arguments which are 
most relevant to international trade. Finally chapter two finishes with a presentation of 
Pogge’s proposal to end extreme poverty, which is particularly relevant to international 
trade. 
Chapter Three 
 Chapter Three examines the two main economic models for international trade, 
the free trade model, and the protectionist model. It covers briefly the historical roots of 
both models, and examines their theoretical basis, outlining Adam Smith’s theory of 
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absolute advantage and David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. In this 
chapter, I present the positions of economists who argue in favor of each of the models 
(free trade model and protectionist model). I also present critiques of both models, 
made by economists. These include Milton Friedman and Jagdish Bhagwati, supporting 
the free trade model, and William Gomory, Andre Gunder Frank, Ha Joon Chang, Joseph 
Stiglitz and Herman Daly with critiques of it. By the end of the chapter it should be clear 
that both of the traditional models have strengths and weaknesses, and that neither 
model is completely satisfactory alone. 
Chapter Four 
 In Chapter Four I evaluate several proposals for reforming the international trade 
regime that do not embrace free trade as a trump concern; most are from economists, 
but they all take fairly strong normative positions on how international trade should be 
structured. Proposals considered are those of Ian Fletcher, Joseph Stiglitz, David 
Schweickart, and Herman Daly. Each of the proposals has important strengths, which 
contribute to my own proposal, but none of the proposals, considered individually, 
meets all the criteria of the three principles of justice in international trade. 
Chapter Five 
 In Chapter Five I present my own proposal for an alternative system of 
international trade based on the three principles of justice. I explain the principles and 
why each is of value for trade in global society, and the basic concerns for each. I 
introduce the idea of a reformed institution for international trade (Global Trade 
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Organization) and outline the main concerns of each of the branches of the institution, 
and how it will act to address them. I then consider how decision making in the 
institution will be structured, and how members of international society will be 
represented in it. Finally, I consider how some parts of the proposal, implemented 
alone, could be quite effective at improving the fairness of the current international 
trade regime, even if it is not possible to immediately move forward with the entire 
reform.  
Is There A Value In Theorizing About International Trade? 
 An important question to consider before wading too far into the problem of 
international trade, is whether or not, there is any point to a philosopher’s working 
through the problems of international trade? This question seems to be handled best if 
it is broken down into two distinct parts. The first part is, whether there is any point in 
theorizing about justice in international trade at all, given that almost all countries 
approach international trade at least partially as “international relations realists”, and 
that it is a fairly common claim (particularly among economists) that economics is not an 
area where justice applies, but is simply governed by scientific rules. The second part of 
the question is, whether or not, there are actual philosophical problems to address in 
international trade. 
The first part of the question is concerned with the problem of whether the de 
facto “realist” orientation of much current trade policy makes it pointless to discuss 
trade theory in relation to justice. The Realist position is based on a belief that each 
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actor (in this case normally states) in international relations will act completely in their 
own interest, without concern for the interests of other states, as far as it is in their 
power to do so. This conception of international interaction can be considered to arise 
from the basic belief that international relations are essentially a zero-sum game. (A 
zero-sum game is best understood as a situation analogous to a pie of fixed size, where 
the only part of the situation that is variable is how big a slice each player will get. There 
is basically no value in “cooperation,” unless it allows you, with your allies, to garner a 
larger share of pie.)  
There are several reasons why justice should be part of the conversation, the 
first being that even if it is a zero-sum game, we ought to divide up what is available so 
that all parties will get a fair share, especially in a world where distribution, not total 
resources available, is why millions die from the effects of poverty. Realism is an unjust 
way to approach trade, and simply because people are approaching it that way doesn’t 
make it right. 
 The second reason is that we know that international relations are not always 
zero-sum games; in fact in many situations, it is clearly and demonstrably a positive-sum 
game, where cooperation between actors ends up being beneficial to all. (A positive-
sum game is a situation where cooperation between actors in the game actually 
increases the sum available to be distributed. Cooperating to work on the pie yields a 
bigger pie for distribution than the sum of pies that individuals could bake alone.) 
Economists that support free trade all argue that international trade is not a zero sum 
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game. So, like Rawls’ explanation in A Theory of Justice that a starting point for 
considering his theory is the requirement of a desire to live in a just nation, I will assume 
as a starting point, an orientation to international trade that we desire to live in a just 
world.  
 The second part of the question of whether or not there is value for a 
philosopher to work through the problems of international trade, is whether or not 
there is actually a philosophical question of substance involved. There are several 
reasons why this is quite clearly the case. The first reason is the fact that there is 
arguably a strong connection between international trade and other problems of global 
justice that philosophers have commonly addressed, such as the problem of global 
poverty, and concerns about the environment, human rights, and the distribution of 
resources in the world. These concerns are all issues where claims about justice are 
being made, the assumption being that a philosopher has the tools to “clear away the 
brush” around these problems, so that what is at stake are made clear. It is also true 
that issues of political economy have historically been addressed by philosophers, with 
moral philosophers being generally well equipped to address the normative aspects of 
questions of political economy.  
I feel there is considerable value in focussing on normative issues in international 
trade, as it is an area that is often considered as a sideline to other problems in global 
justice commonly addressed by philosophers. International trade has not itself been the 
focus of much specific attention from philosophers. It has however been a subject of 
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considerable commentary from economists, much of it at least implicitly normative. I 
feel that balancing the issues of justice involved with theories of international trade is a 
philosophical problem worth addressing. In my argument, I will expand and support the 
defense of issues of justice in international trade, as a valid area for philosophical 
inquiry.  
Justice Concerns in International Trade 
 The current international trade regime is unjust in several ways. I will argue that 
these injustices fall into three basic categories. The three categories include the failure 
of international trade to function up to its potential as a tool in ending the problem of 
extreme poverty, the problems of international trade contributing to inequality both 
within societies and in the international context between states, and the third major 
category which is the problem of negative externalities in market exchanges. 
 The concern that the current system of international trade fails to reach its full 
potential as a tool in the struggle to end the problem of extreme poverty is a particularly 
important charge of injustice, for poverty is one of the major causes of human suffering 
and premature death. It receives much less news coverage than more dramatic events, 
but it causes some 18 million premature human deaths annually2, its toll dwarfing that 
of war and human conflict. What makes it in some ways even more terrible is that it 
would be reasonably easy to end the worst poverty. The resources are available to 
                                                          
2 Andreas  Føllesdal and Thomas  Pogge, Real World Justice: Grounds, Principles, Human Rights and Social 
Institutions (Springer, 2005), 139. 
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ensure that everyone has more than enough to satisfy basic necessities. The issue is that 
the current system fails the most impoverished, because it is not particularly focussed 
on reaching them.  
 I will argue that the problems of inequality in international trade should be 
separated from the problem of extreme poverty, for the pragmatic reason that some 
commentators insist that poverty is a problem, but inequality is not, making it worth 
addressing the issues separately. I will argue that inequality could still be an important 
issue, even in situations where the most extreme poverty is not. Inequality, as a justice 
issue in the current regime of international trade, emerges as a problem in several ways, 
all strongly related, because they stem from the connection between economic 
inequality and political power. The problem shows up both within states, and as a 
concern in world order between states. In the situation of inequality between states it is 
a problem which forms a self-reinforcing cycle, with wealthy states using their power in 
negotiating and bargaining, to set up both the organizing institutions and ground rules 
governing trade in their favor, and also using that same wealth and power to achieve 
terms of trade that are highly favorable to them. It is self- reinforcing because, in 
ensuring that the ground rules and terms of trade favor them, wealthy and powerful 
states tend to reap the greatest benefit from trade relations, which allows them to 
further enhance their positions of advantage, controlling the agenda for future terms of 
trade.  
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These inequalities sustained, or even increased by the current trade regime, spill 
out far beyond the realm of trade and affect the abilities of poorer and weaker states, to 
ensure resources are available for fulfilment of basic needs of citizens, and present their 
interests effectively in world forums. This situation, can often lead to a situation where 
it is nearly impossible to address the other two categories of issue, extreme poverty and 
externalities. 
 International trade may also contribute to inequalities that exist within 
countries. In developing countries it may take the form of wealth from trade based 
economic development, mostly benefiting an elite group, who mediate the trade 
relationship. This scenario also occurs in wealthy countries, where wealth from trade 
activities tends to benefit an elite group who control large amounts of financial capital. 
The problem being in both cases, that wealth generally equals power in dictatorial 
societies, and often, also in societies understood to be reasonably democratic, so those 
elites benefiting from particular trade arrangements, predictably use the power that 
wealth has brought, to influence governance, and ensure their interests are protected 
and promoted.  
 The problem of negative externalities in the current international trade system, 
seems to cover the widest range of issues, some of which are controversial. An 
externality, in general, is any third-party effect of a market transaction between two 
individuals. Some are positive. Some are negative. If a set of transactions has significant 
positive externalities, a case can be made for the public provision of the commodity or 
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service, since the free market will yield a less-than-optimal supply. (To support creation 
of an environment that supports economic development, society as a whole, will often 
shoulder some of the costs of developing infrastructure of which business can take 
advantage. For example, reliance on private enterprise to construct a road network will 
result in a less-than-optimal situation, since a private company would have to set up a 
costly system to ensure that only paying customers could use the network.)  
Negative externalities are particularly problematic costs inflicted on third-
parties. Environmental costs are an immediate concern, but there are certainly other 
sorts of costs, including social or human rights costs (such as the lost opportunities to 
receive education, experienced by children forced by family economic circumstance into 
child labor,) and even cultural costs, which can often be more difficult to define.  
 There are two reasons why externalities are such a problem in international 
trade. First, because a free market system is competitive, based on the cost at which a 
good or service can be supplied to the market, there is a strong competitive pressure to 
lower costs of production. If a supplier of a good or service, can somehow avoid paying 
some of the production costs, they will increase their ability to compete successfully in 
the market. Thus, there is a very strong incentive to externalize as many costs as 
possible. Secondly, international trade, by definition, involves supplying to international 
markets, markets that are not confined by national borders. In wealthy developed 
countries there are usually laws, which are reasonably effective at limiting the ability of 
suppliers of goods, to compete by externalizing harmful costs onto others. But 
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international law has not, for the most part, developed a realistic capacity to limit the 
externalizing of harmful costs. Because of this, at least two problematic situations arise. 
One, there is the concern that, in an international market, there may be an incentive in 
less developed countries, without well-developed legal protective regulation, for 
suppliers to compete by offloading harmful costs on others. This creates a situation 
where the demand for products at competitive prices, in wealthy developed countries, 
ends up causing harm in other countries, without protective regulation. The second is 
that there is the pressure on industries in countries with developed legal regulation, to 
relocate operations to countries where the externalizing of the costs they incur, is still 
permitted. This may even be to the extent of creating situations, where very wealthy 
corporations are able to influence the regulatory law, in developing countries that 
desperately need economic development. 
16 
CHAPTER ONE 
JUSTICE CONCERNS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
John Rawls: A Theory of Justice 
 John Rawls, a professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, transformed the 
field of political and social philosophy when, in 1971, he published A Theory of Justice. A 
Theory of Justice (ATOJ) brought social justice as a philosophical issue into the 
philosophical mainstream and legitimized distributive justice as an area to be studied 
and debated by political philosophers. It is hard to consider most issues of justice 
philosophically without some reference to Rawls’ work.  
 Rawls suggests that his goal in producing ATOJ is to provide an alternative 
theoretical approach to justice for social institutions and societies from Utilitarianism.1 
Thomas Pogge, in his biography of Rawls, explains that it is possible to think of Rawls’ 
work in ATOJ as an effort to demonstrate that, a worthwhile collective human life is 
possible and that, because it is possible, we can find motivation to work for positive 
change and recognize value in the life we live in the world, as it is currently. 
By modeling a realistic utopia as a final moral goal for our collective life, political 
philosophy can provide an inspiration that can banish the dangers of resignation 
and cynicism and can enhance the value of our lives even today.2 
                                                          
1 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1999), xi-xii. 
 
2 Pogge, Thomas. John Rawls His Life and Theory of Justice (New York: Oxford, 2005), 27. 
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While this seems like a big claim for a book on political philosophy many have people 
found ATOJ to be a strong influence either in a decision to study political philosophy or 
as a motivation to look more closely at questions of social justice. 
 The basic argument of ATOJ is quite simple, but it has several key elements, 
which Rawls spends considerable effort elaborating. Rawls first suggests, “justice is the 
first virtue of social institutions,”3 and explains that, social institutions are a social 
structure occurring within societies. His definition of a society and the function of 
principles of justice within it are a strong basis for understanding the foundation of 
social justice: 
[A]society is a more or less self-sufficient association of persons who in their 
relationships to one another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and 
who for the most part act in accordance with them. Suppose further that these 
rules specify a system of cooperation designed to advance the good of those 
taking part in it. Then although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage, it is typically marked by conflict as well as by an identity of interests. 
There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better 
life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts. 
There is a conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent as to how the 
greater benefits of their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their 
own ends they each prefer a larger share to a lesser share. A set of principles is 
required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine 
this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper 
distributive shares. These principles are the principles of social justice: they 
provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society 
and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of 
social cooperation.4 
 
                                                          
3 Rawls, A Theory, 3. 
 
4 Rawls, A Theory, 4. 
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 The idea that Rawls puts forth in this section is that, the very foundation of social 
justice is the conception that, a society exists because in the aggregate, the benefit of 
coming together as a society is enormous in comparison to many individuals living in 
social isolation. The benefits however are not distributed equally, and realistically no 
individual can be said to have the alternative of opting out of society. Even escaping to 
the wilderness will not free one of the effects of society. Since society in the aggregate, 
produces huge benefits which are not distributed equally, it seems only reasonable, that 
we as a society ensure there is concern for fairness in how the benefits, and burdens of 
society are shared. (Imagine how useful Bill Gates’ or Carlos Slim’s skills would be, 
foraging on their own in the forest. Every tremendously successful individual in our 
society owes their success to the environment and structure of society as well as to their 
own efforts.) 
 Rawls’ definition of a society is important, both the idea that it is “more or less 
self-sufficient” and the idea that members of the society recognize certain rules as 
binding and for the most part act in accordance with them. The “more or less self-
sufficient” part is interesting, in that, Rawls explicitly states that his theory of justice is 
not to be applied to international society or global society. In ATOJ he suggests different 
principles and process might apply to a society of nations,5 and in The Law of Peoples 
(TLOP) he takes the position that justice applied to global society has an entirely 
different character, and he abandons his basic ethical focus in ATOJ on liberal ethical 
                                                          
5 Rawls, A Theory, 331-333. 
19 
individualism in his discussion of a law of peoples.6 The “more or less self-sufficient” 
part becomes extremely problematic if Rawls is aiming his theory at the society of the 
United States because it is hard to argue that it fulfills the requirement for self-
sufficiency, whereas countries that have turned their backs on global society and global 
economic interdependence, seem to be furthest from Rawls’ vision of a just society.  
 Rawls suggests that what justice really applies to is social institutions; of which 
he has a fairly specific definition:  
Now by an institution I shall understand a public system of rules which defines 
offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and 
the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as 
forbidden: and they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when 
violations occur. As examples of institutions, or more generally social practices, 
we may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and systems 
of property.7 
 
 Thomas Pogge, when commenting on Rawls’ definition of institutions suggests it 
is a somewhat particular way of understanding social institutions.8 It differs from the 
way in which social institutions, such as the particular schools or banks of a society, are 
                                                          
6 Rawls’ discussion of “the law of nations” in ATOJ is brief (pp. 331-333)--and done in the context of the 
question of civil disobedience--but it would seem to be possible, in the the Original Position for the Law of 
Nations that the representatives, who are, he explains, individuals, but who do not know their position 
even in their own societies, would choose something very different from a society of sovereign states with 
weak obligations to one another. Since the majority of people in the majority of societies are poor, and a 
very important minority are highly impoverished (40% approximately live under the $2/Day PPP poverty 
line), it seems highly likely that given the opportunity to choose principles of justice, and given the 
moderately high possibility that they would end up very impoverished, the representatives at the 2nd 
Original Position negotiations would choose some type of global difference principal. The idea that the 
negotiators would all gamble that they would end up in the top 10 or 15% wealth and income wise of 
global society and be allowed to keep their unequally large share seems out of step with what Rawls 
suggests is rational for the representatives at the first Original Position. (More on this below.) 
 
7 Rawls, A Theory, 47-48. 
 
8 Pogge, John Rawls, 28. 
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generally conceived. Rawls seems to be getting at the function of these institutions 
rather than particular instances. He is looking at the roles and effects of institutions in 
society and the ways they actually shape the society, and the lives of its members. It 
seems likely that he does this, because he does not want to presuppose a particular set 
of institutions, given that his theory may apply to a property owning democracy or a 
liberal socialist regime.9 The care Rawls takes with his discussion of institutions is worth 
considering in relation to principles of justice in International Trade, for effective 
institutions are crucial in turning principles of justice into just practices in society.10  
Liberalism 
 In ATOJ Rawls considers liberalism, the political understanding that society 
should be structured in such a way as to maximize individual freedom for all its 
members, as the ideal starting place for a just society. Rawls takes the position that 
being free to shape one’s own life in the way that one sees fit, to take advantage of 
opportunities to which the individual feels most attracted, and pursue whichever ends 
one values, with as little limitation as possible, is a very high value. He has been 
criticized on this point, with the suggestion this is a cultural value, which is not universal. 
It seems hard from within,11 to see why it would not be considered valuable or 
desirable.  
                                                          
9 Rawls, A Theory, xv. 
 
10 This is Rawls’ position, but also the argument that I will support throughout the dissertation.  
 
11 I mean from within a socialized vision of what is valuable, possessed by someone raised in North 
American society. 
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Utilitarianism 
 A large part of Rawls’ purpose in ATOJ is to provide an alternative theory of 
justice to utilitarianism that can be applied to the institutions that shape a society. 
Rawls explains that while utilitarianism has had since the beginning of the 19th century, 
some very strong thinkers supporting it, there is something basically wrong with the 
conception, which Rawls (and many others) considers basic to utilitarianism: that it is 
ethically acceptable or correct to sacrifice the interests of a minority in order to create 
an aggregate benefit to the group as a whole. Rawls finds it perfectly acceptable for an 
individual to govern herself in such a way, sacrificing in some interests, for what one 
considers a larger overall benefit, but thinks it is a completely unacceptable manner, in 
which, to govern a society. It doesn’t seem acceptable to Rawls, that the life chances of 
some, should be sacrificed for a benefit, that will only accrue to others.  
Rawls explains his alternative to utilitarianism comes from the contractarian 
tradition of Locke, Rousseau and Kant.12 A contractarian understanding of justice in 
society is based on the idea of a hypothetical (usually) pre-society (a state of nature) 
where all individuals are interacting in an anarchic system, in which there are no 
effective formal organizations to regulate the interactions between individuals. The 
conception of this state of nature was a variable. Hobbes described it as the “war of all 
against all.” Locke considered that much of the time it would be in the interest of 
individuals to more or less respect one another’s rights, but that the individual alone 
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had difficult recourse when it was not the case. All of them felt that at a certain point 
the aggregate of individuals would find it in their interest to come together and agree to 
a structure of governance; basically agree to a set of social institutions and formal 
understandings of how they would operate. Rawls considers that understanding society 
as a group of individuals, that have made a contract to abide by specific rules and social 
structures was the best way to conceptualize his theory of justice. From there he set out 
to explain what the particular principles of justice would be that form the basis of a just 
society.  
Rawls’ Principles of Justice 
 Rawls also utilizes the State of Nature approach of the contractarian tradition in 
how he justifies the choice of the principles of justice he believes ought to be chosen as 
the organizing principles of a just society. His state of nature is hypothetical and, in a 
sense, takes the form of a thought experiment. Rawls calls his state of nature “The 
Original Position.” The main feature of the “Original Position” is that those who we 
imagine as selecting the principles of justice that will govern the society, are doing it 
blind; in the sense that they do not know anything about their society or their position 
within it. They are also blind to their own interests within the society, Rawls places the 
persons who will select the principles of justice in a hypothetical situation where they 
do not know what specific personal interests and attributes they will have, whether they 
will be able bodied and strong or disabled and at the mercy of others, whether they will 
be intelligent and a quick learner or someone who is less intelligent and struggles with 
intellectual tasks. The persons imagined in the original position, do not know if they will 
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come from a strong family background prepared for success, or whether they come 
from a broken home, without many good examples to socialize youth into successful 
choices, there is no knowledge of whether the negotiator will be a religious believer or 
an atheist, or from a particular cultural background or race. Obviously as noted it is 
hypothetical. Rawls named the situation in which the persons in the Original Position 
knew nothing of their own characteristics, or that of their society as “The Veil of 
Ignorance.”  
 Rawls argued that in the Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance free from 
the influence of personal interest, the negotiators would choose out of rational self-
interest principles of justice on which to found their society, giving them the best 
chance at access to a fair share of the goods and opportunities available in their society, 
regardless of what characteristics they might possess as a person, ensuring whatever 
their position within the society turned out to be, they would still have a fair share of 
the benefits of living in the society and not be burdened with an unfair share of the 
costs. 
 Rawls claims that in the end the principles that would be agreed to would be 
something like the following:  
First Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
 
Second Principle 
Social and Economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just 
savings principle, and 
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(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under the conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity.13 
 
 He states and restates these two principals several times, as he develops his 
argument in order to construct what he feels is a solid case, so that when the situation is 
considered thoroughly, these principles would be the rational choice, upon which to 
organize the institutions of a just society. 
 The first principle, known as the Liberty Principle, is a fairly straightforward 
expression of the basic idea of liberalism; each individual should be permitted freedom, 
to act as they see fit, in their own interests, as far as they can do so, without interfering 
with the right to liberty of others. Most commentators accept this principle, expressed 
this way, without much argument. In Rawls’ principle, he is particularly clear about the 
concept of equal liberty, and is very firm in giving equal liberty priority, in his scheme of 
principles. This makes it different than many understandings, and he explains that, he 
does not necessarily include a right to hold all types of property, nor a freedom of 
contract. It is explicitly different from what Rawls terms “Laissez Faire” conceptions of 
basic rights.14 It seems likely, or at least plausible, he does this to keep options open, 
regarding the actual structure of economic system a just society could organize around.  
 The second principle is known as the Difference Principle. The Difference 
Principle, is the principal that is a more radical claim for justice, than is generally 
accepted in wealthy developed democracies. Rawls starts out stating this principle as, 
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14 Rawls, A Theory, 54. 
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Social and Economic inequalities are to be arranged so they are both reasonably 
expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and attached to positions and offices open to 
all. 15 His concern about this first statement, is based on the concern that, while 
everyone would include the least well off, it would be more clear to make it explicit that 
any inequality would need to be focussed on improving the situation of those who 
would end up being least well off, in the resulting deviation from absolute equality.  
 Rawls explains that, it might be the case that effective entrepreneurs, might, in 
some economic organizations of society, create a situation where everyone would be 
better off, and it also could be the case, that they will, because of the need for incentive, 
end up with a larger than equal share of the economic benefits of society. However 
Rawls takes the position that, if there is inequality, according to the Difference Principle, 
the test of whether it could be considered just, would be, if it benefitted most, those 
who received the least share in the resulting unequal distribution. Rawls discusses the 
concern for efficiency in the economy in relation to the Difference Principle, using the 
concept of Pareto Optimality. He takes the position that, economic actions or differing 
distributions could be acceptable, if they increased efficiency, and led to those who 
received the least share getting the greatest benefit from the inequality.16 
 The Just Savings Principle is included in the final statement of the Difference 
Principle, because it calls for intergenerational justice, and limits the common human 
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16 Pareto Optimality is a situation of economic efficiency, where use or distribution of available resources 
is such that no one’s position can be made any better, without worsening the position of someone else. 
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propensity to discount future costs. It requires a distribution of economic benefits to be 
sustainable in the long term, and requires the current generation to manage resources 
in such a way, that they will not make future generations less well off. It is one of quite a 
few examples of Rawls’ understanding and engagement with both classical and neo-
classical economics, and alternative economics, focussed on sustainable practices in 
managing economies. The Just Savings Principle, or something like it, supported by 
effective institutions, would be an effective basis for beginning to address currently 
intractable problems, such as climate change.  
  The Difference Principle contains the caveat, that any social or economic 
inequalities be attached to positions that are open to all. Rawls makes it very clear, that 
this is not in place to solely, promote a meritocratic focus on efficiency. He suggests, it 
may be possible to have situations in which some people are effectively barred from 
some offices, which actually makes it more likely that the most talented persons will 
hold the office. This could end up benefitting everyone with some increase in efficiency, 
however in the interests of justice, the offices should remain open to all, because there 
is a kind of good which inheres to the role and duties of these offices, which must not be 
categorically denied to any member of a just society.  
It is also worth considering, especially in the context of principles of just trade in 
global society, that Rawls argues that, one of the reasons he supports a contractarian 
approach to justice in a society, is because he feels that a utilitarian approach to justice, 
can be understood as being maximization of satisfaction of particular desires. Rawls is 
committed to a liberal understanding of the importance of the individual being free to 
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pursue their own interests, or their own conception of the good, and therefore is 
looking for an approach that separates what is right, from particular understandings of 
the good. He argues that a deontological theory does this. Rawls explains, he 
understands deontological theories, as those that, do not specify any particular good 
independent of the right. He is careful to point out, that he believes that all reasonable 
ethical theories must in a sense be consequentialist, as it would be irrational not to take 
consequences into account.17 This is of particular value in a global context because 
although some states are moderately culturally homogenous, (although not really the 
US,) global society requires a theory of justice that does not specify the individual good.  
How the Principles Apply 
Rawls makes the Liberty Principle prior to the Difference Principle, because, 
although he is concerned for ensuring a level of aggregate social welfare, in the sense of 
ensuring that the needs of all members of the society are satisfied to a level that allows 
the society to function effectively, he is also concerned about the problem he sees with 
utilitarian understandings of justice in society, where it is acceptable that the interests 
or rights of individuals, could trumped, in situations where this was strongly beneficial 
to the majority.18 By making the Liberty Principle prior, Rawls is ensuring that rights of 
individuals will not be sacrificed to increase the general material lifestyle of the society. 
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The principles are conceived of as applying to institutions of society, rather than 
being specifically applied to individuals, and are not meant to designate what any one 
particular person ought to receive, but rather, provide a formal structure for justice in 
the society.  
[T]he essential point is that despite the individualistic features of justice as 
fairness, the two principles of justice are not contingent on existing desires or 
present social  conditions. Thus we are able to derive a conception of a just basic 
structure, and an ideal of the person compatible with it, that can serve as a 
standard for appraising institutions[.]19 
 
Rawls understands the parts of the social structure of a society that apply to 
securing basic liberties, and the parts that apply to social and economic inequalities as 
separate. He deals with the principles serially, first discussing what would be required in 
the sense of institutions to support the Liberty Principle, then discussing the institutions 
necessary to support the Difference Principle.  
Institutions and the Liberty Principle 
Rawls sees the Liberty Principle as leading to a list of basic liberties, that are 
considered valuable, and considers that a society organized under the requirements of 
the Liberty Principle will take the form of a constitutional democracy. The constitution 
would combine the list of basic liberties, with a format for the structures and roles or 
positions necessary to support them. A democracy would be the reasonable choice, to 
permit individuals to pursue to the greatest extent possible, their own conceptions of 
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 Rawls, A Theory, 232. 
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the good. requiring it to be a constitutional democracy, would ensure that, no 
individual’s basic rights would sacrificed, in pursuit of the interests of the majority.  
Institutions and the Difference Principle 
The institutions that Rawls outlines as necessary to support the Difference 
Principle, are more directly relevant to understanding Rawls’ principles of justice in 
relation to trade, and are in some ways more controversial than his conception of 
constitutional democracy. He notes that, his principles of justice can be understood to 
be a part of a doctrine of political economy.20 Rawls very explicitly, explains that, his 
principles of justice can apply across a spectrum of economic systems, from one where 
the means of production is almost exclusively privately owned, to one where the means 
of production is owned, or controlled, almost exclusively, by the society in general.  
Rawls considers several important ideas in relation to the creation of institutions 
to support the principles of justice. He suggests that, the structure and dynamics of 
social interaction, fostered by the economic organization of a society, shapes the 
understanding of what is of value in a society.21 He explains that, economic thinkers 
from a wide variety of perspectives have accepted this. He argues that, because of this, 
the design of the economic institutions of a society must operate in such a way that they 
foster respect for and engagement with the principles of justice. Rawls suggests 
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21 Rawls, A Theory, 229. “How men work together now to satisfy their present desires affects the desires 
they will have later on and the kind of persons they will be.” 
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economic efficiency ought not to be a complete trump on the design of the institutions, 
which must also address political and ethical concerns in the society.22  
Rawls goes to the trouble, of laying out the plan, of the actual regulative 
institutions for the economy of a society, organized according to his principles of justice. 
He suggests four main branches for the economic institutions of a just society: the 
allocation branch, the stabilization branch, the transfer branch and the distribution 
branch.23  
Rawls points out that, the principles of justice relate, to an important extent, to 
the provision of public goods; that is, goods, services or conditions that require the 
pooling of the resources of society to achieve. The concern about public goods for a 
society is that once they have been put in place they benefit everyone regardless of 
whether or not they have contributed to them. This concern is known as the free rider 
effect and is a considerable problem in political economy because it can be very difficult 
to get citizens who are willing to pay for the provision of a public good to do so until 
they are sure arrangements are in place to ensure that others will not be able to shirk 
their responsibility. Rawls explains that the institutions will need coercive power to 
ensure there is confidence within the society that members will not be made worse off 
by contributing to provision of public goods that others make use of without paying 
for.24  
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 The allocation branch is focussed on maintaining fair and competitive market 
conditions, working to avoid over-concentration of market power and to address 
“obvious departures from efficiency caused by the failure of prices to measure 
accurately social benefits and costs” (market externalities).25 In general it would be an 
institution with a largely microeconomic focus, although it would also be addressing 
macroeconomic issues in the case of strategic legislation and policy. It is role is to 
minimize negative externalities.  
This is another area where Rawls expresses concern about the ability of the 
institutions to have sufficient coercive power 
[O]f course, there are the striking cases of public harms, as when industries sully 
and erode the natural environment. These costs are not normally reckoned with 
by the market, so that the commodities produced are sold at much less than 
their marginal social costs. There is a divergence between private and social 
accounting that the market fails to register. One essential task of law and 
government is to institute the necessary corrections.26 
 
 It is interesting how concerned Rawls is about this situation, which has been a 
strong concern in thinking about environmental issues and the economy. At the time 
Rawls was formulating his theory of justice, it was an emerging issue, it has now become 
a standard justice issue in economics and is considered particularly problematic in 
international trade. In this role it is extremely non-controversial, even very orthodox 
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economists working in environmental sustainability such as Pigou and Coase here (also Garret Hardin who 
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26 Rawls, A Theory, 237. This is a very important point in considering international trade, the current 
regime is spectacularly ineffective at achieving this and permits extremely harmful environmental and 
social negative externalities. 
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classical liberal thinkers in economics agree it is unjust to permit the externalization of 
costs or harmful effects onto persons who are not voluntary participants in a 
transaction. Internationally the World Trade Organization (WTO) is responsible to some 
extent for mediating disputes between sovereign states that arise in this area but, as 
will be discussed, later it has weaknesses in both administrative structure and effective 
coercive power making it fall short as an economic institution supporting justice in 
global society. 
 The other role of the allocation branch is to restrict over-concentrations of 
market power, which distort the function of markets. By this Rawls means the operation 
of monopolies, partial or effective monopolies, and cartels. In a sense this is, again, a 
fairly orthodox role. Many countries have or have had legislation which attempts to 
address this situation (with variable success), because these types of market conditions 
are perceived in general as being in the interest of the producer who holds the 
monopoly, but in general against the interests of other actors in the economy and those 
generally of society. There are situations where monopolies are considered useful to 
society, including natural monopolies and in the development of new industries where 
there are very important returns to scale, and Rawls is aware of these (at least of 
natural monopolies). Any scheme of national emissions trading to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions, would likely fall under the purview of the allocation branch. 
The stabilization branch has the macroeconomic focus of working towards full 
employment. Rawls says this should be understood as employment opportunity and 
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choice.27 He also suggests this would include ensuring “the deployment of finance was 
supported by strong effective demand.”28 The concept of full employment as a goal of 
an economic system is worth discussing. Particularly since the second half of the 20th 
century, there has been a belief that full employment in a country’s economy, while a 
nice idea in the sense that no one must suffer the indignity of being unable to find 
employment when they want it, is not entirely desirable. This is because it is conceived 
full employment would tend to lead to high inflation in an economy because of the 
upward pressure placed on wages by competition between employers to secure 
relatively scarce employees. It is easy to understand why Rawls takes the position he 
does, as he is strongly committed to principles of justice which do not permit the 
sacrifice of the interests of a minority of individuals to serve even the greater good of 
society. Maintaining a pool of reserve labor for which as a group (individuals may move 
in and out of it) there will never be satisfactory employment, in order to serve the end 
of economic efficiency, can never be acceptable to Rawls who explicitly commits to 
fairness over efficiency in the economy.29 
The other goal of strong effective demand is very closely related to employment. 
Here it seems Rawls is referencing the concern for the level of wages in the economy or 
possibly more accurately the ratio of returns to labor from production. This position 
likely reflects a belief in the importance of effective demand in flattening out the down-
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sides of business cycles or even economic recessions, which are normally not seen as 
positive from either a social or economic perspective.30 The way in which Keynesian 
demand side policies made a comeback during the 2007/8 economic crisis, after years of 
a supply side focus, lends a certain renewed validation to the inclusion. Joseph Stiglitz, 
ex–Chief Whitehouse Economist and past Chief Economist of the World Bank, makes an 
argument, which is discussed later on, that an important factor in the 2007–2008 global 
crisis was the shrinking share of returns to labor from production in wages and the 
resulting complications of effective demand. In many contemporary states there are 
economic institutions which fulfil some of the roles Rawls is envisioning for this branch. 
Central banks manipulate interest rates and therefore the cost of using capital in order 
to affect relations of economic growth to levels of employment in a variety of ways, 
sometimes not entirely successfully. Most states also have programs supported by 
government that work to train and encourage workers to enter fields which suit the 
opportunities of the current economy and goals for future economic development. 
Internationally it could be argued the World Bank and the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) act in this way to some extent, although their policies have in general shifted 
away from the demand side economic thinking that characterized their creation at the 
Bretton Woods conferences of 1944, to be more in line with a supply side consensus 
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which has largely come to fore since Rawls’ publication of ATOJ (their goals now 
certainly are not full employment nor ensuring effective demand31). 
The transfer branch is designed to ensure the needs of the society are being 
effectively met using the product of the economy; its job is to ensure a certain level of 
well-being for all members. In a sense the focus of the transfer branch is 
microeconomic. 
[G]overnment guarantees a social minimum either by family allowances and 
special payment for sickness and employment, or more systematically by such 
devices as a graded income supplement (a so-called negative income tax).32 
 
The transfer branch according to Rawls has the job of making sure the incomes 
of all members of the society are sufficient to meet needs, but it is different than the 
stabilization branch in this sense. While the stabilization branch focuses on ensuring 
employment and arranging wages from work to put enough money in the hands of 
enough of the population to support a vibrant economy, the transfer branch focuses on 
redistributing the product of the economy to ensure that no member of the society is 
allowed to fall below an agreed upon threshold which permits them to be active 
participants in the society and allows them freedom of opportunity to shift their 
position in society. All wealthy developed countries have institutions with this function, 
only the level of support provided to members of the society through redistribution is, 
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32 Rawls, A Theory, 243. 
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in general, contested.33 For Rawls this would be decided by the function of the 
difference principal and calculations of what level would most benefit the least well off 
when the overall economy is taken into account. At the international level there is really 
no equivalent to Rawls’ transfer branch. The United Nations (UN), starting with a 
General Assembly Resolution in 1970, has attempted to have wealthy developed 
countries transfer 0.7% of their GDP to a fund for financing development in poor 
developing countries. Most wealthy developed countries have made commitments to 
do so, but none of the G8 countries have actually carried through on their 
commitment.34 The UN lacks the coercive power that Rawls suggests is necessary to 
ensure confidence in the compliance of others required of an institution which is 
involved in the provision of public goods.  
The fourth branch is the distribution branch, which is focused on the long term 
concern of distribution of wealth and preventing the development of large entrenched 
inequalities which Rawls argues consistently are obstacles to effective equal political 
liberty and equality of opportunity.35 He claims it is possible to distinguish between two 
major areas in which this branch operates. The first of these is a scheme of inheritance 
taxes and progressive taxes on income, and in some cases limits on property rights.  
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http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htm (July 10, 2014) 
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The purpose of these levies and regulations is not to raise revenue (release 
resources to the government) but gradually and continually to correct the 
distributions of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to 
the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity.36  
 
The second area of responsibility for the distribution branch is the creation and 
management of a taxation regime that will raise the revenue that is required for 
operation of the system of institutions and their policies that have been created to 
support the principals of justice. 
 Social resources must be released to the government so that it can provide for 
the public goods and make transfer payments necessary to satisfy the difference 
principle. This problem belongs to the distribution branch since the burden of 
taxation is to be justly shared and it aims at establishing just arrangements.37 
 
 Rawls suggests a proportional tax on expenditures or income, is likely the best 
method, of raising the revenue required to support the institutions required by the 
principles of justice because it maintains an incentive to be productive, although he is 
careful to mention this is in ideal theory and wouldn’t make even steeply progressive 
taxes unjust in non-ideal institutions.  
 Rawls summarizes the discussion of the distribution tax by making clear that 
inheritance taxes, progressive taxes on income and definitions of private property rights 
are specifically focussed on supporting the Liberty principle through restricting the 
growth of economic inequality to below the point where it would jeopardize political 
equality. On the other hand the proportional tax on expenditure or income is put in 
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place to ensure sufficient resources to support the institutions which uphold the 
Difference Principle.  
 Taxes of the second sort proposed by Rawls, those used to support public goods 
and public institutions of a society are commonplace in most states. How the costs are 
divided among members of society and the extent of provision of public goods as well as 
the particular institutions that ought to be public rather than private is often contested, 
but despite the existence of libertarian arguments condemning any form of taxation, the 
role of states in levying taxes to support agreed upon public goods is non-controversial. 
However, the first function of Rawls’ proposed distribution branch, forms of taxation 
specifically aimed at reducing concentrations of wealth in society are for the most part 
politically unacceptable in most wealthy developed countries. Inheritance taxes exist 
and to some extent have the role of reducing the concentrations of wealth passed 
between generations, but they do not achieve this goal to any great extent, and it is 
unlikely that there will be a discussion of how to make them more effective in this 
respect in the near future, especially because of the power of the interests of 
concentrated wealth in the political system. Internationally there are really no 
institutions which have the function of Rawls’ distributive branch. In some senses this is 
really so much worse for political equality and justice in global society. Public 
institutions which exist at the level of international society are International 
Government Organizations (IGOs) of which the United Nations (UN), the WTO, the IMF 
and the World Bank Group are important examples. They are all institutions that were 
founded with the conception they would provide public goods in global society. They all 
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suffer in one way or another from the problem that there is no effective analog to the 
second part of Rawls’ distribution branch. The IMF and World Bank are directed by the 
states which make the greatest contributions to them, and therefore fairly consistently 
operate in ways that have been categorized as being in the national interest of the 
wealthy developed states that fund them rather than the poorer developing states that 
in general make use of the services they provide. The UN is also funded by states based 
proportionally on their wealth, and faces criticism from its biggest contributors (with 
and without reason) when its organs that are not administrated according to 
proportional contribution fail to act in the national interest of the largest 
contributors.38This weakens the UN, and also is less well administrated in some cases, as 
wealthy powerful states dismiss it rather than work within it. 
Just Savings Principle 
Rawls is concerned about justice between generations, and he addresses it with 
what he calls the Just Savings Principle. Rawls suggests that in some ways obligations of 
justice to future persons are difficult in a contractarian understanding of ethics because 
there is no possibility of reciprocity between generations. It is a problem in 
contemporary society as our legal conception of the rights of individuals functions for 
the most part on the ability of individuals to make a rights claim in defense of their 
interests, or at very least be capable of presenting one’s interests. In the case of future 
generations it is obvious that they will not be able to express those interests. Historically 
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in our society while important attention has often been paid to securing for the long 
term the institutions that support political liberties as they have been achieved, at least 
in effective constitutional democracies, there has been considerably less attention 
focussed on the concern for the economic wellbeing of, and availability of resources for 
future generations. This may be because in general the material lifestyle has improved 
markedly for each generation for the last 250 years or so, and it may have been 
contributed to by a single minded focus on economic growth and expansion of 
economies during that same period. It is difficult to ascertain with certainty the cause.  
 Rawls approaches the concern for justice between generations using his 
conception of the original position with the veil of ignorance. He suggests that even 
though the persons in the Original Position would be contemporaries generationally, 
they would have to negotiate a principle such that, they wish all earlier generations, 
would have followed it.39 They would in effect be obliged to extend the Difference 
Principle to include the advantage of the least well off through subsequent generations. 
Rawls considers that this would likely shift the social minimum in order to ensure 
sufficient savings and capital of various forms to support at least that minimum for the 
next generation.  
[P]ersons in different generations have duties and obligations to one another 
just as contemporaries do. The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is 
bound by the principles that would be chosen in the original position to define 
justice between persons at different moments in time.40 
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 Rawls doesn’t consider specifically the use of resources in his Just Savings 
Principle, or mention at all the concern for environmental degradation imposed on 
future generations in his discussion of the obligations of justice between generations. 
This however has become a larger issue since the publication of ATOJ and Rawls engages 
with it in his later work The Law of People (TLOP). It seems significant and relevant that 
he considers the topic of the obligations of justice between generations in a society in 
the context of the institutions a just society would need to develop. 
In ATOJ it is clear that Rawls is strongly committed to the idea that fair/just 
background conditions are necessary for a fair / just economic system. Rawls in no way 
leaves the design of the institutions which control the background fairness of the society 
up to the vagaries of individual negotiation, but rather suggests the basic parameters of 
the institutions and explains that in actual conduct their effectiveness would be 
appraised according to how well they support his principals of justice.  
The Law of Peoples and Justice in International Trade 
 In The Law of Peoples (TLOP) Rawls tries to develop a plausible, theoretical 
conception of how a global society made up of cooperating societies that all ensured 
basic human rights for all of their citizens could be possible. This concept develops from 
the discussion of the law of nations briefly outlined in ATOJ.41 He uses the concept of 
the Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance to consider principles for the Law of 
Peoples, but he will use it differently than he uses it in the domestic society context of 
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ATOJ . The use of the Original Position is different in two ways that are worth 
considering. The representatives who specify the principles of justice, in the case of 
TLOP are representatives of peoples (which Rawls uses as his main actors in the society 
of peoples) rather than individuals. It is worth noting as well, that in TLOP, individuals 
have only a very minimal role, as the subjects of human rights. The second way in which 
the Original Position as conceived in TLOP is very different than ATOJ, is that while 
within the original position in ATOJ the parties select from among a variety of possible 
principles, in TLOP Rawls chooses 8 principles that are traditional in international law 
and takes the position that the role of the parties in the second original position is to 
accept them.42  
 Rawls continues to consider that justice in society is achieved by ensuring a 
framework of just institutions and policies. He structures interactions in society so that 
they are for, the most part, consistent with justice and ensuring that they will remain so 
in the long term.  
Two main ideas motivate the Law of Peoples. One is that the great evils of 
human history unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of 
liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, not to mention genocide and mass 
murder—follow from political injustice, with its own cruelties and callousness. 
The other main idea, obviously connected with the first, is that, once the gravest 
forms of political injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least decent) 
social policies and establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these 
great evils will eventually disappear.43 
 
                                                          
42 He also suggests that they will develop principles behind cooperative associations/institutions needed 
in the society of peoples, but does not develop those principles extensively.  
 
43Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples ( Cambridge: Belknap, 1999), 6-7. 
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 Rawls suggests many of the causes of injustice in world society require equal 
political participation, religious freedom, political freedom, freedom of conscience and 
equal justice for women to be resolved. It seems somewhat contradictory though that, 
when he actually specifies the set of basic human rights that is supported in the law of 
peoples, it falls far short of this.44 
 Rawls explains in TLOP, he is working out a conception of the foreign policy of a 
reasonably just, liberal people, such as that he outlines principles for in A Theory of 
Justice (or the conceptions he suggests in Political Liberalism). The principles are those 
that, the liberal society, will use to conduct its foreign policy, but are not being proposed 
with the idea they are actually being adopted by all peoples in a just international 
society. They are the rules a society like those he has previously proposed, (such as in 
ATOJ) could adopt in order to conduct itself justly, in the actual, not particularly just, 
world order, as it exists. He explains that, when he considers the point of view of 
peoples, who are not organized as reasonably just liberal societies, he is only doing so in 
order that, we can assure ourselves as liberal peoples, that that the principles would be 
acceptable from a decent non-liberal point of view.45  
                                                          
44 Rawls, The Law, 9. His position on human rights is below, in the section on decent societies. He takes a 
very minimal position on human rights because he is considering it as a basis for intervention in other 
countries’ domestic affairs. I consider it problematic that he acknowledges that a fairly strong set of 
human rights is required to address many issues that he considers important, (he calls them “great evils”) 
but he seems to be willing to sacrifice these in order to minimize obligations to individuals in the 
international order. I think it is a major sacrifice. 
 
45 Rawls, The Law, 9-10. 
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 Rawls outlines five categories of societies, which he calls peoples, that he will 
work with in his Law of Peoples. He starts with the liberal peoples who he uses to derive 
the set of principles he will use. The second category of societies he calls decent 
hierarchical peoples, which he describes as having a decent consultation hierarchy.46 He 
includes liberal and decent hierarchical peoples in what he describes as “well-ordered 
peoples.” He also names, outlaw states, and burdened societies (societies burdened 
with unfavorable conditions). The fifth category of society is described as benevolent 
absolutisms, which Rawls says, honor human rights but members do not participate in 
political decisions.  
 He begins with the social contract conception, of a constitutionally democratic 
society, and extends this conception with the introduction of a second Original Position, 
at what he describes as a second level. In this second Original Position, the 
representatives of liberal peoples make an agreement with other liberal peoples. A 
second, separate agreement is made with non-liberal decent peoples. He explains the 
agreements are hypothetical, and non-historical, and are entered into by peoples who 
are equal, and are positioned equally in the Original Position, behind a Veil of Ignorance. 
Rawls describes his position as being derived from the process suggested by Kant in 
Perpetual Peace. Rawls explains that, it is Kant who suggests that establishing a just and 
effective civil constitution, is not easily possible without first ensuring that international 
                                                          
46 Rawls, The Law, 4. Rawls discusses the idea of decent hierarchical peoples and decent peoples. He holds 
the concept of decent peoples in reserve. The criteria for both types of decent people are discussed in the 
section covering the 3rd Original position. In many cases he uses the term decent peoples to mean both 
decent peoples and decent hierarchical peoples. The use of the term peoples is discussed further on.  
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society will also be governed by law.47 It is important to keep in mind, that when Rawls 
discusses the principles agreed to by persons in the original position, he is always 
considering this as a tool for thinking about what a just policy would look like, not an 
actual negotiated agreement. 
 Rawls describes several conditions that, he argues, make his conception of a Law 
of Peoples a realistic utopia. First he explains that it is realistic, in that, it views peoples 
as they are, and a society of peoples, as it might be, the 2nd original position allows it to 
do this. He claims it is also realistic in the sense that it is workable, and can be applied to 
ongoing cooperative political arrangements. He describes his conception of the Law of 
Peoples as utopian, in the sense that it uses political ideals, principles and concepts to 
specify right and just political and social arrangements for the society of peoples.48 
Why Peoples (Not States)? 
 Rawls explains he chooses the term “peoples” to describe the actors in the 
society of peoples, because states do not fit all the criteria he considers important for 
peoples. Rawls explains there are three basic features that define liberal peoples: a 
reasonably just constitutional democratic government that serves their fundamental 
interests, citizens united by “common sympathies,”49 and a moral nature. He describes 
                                                          
47 Rawls, The Law, 10. Rawls is summarizing Kant’s position “The problem of establishing a perfect civil 
constitution is dependent upon the problem of a law-governed external relation between states and 
cannot be solved without having first solved the latter.” Kant, Immanuel. “Idea for a Universal History 
from a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” 9. PDF from Yale University Press: 
http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/excerpts/kant_perpetual.pdf 
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49 Rawls explains that he gets the concept from Mill, and it is used by Mill to mean what we call 
nationality. Rawls, The Law, 23. 
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these as having, in order, an institutional nature, a cultural nature, and the moral 
nature, coming from a commitment to a political conception of right and justice.50 
 Rawls suggests the “common sympathies” can be problematic. He is aware that, 
many possible societies united under a single government, will not share language, 
history or a common understanding of the political meaning of that history. He feels this 
is necessary as a starting place, and that we will be able to work out political principles 
to deal with the hard cases. He explains, it is possible in a reasonably just polity, to 
satisfy the reasonable, cultural interests of diverse ethnic backgrounds. Rawls sees that 
he has created a conflict but doesn’t feel that it is crucial to his position.51  
 The moral character criteria is important, Rawls explains it means that peoples 
offer fair terms of cooperation to one another, in the same sense as he has detailed for 
domestic societies. People will offer fair terms of cooperation and honor them, when 
they are assured that other peoples will do so as well.  
 It is also important to note that Rawls chooses peoples rather than states 
because he will not accept all the traditional terms of state sovereignty. He wants to 
challenge the right to go to war in pursuit of the self-interested, political ends of the 
state. He very explicitly wants to restrict the states internal sovereignty, meaning he will 
not accept, a state’s right to do as it wills with its own people. Government powers are 
                                                          
50 Rawls, The Law, 23-4. Interestingly Rawls explains that the terms of a reasonably just constitutional 
government include that it not be directed in the interests of large concentrations of private economic 
and corporate power veiled from public knowledge.  
 
51 This might be true, but it seems problematic to start out requiring common sympathies, and have to 
immediately explain that in the majority of cases, this won’t be the case in the way he has defined them. 
This is not a simple area to more or less ignore. 
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to be limited, to those acceptable under a reasonable law of peoples. One of the ways in 
which they are to be limited, is to be defined by human rights. Rawls notes, he is aware 
of the difficulties in interpreting rights in various situations, but he says “their general 
meaning and tendency is clear enough.”52 
 Rawls then explains that the difference between states and peoples, is mostly a 
function of the relationship between the rational, and reasonable in a state’s actions. He 
suggests, if the conception of a state is that of being mostly governed by the rational 
ability to maximize its interests, based on the power to do so, then peoples are very 
unlike states. Rawls explains that, liberal peoples limit their interests by what is 
reasonable (in the sense of being negotiable with others in an environment of fairness) 
and act in accord, with an acceptance of the Law of Peoples. Rawls opens the door, to 
the way in which the concept of state sovereignty can be limited by justice, and makes 
clear that, the Law of Peoples is a liberal, rather than a realist conception of 
international relations. He doesn’t want to debate the historical legitimacy of the realist 
position, as its tenets don’t make sense in a conception of just global society. 
 In the end, Rawls chooses the concept of peoples, to be the actor in his society 
of peoples, for very strong reasons. It is clear he is not taking a fully cosmopolitan 
position on global society, but also apparent, that he is going to limit, or rework some of 
the traditional understandings of state sovereignty. It seems particularly important that, 
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in TLOP. See footnote 4. 
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some of the basis for the legitimacy of the actions of peoples, in the society of peoples, 
derives from their participation in a Law of Peoples.  
Two Original Positions 
 In TLOP, Rawls uses the concept of the Original Position, with the Veil of 
ignorance, three times. The first original position is the original position of ATOJ, where 
representative are members of a single society selecting the organizing principles of 
justice for their society. They choose the same liberal principles, chosen in ATOJ (or 
interpretations discussed in Political Liberalism).53 
There are five essential features of Rawls’ original position: 
1. Models the parties as representing citizens fairly 
2. Models the parties as rational 
3. Models the parties as selecting from among available principles of justice those 
that apply to the appropriate structure, in this case basic structure. 
4. Models parties as making the selections for appropriate reasons 
5. As selecting reasons related to the fundamental interests of citizens as 
reasonable and rational.54 
 
 Rawls suggests the original position possesses these five features because 
behind the veil of ignorance, parties must be rational in order to ensure that their 
interests are maximized as much as possible, and the situation makes them all equal, as 
they do not know their specific interests, and so must negotiate rationally for principles 
that would be fair regardless of the position they end up in. The veil of ignorance 
assures that the principles chosen will be chosen for appropriate reasons, because the 
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parties have no knowledge of their own interests to bias them. Rawls explains that, 
putting citizen’s comprehensive doctrines behind the veil of ignorance ensures that the 
political principles will be those that support reasonable pluralism in the society. 
 In order to find principles of justice that will apply in the society of peoples, 
Rawls uses concept of a 2nd Original Position. Again, it is a model of representation of 
fair conditions, this time though, the parties are representatives of liberal peoples, who 
will specify The Law of Peoples. Rawls notes that, both the parties as representatives, 
and the peoples they represent, are represented fairly as equals. It is important that the 
peoples do not know where they fit in the society of peoples (except that they are 
liberal). And it seems the representatives also do not know where they will fit in within 
the domestic society. They are behind the veil of ignorance, as far as territory, 
population, and relative power of the people they represent. They know that conditions 
are sufficiently favorable among their people to support constitutional democracy, but 
they do not know the extent of their natural resources, or level of development. 
 He explains that, the 2nd Original Position functions in exactly the same way as 
the first original position, in that it suggests terms we would actually accept as fair, for 
specifying the basic terms of cooperation between us and other liberal peoples. It 
satisfies the same 5 essential features as the 1st original position. He explains that in the 
1st original position the veil of ignorance hid the citizens comprehensive conception of 
the good, whereas in the 2nd the representatives know they represent liberal peoples, 
but the comprehensive conception of the good is still absent, because the political 
constitution of a liberal people, must not have a comprehensive conception of the good. 
50 
Rawls explains that, what comes out of this is a respect and recognition for each other 
as peoples, but not necessarily that they will not accept inequalities of certain kinds, in 
the institutions of the society of peoples. Rawls gives the example of the United Nations, 
ideally conceived, as an institution where it could be reasonable to accept a certain level 
of inequality. He explains that these inequalities parallel the inequalities accepted in 
their own societies. In the third criteria of the 1st Original Position, Rawls has the parties 
“selecting from among available principles of justice,”55 whereas in the 2nd Original 
Position, Rawls explains that the parties simply reflect on the advantages of the 
positions he has selected from traditional understanding of international law.56 Rawls 
has the representatives in the 2nd Original Position accept a series of eight principles, as 
the basis of the Law of Peoples: 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are 
to be respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for 
reasons other than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
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56 Rawls, The Law, 41. Rawls discussion of the difference in the actual process of selection of principles between 1st 
and 2nd Original Positions: 
 
A large part of the argument in the original position in the domestic case concerns selecting among the 
various formulations of the two principles of justice (when the view adopted is liberal), and between liberal 
principles and alternatives as the classical, or the average, principle of utilitarianism, and various forms of 
rational intuitionism and moral perfectionism. By contrast, the only alternatives for the parties to pick from 
in the second-level original position are formulations of the Law of Peoples. 
Thus, in the argument in the original position at the second level I consider the merits of only the 
eight principles of the Law of Peoples listed in §4.1. These familiar and largely traditional principles I take 
from the history and usages of international law and practice. The parties are not given a menu of 
alternative principles and ideals from which to select, as they are in Political Liberalism, or in A Theory of 
Justice. Rather, the representatives of well-ordered peoples simply reflect on the advantages of these 
principles of equality among peoples and see no reason to depart from them or to propose alternatives 
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7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable 
conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social 
regime.57 
 
 Rawls takes the position that, in the 2nd Original Position the parties (conceived 
as representatives of liberal peoples) will decide to found three specific organizations. 
Rawls calls these “cooperative organizations,” he likely calls them this to ensure that he 
is not calling for the creation of a world government, but realistically they are social 
structures, created to regulate the behaviour of peoples in the society of peoples. He 
specifically states that, the guidelines for creating them are formulated behind the veil 
of ignorance, to ensure fairness. He suggests one of the institutions would be analogous 
to the United Nations, but because of the concern to avoid both the traditional 
understandings of sovereignty, and traditions of realist state politics inherent in the 
terms states, and nations, he calls it the Confederation of Peoples. The other two 
institutions,58 he explains are analogous to the GATT,59 and the World Bank. He clearly 
and specifically at this point, explains that the trade organization would be “framed to 
ensure fair trade,”60 so it is interesting that in the following paragraph, he defaults to 
free trade as the assumption.  
In the working of organizations and loose confederations of peoples, inequalities 
are designed to serve the many ends that peoples share. In this case the larger 
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58 In this paragraph he calls them organizations, but further up when discussing their scope he uses 
institutions. 
 
59 The original Law of Peoples was presented in 1993, before the WTO, so it is not likely a preference for 
the structure of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) over the WTO.  
60 Rawls, The Law, 42. 
52 
and smaller peoples will be ready to make larger and smaller contributions and 
to accept proportionately larger and smaller returns.61 
 
This is a very different conception of how economic institutions will operate than 
that which Rawls argued for in ATOJ. In ATOJ, Rawls proposed institutions which limited 
the growth of inequality within society, and even worked to ensure that equality (or the 
limits to inequality) would be secured over the long term. In the 2nd Original Position 
model, it seems that institutions will be, very much, like the status quo in international 
society, where wealthy powerful countries run most of the economic institutions, 
arranging policies to benefit themselves, and maintain their positions of power.62 It is 
possible Rawls takes this position, because it is the status quo in the current 
international institutional order, but it is an area where TLOP seems to contradict his 
earlier positions, (such as discussed above in ATOJ) where he structures the institutions 
of society to limit this type of compounding inequality, because he fears its detrimental 
effects on political equality.63 He is still concerned about political equality in TLOP.  
The 3rd Original Position 
 Rawls suggests once a Law of Peoples has been decided upon for liberal peoples, 
a third Original Position will be used to consider, whether the same principles chosen in 
the 2nd Original Position for relations between liberal peoples, can apply to relations 
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62 Rawls holds the position in ATOJ that the institutions of society must work to preserve a basic economic 
equality, to protect political equality and fairness in agreements, as discussed earlier in this chapter. He 
also holds the position in “Basic Structure as Subject,” and Political Liberalism.  
 
63 This seems to be where TLOP falls down for me, it doesn’t make sense to sacrifice justice in the global 
institutional order for national interest (or the interest of peoples). 
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with decent peoples. In the 2nd Original position, he did not include decent hierarchical 
peoples, even though he makes room for them in his scheme of well-ordered peoples. 
His explanation is that, he needed to first derive the principles of the Law of Peoples, 
then to consider under what conditions, and to what extent non-liberal peoples, would 
be tolerated by liberal peoples.64 Rawls left all non-liberal societies out of the 2nd 
Original Position, as he felt there was a concern that, since non-liberal societies do not 
support liberal conceptions of justice for their people, they would not be acceptable in 
the society of peoples, and could be subject to various forms of sanction, with the goal 
of forcing them towards liberalism. Rawls decides that, it would be respectful, and more 
productive than alienating the peoples, to include them in the Society of Peoples if 
possible. He explains that it would be possible to include a non-liberal society, if that 
society conforms to standards of decency in the way it treats its members, and they 
could be considered to be likely to support the principles of the Law of Peoples, which 
were spelled out in the 2nd Original Position.65 He then considers the characteristics of a 
decent society that ought to be tolerated by liberal peoples. 
 Decent peoples as defined by Rawls are non-liberal peoples, in the sense that 
they do not have a society founded on principles of effective political equality for all 
members, or they lack a commitment to organizing society, in such a way, as to ensure 
each individual member is free to pursue their own individual conception of the good as 
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65 Note: Rawls explains this when he is formulating the 2nd Original Position, discusses the principles, then 
goes back to work out what decent people might look like. 
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they see fit, within a context of all others having similar liberty. Simplifying, they are 
societies which are organized around a particular comprehensive conception of the 
good. This comprehensive conception could be religious or secular, Rawls gives the 
example of hypothetical Islamic Kazanistan, but it seems likely that some forms of 
communist societies could fit this category, at least ideally. Rawls calls them “decent 
hierarchical peoples”66 because he describes them as having a “decent consultation 
hierarchy,”67 by which he means that the society is governed by rule of law, dissent is 
permitted, and rulers give respectful reply to dissent, addressing issues of rule of law 
expressed in it.68 He explains that he considers that, there might be other types of 
decent peoples, who would not fit the hierarchical label. In general, Rawls uses the term 
decent peoples to indicate both decent and decent hierarchical peoples.  
 Rawls discusses several other criteria that would make a non-liberal society a 
decent society: The first is that the society is not aggressive in the society of peoples, it 
respects the political and social order of other peoples, and does not advance its 
interests through coercion or force. The second set of criteria is more complex. A decent 
hierarchical people, must have a system of law, which is focussed on the common good 
of the society, and which secures basic human rights for all members of the society. 
Interestingly Rawls requires that it includes a conception of formal equality, that like 
cases be treated equally. He also requires that, a decent hierarchical people’s system of 
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law, be based on the conception, meaning that, all of the society’s members are 
considered persons capable of understanding, and complying with, moral duties, and 
duties of justice in the society. He does not however, ask for legal equality. Rawls also 
requires that for a society to be considered decent, the judges and public officials of that 
society, must sincerely believe, that the system of law is in the interests of the common 
good.69  
 Rawls explains that representatives of decent peoples can be reasonably 
represented in the 3rd Original Position as equal parties, even though their societies may 
not be internally egalitarian, because they can be understood to desire equal standing in 
a society of peoples. He explains that, the representatives of the decent peoples are 
decent and rational (as opposed to reasonable and rational70), and that decent peoples 
would accept the Law of Peoples adopted by their representatives as fair terms of 
political cooperation between peoples. Recall that Rawls uses the term reasonable, in 
the sense of being open to persuasion by the reasons of others, according to a 
conception of justice. He explains, “I think of decency as a normative idea of the same 
kind as reasonableness, though weaker (that is, it covers less than reasonableness 
does).“71 
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Human Rights in The Law of Peoples 
 For Rawls in TLOP, human rights are very minimal, much less extensive than the 
set of human rights established by the UN UDHR72, and even more minimal than those 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,73 (which contains a 
considerably less ambitious, stringent and extensive understanding of human rights 
than the UN UDHR). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at a 
minimum, bans discrimination in the allocation, of the political rights it does offer, on 
the basis of religion, race or gender. Rawls does not do this, and explicitly allows 
discrimination, concerning political and civil liberties, based on gender and religion.74 
Rawls explains that, human rights in the Law of Peoples, are not the same set of rights 
that persons hold in “a reasonable constitutional democratic regime.”75 
Human rights in the Law of Peoples, by contrast, express a special class of urgent 
rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) 
of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide.76  
 
 Rawls argues for this very restricted sense of human rights, as they are related to 
his conception of justified reasons for intervening in a society’s domestic affairs, and 
engaging in war. He calls them a necessary, but not sufficient, standard for the decency 
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of political and social institutions.77 And he explains that, fulfilling this minimal 
conception of human rights, is sufficient to exclude justified intervention by other 
peoples, in the form of diplomatic and economic sanctions or military force.  
 Rawls explains, the criteria for the basic conception of human rights is based on, 
the minimal lowest common threshold of rights, accepted by all liberal and decent 
peoples, and that, these peoples will not tolerate outlaw states, which allow, or cause 
situations falling below the minimal rights criteria. He suggests that human rights, in the 
limited form he conceives of them, are separate in a sense from political institutions, in 
that rather than emanating from a particular institution, they are a standard which 
particular institutions must meet, to be admissible to good standing, in a reasonably just 
society of peoples.78 However, Rawls says they are binding on all societies, and outlaw 
states which violate them, are subject to condemnation, and in very serious cases, 
forceful sanctions.79  
Why Peoples, Not Individuals, in a Second Original Position? 
 Rawls explains that taking up a cosmopolitan position, where all individuals in 
global society were considered to possess the “two moral powers,”80 a capacity for a 
sense of justice, and a capacity for a conception of the good, as the basis of political 
equality in comprehensive liberalism as described by Kant, Mill or in his own Political 
Liberalism, and starting from a global original position, which considers, all persons to 
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have equal basic rights and liberties, would be problematic, and inappropriate in TLOP, 
where his goal is to elaborate a just foreign policy for a liberal society.  
 The key point to consider in this, is that Rawls is not actually arguing for the 
structure of a just society of peoples, but rather what a just foreign policy would be for a 
liberal society, in light of, something like, the actual structure of world society. The point 
is somewhat complex, in that he is using the tool of a society of peoples, to consider 
what would be reasonable for a liberal society to expect of other independent societies. 
This takes into consideration, what is considered just, but is also, framed within the 
idea, that a liberal society could not expect other societies to give up their 
independence lightly, for conceptions of justice they did not necessarily share. Once he 
is confident about standards that would be agreed to by societies a liberal society would 
respect, he can also decide what cannot be tolerated as well. The approach can be 
confusing, because much of the time Rawls seems to be suggesting the basis for realistic 
utopian society of peoples, when he is actually using the society of peoples as a thought 
experiment, or mental tool to think about formulating a reasonably just foreign policy 
for a single society. The difference is subtle, because he does posit what he considers, a 
just basis for the Law of Peoples, but he is doing it in a context that rules out some 
possibilities in considering global justice. Within the parameters he has set out, there is, 
in a sense, less reason to consider that, many people in the world would choose to do 
something other than the status quo.81 
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Rawls Conception of Trade in The Law of Peoples. 
Rawls does not discuss international trade extensively in TLOP, which is 
unfortunate, since it is a powerful concern in any conception of a global society. He 
claims there will be standards for trade, but does not specify anything about them other 
than to suggest he believes a free trade model is in everyone’s long term advantage, 
and that a fair background framework is necessary but gives no principles or even 
suggestions as to what this might look like. 
Consider fair trade: suppose that liberal peoples assume that, when suitably 
regulated by a fair background framework, a free competitive trading scheme is 
to everyone’s mutual advantage, at least in the longer run. A further assumption 
is that the larger nations with wealthier economies will not try to monopolize the 
market, or aspire to form a cartel, or act as an oligopoly. With these 
assumptions, and knowing as before that the veil of ignorance holds, so that no 
people knows whether its economy is large or small, standards can be specified, 
followed, and enforced.) Should these cooperative organizations have unjustified 
distributive effects between peoples, these would have to be corrected and 
taken into account by the duty of assistance[.]82 
 
 Although it is limited, this passage seems to contain some of the most important 
ideas in TLOP, at least in regard to constructing something like, a Rawlsian approach to 
international trade. What is important here seems to be, that the principles which 
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establish the background framework for justice as fairness in international trade, are to 
be worked out in the Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance.  
 Rawls does not go into detail on what would constitute a fair background 
framework for international trade, but it seems sensible to extrapolate a reasonable 
conception that Rawls might have agreed with. Rawls has said categorically, he does not 
feel the Difference Principle he develops in ATOJ, can reasonably be applied in a global 
context, so it is clear he would not consider it to arise in the context of international 
trade. 
  It in ATOJ, Rawls considers it problematic to specifically commit to a particular 
economic model, suggesting the exact details of the institutions would shift depending 
upon the economic model the society was operating on, but that in general, there 
would be a need for effective economic institutions to maintain basic fairness in the 
economy, that would apply regardless of whether, the economy was largely based on a 
free market model, or a model where most of the productive property was publicly 
owned, whereas in the TLOP, he is prepared to claim that a free trade model would be 
in everyone`s interest, in the long term. I find that interesting, and a bit contradictory, 
since in ATOJ, he is very clear that sacrificing a few, for the good of the majority is 
wrong, and that it is important to balance, ensuring a decent social minimum for 
everybody in the present, with ensuring the same in the future. He considers both to be 
quite important.83 When he says free trade is, “to everyone`s mutual advantage at least 
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in the longer run,”84 it seems somewhat problematic. It is not consistent with his earlier 
positions on free exchange and free market economics, and very few people that 
support international free trade, consider that it is to everyone’s advantage. Most 
supporters consider that the aggregate advantage is so great, that it justifies the costs 
for those who will not benefit.  
 In ATOJ Rawls is clear that economic efficiency ought not, always be the highest 
goal in managing an economy, and that social concerns should also have bearing. 
Keynes, who Rawls quotes,85in his discussion of acceptable inequality in an economic 
system, was quite concerned that supporters of free market economic models often 
failed to take into account the concept and possible extent of frictional unemployment 
in their argument for economic efficiency.86  
 It seems reasonable to suppose that, in the selection of a background framework 
for fairness in international trade, in the Original Position behind the Veil of Ignorance, a 
principle, that international trade be in the interests, as much as reasonably possible, of 
reducing absolute poverty in global society would be selected.87Trade practices which 
tended to increase absolute poverty would be strictly unacceptable, and trade with 
peoples that were so impoverished as to fall under the obligations of the duty of 
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assistance would be required to ensure that they resulted in a positive effect on the 
level of impoverishment. This principle seems in accordance with Rawls’ position, that a 
duty to assist impoverished others in global society, requires a clear cut off point, and 
also with his belief that free trade would be in everyone’s long term interest.  
 Another principle that seems to be necessary for the conception of a fair 
background framework is that trade, in general, needs to take into account inequalities 
between the participants. The terms of trade would need to be arranged in such a way, 
as to work towards decreasing the inequalities to the greatest extent possible, while still 
maintaining terms of trade beneficial to both. Terms of trade or trade agreements that 
increased inequalities between parties would be, except in exceptional circumstances, 
unacceptable.  
 While this may appear to be derived from the Difference Principle, it is actually 
based on Rawls’ discussion of trade in TLOP. Rawls explains that inequality in itself is not 
a problem, so long as each society has sufficient resources to provide its members with 
enough to support a well-organized society. The problem is, that Rawls expects the 
regulation of fairness in trade will be managed by cooperative agreements, and 
negotiation between peoples. In TLOP he argues the fair background will ensure wealthy 
powerful societies will not use their power to shift market conditions and terms of trade 
to their advantage, but Rawls also consistently makes the case that extremes of 
inequality impact effective political participation, and make democratic political 
systems, democratic in name only. It seems likely, that in order to preserve free and fair 
trade, the representatives in the Original Position, not knowing their society’s actual 
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wealth and position, will opt for a principle of fairness in trade that helps to preserve 
the long term fairness of trade for all societies. Suggesting this principle may seem 
problematic when it is clear Rawls does not believe peoples in the Original Position 
would choose the Difference Principle, but it actually makes sense in relation to his 
consistent position on inequality in political systems; that beyond a certain point they 
make effective participation in a democratic system highly problematic. As he suggests 
when inequalities of wealth exceed a certain limit, “... political liberty likewise tends to 
lose its value, and representative government to become such in name only.”88 
 I suggest, a principle would be chosen that outlined the concern that, trade 
would not be acceptable, when it placed unacceptable negative costs on those who 
were not consenting participants in the exchange. This would include social and 
environmental costs for others in global society, and would also include costs imposed 
on future members of global society. In this case the principal seems reasonable for 
negotiators in the Original Position, as they would have no knowledge of their societies 
wealth and power to effectively redress wrongs in international situations, but they 
would know they were negotiating principles to apply in international society, where it 
would be difficult to seek redress in courts, making it important to have the principle of 
avoiding harm to others enshrined in the background structure of fair trade.  
It is definitely possible Rawls would have suggested other principles, but these seem 
to support the concern for a fair background structure in international economics. An 
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important difference however, is the role of institutions in international economics, 
compared with Rawls’ discussion of the role of institutions in a just society. Rawls relies 
on institutions to realize procedural justice in society, where the social structures are 
arranged in such a way as to guide the actions and interactions of members of the 
society in line with the principles of justice.  
Without an appropriate scheme of these background institutions the outcome of 
the distributive process will not be just. Background fairness is lacking.89 
 
 Rawls suggests that this is necessary for the institutions to structure the society 
in line with the principles of justice as its members will have differing ends and 
conceptions of the good. He explains that a society where all members had the same 
ends and conceptions of the good would not need effective institutions but it would also 
be in a sense beyond justice. 90 The Society of Peoples cannot be expected to be beyond 
justice in this respect, and is highly likely to need effective institutions in order to 
structure the activities of its members in line with justice (any conception of justice). 
[T]he idea of justice as fairness is to use the notion of pure procedural justice to 
handle the contingencies of particular situations. The social system is to be 
designed so that the resulting distribution is just however things turn out. To 
achieve this end it is necessary to set the social and economic process within the 
surroundings of suitable political and legal institutions.91 
 
Rawls conception of “cooperative organizations” as the institutional structure which 
supports a system of fair and free trade, appears to conflict with his position that, 
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inequalities of participation in supporting these institutions, and inequality of benefits 
received from them would be acceptable in the 2nd Original Position. If Rawls believes a 
fair background framework for trade is important (as he claims it is), it will, according to 
his own explanation of justice as fairness, require institutions that create a fair 
procedural structure for international economic processes and agreements. An 
institution with a structure similar to the current IMF and World Bank, will not achieve 
this, as is apparent from the extensive criticism they receive concerning their activities.92 
Rawls’ concern to protect a conception of the special value of “peoples” or state 
societies ruled by a sovereign government, ends up contradicting his position on the 
importance of institutions in a just society. While defending his conception of basic 
social structure as the subject of justice, he takes the position that without effective 
institutions structuring interactions, it will not be possible to sustain the conditions that 
permit self-interested actors to negotiate free agreements that are reasonably just or 
fair.  
[S]uppose we begin with the initially attractive idea that society should develop 
over time in accordance with free agreements fairly arrived at and fully honored. 
Straightway we need an account of when agreements are free and the social 
circumstances under which they are reached are fair. In addition, while these 
conditions  may be fair at an earlier time, the accumulated results of many 
separate ostensibly fair agreements, together with social and historical 
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contingencies, are likely as time passes to alter institutions and opportunities so 
that the conditions for free and fair agreements no longer hold.93 
 
 It is a serious concern for Rawls’ position, that a fair set of background principals 
for trade, combined with the cooperation of members of international society, will 
ensure a mostly free and fair international trade regime. To remain consistent, he must 
either consider his background framework for fair trade, to amount to a basic structure 
of global society created in support of principles of justice for trade, or consider that 
international trade would not be consistently free and fair at all, under his scheme of a 
society of peoples. If he adopts this second position, then his whole scheme of justice in 
TLOP ends up being invalidated, if unjust international trade regimes and international 
economic institutions are proven to violate basic human rights. 
I think Rawls is making a mistake, relevant to fair international trade, in making the 
representatives in the Original Position, as described in TLOP, representatives of 
Peoples, instead of actual individuals. The concern is, that he ends up creating a 
situation where principles for fair international trade, would be chosen by a single 
representative of the entire society. A single representative, knowing they would likely 
be in the majority, could agree to principles that would permit the interests of a 
minority of members of society, in having access to a decent social minimum, to be 
sacrificed to a perceived utilitarian greater good of the society, or even to the benefit of 
a hierarchical elite. He is very opposed to sacrificing the individual for economic 
efficiency in ATOJ, and it is hard to accept that he is willing to abandon this concern. It is 
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also a problem understanding how, a hierarchical society could be justly represented in 
the original position by a single individual.  
Many commentators have argued the WTO, and trade agreements in general, tend 
to reflect negotiations, which end up producing more benefit for those in positions of 
power.94 The problem with this is that, Rawls’ approach in TLOP is highly unlikely to 
address and provide solutions for the problems, which exist in international trade, or 
work towards international trade becoming the poverty fighting tool it could be, if its 
potential was put to use effectively. 
Thomas Pogge takes the position that, Rawls’ vision of global economic order in 
TLOP, is remarkably similar to the conditions which, exist in the current international 
economic order, where wealthy powerful states use their advantages in information and 
bargaining power, to negotiate agreements, which while freely agreed to, in the end 
consolidate and amplify international inequalities.95 
 On the other hand, David Reidy feels that, Rawls principle of commitment to free 
and fair trade is actually much richer and powerful than it seems at first. He explains: 
Rawls clearly states that well-ordered peoples are to refrain from monopolizing 
markets, forming cartels, acting as oligopolies or otherwise frustrating free and 
fair international or global trade and economic relations.96 
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Reidy takes the position that, Rawls’ limited position on trade, nevertheless sets 
out the important basic conditions for just international trade. He explains that Rawls’ 
description of the fairness rule being worked out behind the veil of ignorance, in the 2nd 
Original Position, should allow Rawls to assume the agreements are fair. This is a 
problematic claim, as the activities of monopolizing markets and acting as oligopolies 
are entirely consistent with the free trade model for international trade, (which Rawls 
specifies). This is actually how enterprises function in free market economies. No large 
corporations ever enter a market, without the idea that they are going to have some 
strategic advantage of information, technology or supply that will help them avoid 
competing in a cutthroat race to the bottom on prices. The free trade model simply 
stops countries from creating a barrier to foreign competition. True, free trade would 
limit a very powerful country’s legal ability to create conditions where a business had a 
legal international monopoly on a specific type of business, but this is really not what 
occurs in international trade, (it is more consistent with mercantilism HBC or East India 
Company or the like). The free trade model is entirely consistent with oligopoly, which is 
very common in the current international trade regime. It would actually be very 
difficult to limit oligopoly, without actual intervention in markets, either domestically, or 
internationally. Claiming that, a free trade model for international trade is related to 
preventing the formation of oligopolies, doesn’t make sense.  
Although Reidy supports Rawls’ conception of international justice in TLOP, he 
ends up taking the position that, there are some concerns with how Rawls approaches 
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international trade. He suggests that although Rawls does not discuss it, the possibility 
of fair trade with what Rawls calls “Burdened Societies” is very problematic.  
Burdened societies are not able to sustain a well-ordered domestic legal and 
political order on their own. Property rights and the rule of law are thus unlikely 
to be secure in burdened societies, rendering problematic informational 
transparency and thus the genuine voluntariness of trade and the presumption 
of mutual advantage in trade with or between them. Further, trade with or 
between burdened societies will likely often involve duress on one or both sides 
as well as radically unequal bargaining positions, since so many burdened 
societies are desperately poor.97 
 
 Reidy explains trade with burdened societies, in general, would fall under the 
“Duty of Assistance,” rather than be considered part of free and fair trade agreements, 
considered by Rawls under international trade. Reidy considers the concern that, even 
between what Rawls describes as “Well ordered Peoples,” there can definitely be 
situations where inequalities in wealth and power in a transaction, can lead to injustice 
in trade. He makes the claim that, “Rawls’s position is simply that mutually 
advantageous trade between well-ordered peoples is presumptively just, and that 
international economic justice requires no more than the long-term preservation of 
such trade relations.”98 
Although Reidy admits injustices can occur, he asserts that, in spite of this, Rawls 
really does not need to articulate a more elaborate position on trade, and Rawls 
presumption that a background agreement to support mutually beneficial free and fair 
trade is a reasonable way to address the issue. 
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Here a charitable reading of Rawls’s position would allow that while great 
economic or material inequalities between well-ordered peoples are not per se 
objectionable, and while the well-orderedness of trading partners is sufficient, 
despite great economic or material inequalities, to generate a presumption that 
trade relations are voluntary and thus mutually advantageous, such inequalities 
may nevertheless prove objectionable in particular transactions. There is nothing 
inconsistent in this position. It is perfectly consistent to hold that very great 
inequalities between peoples (a) do not matter in themselves as a matter of 
global economic justice (assuming that the global social/economic minimum at 
which the duty of assistance is aimed is universally realized), (b) do not 
constitute in themselves a reason to reject the presumption of voluntariness and 
mutual advantage in trade relations between well-ordered peoples, yet (c) may 
still matter a great deal as a matter of transactional justice between particular 
parties in particular contexts for particular reasons.99 
 
In some of his other work Rawls himself critiques the position he takes in TLOP 
on the idea that fair trade in international society is achievable without institutions 
similar to those he feels necessary to support economic fairness in ATOJ. In Political 
Liberalism Rawls clearly takes the position that the type of methodology for regulating 
trade he is promoting in TLOP, as a just way of maintain background fairness in trade, 
will over time lead to a deterioration of the conditions of background justice and the 
promotion of the oligopolistic market power and skewed distribution of the benefits 
accruing to trade he suggests that he wants to avoid even in TLOP. 
[S]uppose we begin with the initially attractive idea that social circumstances 
and people's relationships to one another should develop over time in 
accordance with free agreements fairly arrived at and fully honored. 
Straightaway we need an account of when agreements are free and the social 
circumstances under which they are reached are fair. In addition, while these 
conditions may be fair at an earlier time, the accumulated results of many 
separate and ostensibly fair agreements, together with social trends and 
historical contingencies, are likely in the course of time to alter citizens' 
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relationships and opportunities so that the conditions for free and fair 
agreements no longer hold.100  
 
[T}he tendency... for background justice to be eroded even when individuals act 
fairly: the overall result of separate and independent transactions is away from 
and not toward background justice. We might say: in this case the invisible hand 
guides things in the wrong direction and favors an oligopolistic configuration of 
accumulations that succeeds in maintaining unjustified inequalities and 
restrictions on fair opportunity.101 
 
Rawls also suggests in his work on economic institutions in ATOJ that in order for 
the economic system and market exchange not to follow a tendency to produce unjust 
inequalities particular institutions would need to be constructed in order to counteract 
these forces of inequality.102 
The Law of Peoples and Principles of Just International Trade 
Careful reading of TLOP and consideration of what various commentators have 
made of it, allows a discussion of how to relate Rawls’ conception of justice in 
international society, to the principals I have considered as a basis of a just international 
trade regime. I make the claim above that, if Rawls had actually worked out the 
principles of a fair background structure of international trade in the 2nd Original 
Position, the principals would be quite similar to those I propose.103 I will develop my 
argument for them in relation to positions Rawls takes in TLOP.  
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Commentators have said quite a bit, both positive and negative, about Rawls’ 
“duty of assistance” in TLOP. There seem to be both weaknesses and strengths to his 
approach, and it is a topic worth discussing in relation to international trade. In this 
section I will discuss how Rawls’ conception of justice in international society, fits with 
the principals I suggest for a just international trade regime, and I will attempt to explain 
how the “duty of assistance” fits into the discussion. 
The first principle I suggest for a just international trade regime, is that 
international trade should be regulated in such a way, as to be as effective as possible, 
at reducing absolute poverty in the world. Most of the people who support increasing 
international trade (as opposed to those who support creating barriers to it) claim that, 
it produces economic growth, in the sense of more effectively turning available 
resources into goods and services that people need. It makes sense that, if we can use 
international trade to reduce the number of people suffering from extreme poverty, we 
ought to do so. Obviously, this needs to be well thought out, as trade must benefit all 
participants to be practical, but it seems if there is an economic benefit produced by 
trade, some of it should go to improving the lot of the worst off.  
From the point of view of ATOJ, there is little doubt Rawls would have supported 
this within his conception of justice, however his conception of justice for international 
society, is not nearly as clear on this point. This is where the “duty of assistance” comes 
into play in TLOP. It is listed in the statement of principles of the Law of Peoples as 
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“Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.”104 
The duty of assistance is a general principle that, “well ordered” societies have 
an obligation to assist “burdened” societies, in becoming well ordered societies. The 
assistance could mean a variety of things according to Rawls, including some assistance 
in developing just institutions, but he is concerned about stepping over the bounds of 
respect between peoples.105 Rawls notes that, the duty of assistance may require some 
extent of redistribution, (in the form of development aid, from wealthy peoples to poor 
peoples), in order to support the development of basic institutions and social structures 
that are needed for a well ordered society, but he also says the duty of assistance has a 
cut-off point, at the level at which a society is able to support the institutions and social 
structures of a well ordered society. Rawls is very clear about the cut-off point, and 
suggests that poverty or wealth beyond a basic level, has little to do with whether a 
society should be considered well ordered or not.106 On this interpretation, Rawls would 
likely be in favor of a principle of trade, focussed on alleviating severe absolute poverty. 
However Rawls is also very clear, it is not the responsibility of well ordered societies to 
compensate burdened or disordered societies for the results of their own poor 
decisions, either currently or historically.  
I believe that the causes of wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their 
political culture and in the religious, philosophical and moral traditions that 
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support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in 
the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by 
their political virtues.107 
 
Rawls takes the position that, a large part of the economic success or failure of a 
society is based on domestic social and political structures and attitudes, and that, other 
societies ought not to be forced to give up the benefits accruing to them through their 
own industriousness and positive political culture, to support societies which have 
chosen different less successful paths. Basically Rawls’ position is that countries in 
serious poverty or experiencing serious economic problems generally have brought it 
upon themselves through the structure and character of the society. This seems very 
much like what Thomas Pogge calls “explanatory nationalism,” in World Poverty and 
Human Rights, which he describes as a strategy used to justify ignoring the impact of 
serious poverty in other countries. Pogge specifically addresses this claim made in 
Rawls’ TLOP, and he describes Rawls’ position as the “Purely Domestic Poverty 
Thesis.”108 Rawls also takes the position that, although national borders might be 
considered to be of arbitrary historical origin, this does not take away from their 
importance in contemporary international society, where they take on a crucial role of 
denoting which resources and land belong to which states. Rawls explains, this makes 
resources explicitly, the property of one state, and assigns responsibility for its use, 
protection, and maintenance to that state. Rawls makes a tragedy of the commons 
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argument that, if it were not for the role of borders in assigning resources as assets to 
particular peoples, the resource assets would deteriorate.109 It also ensures clear 
responsibility for the consequences, when mismanagement occurs.  
Rawls would likely disagree with solutions to make trade work to reduce 
poverty, that are like Stiglitz’s market openness principle, 110 which suggests an effective 
way to make trade work in the interests of developing countries, would be to have all 
countries open their markets, generally, to countries with GDPs smaller than their own. 
Rawls might consider this too open ended, for his duty of assistance in TLOP, as it has no 
cut-off point. It is also likely, that in light of his concern, that well-ordered societies 
ought not be forced to pay for the mistakes of burdened societies, and his concern for 
the promotion of good institutions and policies, rather than redistribution, that he 
would want to make a principle such as Stiglitz’s, contingent on adoption of particular 
policies and institutional structures. Rawls might accept that trade ought to be 
regulated to benefit countries generally in serious need, but likely he would not want to 
accept this as a general principle, as it conflicts with his belief, that societies are in 
general responsible for their own situation, and his desire to avoid imposing on well-
ordered societies, the general duty, to make up for the bad decisions of burdened 
societies. He could probably reconcile a cut-off point in the duty of assistance, with a 
principle of justice in trade focussed on reduction of severe poverty.  
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The second principle I propose, is that international trade would be just only 
when it either worked actively to limit inequality, both between states and within 
countries, or at very least, was conducted in such a way as to avoid increasing 
inequality. On this issue Rawls comments:  
Equality among Peoples. There are two views about this. One holds that equality 
is just, or a good in itself. The Law of Peoples on the other hand, holds that 
inequalities are not always unjust, and that when they are, it is because of their 
unjust effects on the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, and on relations 
among peoples and between their members.111 
 
Rawls notes three reasons why one might be concerned about inequality. One is 
a concern for alleviating the sufferings of the poor. But Rawls maintains here that 
equality is not important, that, what matters are consequences. If all members have 
sufficient resources to participate effectively in the society, there is no need to be 
concerned about inequality. Rawls explains that in the society of peoples, the duty of 
assistance only applies until a society is capable of forming liberal or decent governing 
institutions, and after that point there is no need to be concerned about inequality. 
The second reason, regards feelings of inferiority or stigmatization, the poor may 
feel in relation to other members of society. Rawls suggests that, here it is important to 
avoid conventions that establish ranks or social deference based on wealth within a 
domestic society, but within the society of peoples, this is not a good reason to focus on 
inequalities, since feeling of inferiority and stigmatization derive overwhelmingly from 
comparisons with one’s compatriots, not with those of other societies. 
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The final reason concerns fairness in political processes. Rawls is concerned that, 
inequality may affect the ability to effectively participate in political processes. He 
argues that public financing of elections is useful in addressing this, but also that 
equality of opportunity in a domestic economy, must be more than simple legal 
equality. And also that fairness in educational opportunities, and consideration of 
background situations is needed. In the society of peoples, Rawls suggests that fairness 
is built into the peoples being represented equally in the second original position, 
behind the veil of ignorance.112 “Basic fairness among peoples is given by their being 
represented equally in the second original position with its veil of ignorance.”113 
In TLOP Rawls accepts that inequalities can lead to issues of justice, but his 
concern is much greater in ATOJ. In TLOP Rawls addresses this in two ways. First he says 
that to a large extent basic fairness is settled, because it would be covered in the second 
original position, and second, he takes the position that inequality is not particularly 
important for fairness, at the level of international society, because to some extent 
inequalities support the different ends that societies might have. In the first case, the 
claim that the second original position takes care of most of the concerns for inequality, 
seems inconsistent with his position in ATOJ, where equality emerges as an important 
guiding principle of justice, and Rawls explicitly explains how a society would need to 
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design institutions that continually functioned to support it.114 In relation to the second 
claim, that inequalities reflect the different ends of societies, he seems to ignore quite a 
lot of evidence that inequality reinforces inequality, in the politics of negotiating the 
relations between states in international society.  
Rawls may have good reasons for not pushing for economic distributive equality 
at the international level. It is fair to argue that, Rawls is aware of arguments from the 
point of view of sustainable environmental practice, that bringing the global population 
up to a level of material lifestyle similar to developed western countries, would be an 
environmental disaster, and likely is not even possible.115 If this is his argument though, 
rather than just throwing out equality, an argument could be made that, it would be 
more reasonable to outline a scheme where sustainable development could be part of a 
just conception of international society.  
Rawls’ position that inequality is only important when it impacts fairness, seems 
to be a very reasonable position in many ways. However, it is not clear Rawls proves the 
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inequalities in international society he accepts, will not lead, as many others claim, to 
considerable unfairness and unjust conditions in international society.116 
It is clear Rawls would not, in general, consider that a principal for regulation of 
international trade ought to concern itself with intra-state inequalities, or inequalities 
within the societies that make up the larger society of peoples. Rawls makes it quite 
clear that, his conception of justice within TLOP is for justice between societies, and that 
it would not take individuals into consideration, in the international context.  
The third principle I suggested for a just international trade regime, is that trade 
ought to be regulated in such a way, that the ability to compete unfairly in trade 
through negative externalities is limited, that is, to restrict as effectively as possible, the 
ability of producers to use differing international standards and enforcement, to avoid 
paying, or to download social, environmental and economic costs of the production 
process, on those not party to the transaction. Although Rawls addresses this concern 
directly in ATOJ, and suggests a specific institution would need to be created to address 
it, in TLOP Rawls addresses this concern much less directly, than the first two principles, 
on which he makes considerable applicable commentary. Negative externalities are an 
important source of injustice in international trade, because international law and 
international institutions, as they stand, are not sufficient to address them. They are a 
problem, because of fragmented nature of regulation, and control of labor laws, 
environmental degradation, and pollution controls, as well as variations in property, 
                                                          
116 In this paper see below: Singer, Pogge, Stiglitz. 
80 
contract and tax law between countries. Treaties address these issues, and function to 
some extent, but a restructured international institutional approach, of some kind, is 
probably necessary to address them.  
Rawls is aware of both environmental issues, and issues around international 
institutions, but it seems like there is not enough in TLOP, to interpret Rawls’ position on 
this. He specifically explains there is a responsibility to future generations not to deplete 
required resources or cause harmful environmental degradation, however he does not 
address the concern directly in the TLOP. 117 
In many cases, social costs of negative externalities might be considered by 
Rawls, to fall outside the purview of the law of peoples, in the sense that, it is not 
concerned with the internal domestic structure of societies beyond basic obligations of 
human rights. This would mean that, domestic social conditions would not be relevant 
to international trade concerns; very similar in a way to the product versus process 
distinction has been applied within the WTO.118 This could be a particular problem, in 
the relation between well-ordered states and burdened states, or other states without 
well ordered, or decent, domestic arrangements. The Law of Peoples covering 
interaction in the society of peoples, really doesn’t cover trade interactions with 
societies that fall outside of the society of peoples. David Reidy, who generally defends 
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Rawls’ position on international justice, suggests that under Rawls’ conception trade 
relations with and between burdened societies would be a concern.119 
 Reidy claims that trade relations between well-ordered societies and burdened 
societies would be something well-ordered societies would be obligated to address in a 
fair way because the duty of assistance would apply, but TLOP rejects nearly all ethical 
individualism. The domestic order beyond human rights is beyond the realm of the Law 
of Peoples, so many types of negative externalities occurring within domestic societies, 
would not seem to create obligations under the Law of Peoples (although some would 
as human rights concerns). In general there is a duty of non- intervention.120 It would 
have been interesting to ask the question to Rawls, who notes that, certain types of 
institutions would need to be developed to support human rights, as well as to support 
treaties and agreements, but is non-specific about them in TLOP.  
Rawls suggests that, fair background structures for trade would be developed in 
the Original position in TLOP, and it is reasonable to consider that with the extent of 
concern for the subject in ATOJ, a concern for restricting negative externalities in 
international trade would be part of that fair background structure. 
His focus on group or collective rights of peoples, and complete dismissal of 
ethical individualism in TLOP, creates a situation where, from Rawls perspective, it 
would seem many of the concerns for justice in international trade that are most 
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discussed in normative literature on trade and globalization, would be concerns which 
apply only within domestic societies. Rawls dismissal of ethical individualism in the 
context of justice in international relations, puts him in a very different category than 
both Thomas Pogge and Peter Singer. 
The differences between, the position that Rawls takes on justice, in his 
influential ATOJ and the position he takes in TLOP, are extensive, and the reaction of 
many who are familiar with both, suggests, there are enough problems with the 
differences to make TLOP unsatisfactory in many ways. This makes it worthwhile to 
consider, what can be drawn from ATOJ in relation to justice in international trade, even 
though Rawls explained that, ATOJ was meant to apply only within a domestic society. 
In ATOJ Rawls has a strong focus on equality; both of the basic principles he 
defends are based upon it. In ATOJ equality is not simply valued for itself. Rawls argues 
there, that equality is important, because it promotes a society where everyone has the 
opportunity to pursue their conception of what is valuable in human life, to the fullest 
extent of their potential. Basically, the idea that, equality supports fairness in a society, 
and that in a situation where we don’t know everybody’s individual conception of the 
good, fairness and the ability to pursue ones ends, are a reasonable approach to a just 
society.  
In ATOJ Rawls seems to be defending a conception of justice that would be 
compatible with both the unrestricted free trade model for international trade, as well 
as protectionist models of trade, in this regard his main concern would be, that trade 
was regulated by institutions, which function to support principles of justice in society. 
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There doesn’t seem to be an obvious argument for why the reasoning behind the 
conception of justice, and how it applies to economic institutions in ATOJ, would not 
also apply to international society, particularly as we see, that in many ways, it is hard to 
understand any one country, as an isolated entity, functioning independently, outside of 
the economic (and social) interdependence of contemporary international society. 
Rawls claims the theory from ATOJ does not apply to global society, but it is hard to see 
a reasonable and convincing argument for excluding ethical individualism completely, 
from a highly interdependent society where individual people carry on relations, and 
create obligations across international boundaries, outside of the structure of the nation 
state. It is a tough argument, that the only way individuals have moral standing in global 
society, is as citizens of states, and it is hard to see how Rawls can argue in one case that 
the accident of your social position at birth should, in a just society, have no bearing on 
your chances for success in life, and then take the position that, individuals have no 
moral standing in international society. Although Rawls didn’t agree, it seems that much 
of the work done by Rawls in ATOJ, around the role that institutions need to take on in a 
just economic system, can be applied quite reasonably to international trade. 
Charles Beitz and Iris Young: Building from Rawls 
Charles Beitz: A Critique of Traditional Models of Obligations of Justice in  
International Relations 
 Charles Beitz wrote Political Theory and International Relations as a proposal for 
a normative approach to political theory in international relations. Beitz supports the 
conception that the principles of justice, and much of their application in developing 
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institutions that structure society, in a way that supports just interactions between its 
members, which were developed by Rawls in A Theory of Justice, reasonably, ought to 
be applied to global society. In Political Theory and International Relations, he argues for 
this, suggesting many aspects of global society to which it would apply. I think there are 
several lines of argument specifically worth considering, in relation to the question of 
whether or not principles from ATOJ, can be appropriately applied to international 
trade. 
 Beitz lays out two of the traditional positions for understanding the role of 
justice and morality in international relations. The first of these, moral skepticism, is the 
position that international relations is an area where justice or morality, as such, doesn’t 
really hold. This position, associated with international relations realism, has been an 
influential position historically, and continues to have a strong influence on the foreign 
policy of many states in the 21st century. An important feature of the realist position of 
moral skepticism, is the conception that global society is analogous to a Hobbesian state 
of nature. In the analogy, states are considered analogous to the individual persons in 
the Hobbesian state of nature, each possessing unlimited liberty, to act in their own 
interest to the extent of their capability to do so; the sovereignty of states being 
analogous to individual freedom. Hobbes described this position as “The war of all 
against all”, in which concerns of morality or justice are irrelevant entirely.121 Moral 
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Skeptics see justice and morality, as irrelevant to international relations, because of the 
anarchic nature of global society. 
 Beitz explains that the second position is based on modern natural law theory, 
and holds that morality and justice are appropriate in international relations, but it is a 
moral system where states are considered to be, both the agents and subjects of 
morality, and the obligations of justice are held to be much weaker than those that exist 
within states. Beitz calls this position a “Morality of States” conception of international 
affairs, which understands global society as anarchic, but still recognizes an obligation to 
respect the basic rights of others, although the obligation is weakened considerably by 
the nature of the society. This is a form of international relations liberalism; Beitz 
describes Rawls’ position in international relations as social liberalism.  
 Beitz argues for an alternative to both of these, one that would see the 
obligations of justice and conception of morality at the level of global society, as being 
similar to what Rawls argues in favor of in ATOJ. His argument for this alternative is 
based on a rejection of the arguments for both realist moral skepticism, and more 
importantly, the morality of states, in global society.  
 He begins his argument with realist moral skepticism, although some of the 
arguments also apply to morality of states. Beitz claims that the analogy of global 
society as a Hobbesian state of nature, where each state can be conceived as a person 
with an unlimited liberty to act in their own interest, is wrong in several senses.122 
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Firstly, states are not the only actors in global society. A wide variety of actors including, 
IGOS (International Government Organizations), INGOS (International Non-Government 
Organizations), transnational corporations, and even individuals, all interact in global 
society. Secondly the power or strength of actors in global society is radically unequal, 
unlike the Hobbesian state, where none can dominate the rest effectively. The states in 
international society are also unlike Hobbesian individuals, in the sense that, in many 
ways, they are not self-sufficient, but are in fact, highly interdependent economically, 
and for security. Beitz also makes the claim that in the Hobbesian state of nature, 
individuals are not able to rely on reciprocal cooperation, as there is no authority to 
ensure compliance, but in global society, states regularly and reliably cooperate in 
shared projects, and that, non-compliance is the exception, rather than the norm. 
 Beitz explains that in Hobbes’ state of nature individual persons are, in a sense, 
subject to natural law, but because reciprocal enforcement does not exist, the only 
natural law that individuals are bound to follow, is not to do anything that would 
jeopardize their ability to preserve their own life. This is understood as, a right of states 
(in realist conceptions of international relations,) to act in national self-interest, or 
national survival. Beitz considers this understanding flawed, as even the survival, of a 
state, is a categorically different thing than survival of individual persons. His position is 
that, the cultural or economic interests of a state, ought to have a different moral 
weight for the leaders of states, than the lives of persons. In situations where the 
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leaders must act to protect the lives of individuals, different moral principles are 
involved, than situations where national economic or cultural interest, is at stake.123 
 Beitz then, wants to address the morality of states position, that there are 
obligations of justice, that exist at the level of global society but, because of the 
different nature of global society, the principles of justice that apply would be thinner 
and weaker, than that of a state unified under a constitution. He explains that, this is the 
position Rawls holds, and that, he wants to use some of the arguments Rawls gives to 
support justice within a society, to illustrate the problems of drawing a categorical 
distinction, between societies within a state and global society. He points out, that 
Rawls assumes for the sake of his theory, that states are mostly self-contained. Justice 
governs the relations within states, because states are conceived as a cooperative 
venture, where members consent to participate in order to benefit from the 
cooperation. Principles of justice regulate the cooperative venture, so the distributions 
of the benefits of cooperation are shared fairly. Beitz says, this assumption of self-
sufficiency is problematic for Rawls’ position, in the sense that, if states interacted in 
cooperative enterprise, by definition, justice would be appropriate in governing the 
distribution of the benefits of the cooperation. Beitz makes the claim that in many ways 
Rawls’ description of states as being mostly self-sufficient, seems not to fit well the 
actual situation of international relations, and that if we take Rawls’ argument about 
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how obligations of justice are created in society seriously, we need to reconsider the 
limits of justice.124 
 Beitz argues that, there is a high level of economic interdependence in global 
society, and that, it is tending to increase over time. He argues that, international 
economic cooperation, and interdependence, create aggregate benefits, in the same 
manner that Rawls uses to support his argument for principles of justice in ATOJ, but in 
the absence of social structures and institutions which promote fairness, the results can 
be unjust.  
The main features of contemporary economic interdependence relevant to 
questions of justice are the results of the growth of international investment and 
trade. Capital surpluses are not confined to reinvestment in the societies where 
they are produced, but instead are reinvested wherever conditions promise the 
highest yield without unacceptable risks.125 
 
There are several reasons for thinking that interdependence widens the income 
gap between rich and poor countries even though it produces absolute gains for 
almost all of them. Because states have different factor endowments and varying 
access to technology, even “free” trade can lead to increasing international 
distributive inequalities (and, on some views, to absolute as relative declines in 
the well-being of the poorest classes) in the absence of continuing transfers to 
those least advantaged by international trade.126 
 
 Beitz notes, there is still considerable controversy, about exactly how the 
benefits and costs of international economic interdependence are divided, but he claims 
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that it is beyond dispute, that there are both benefits and costs, and therefore the social 
cooperation that creates them entails an obligation for justice in their distribution, in 
the same way as those support Rawls’ argument accept obligations justice in a domestic 
society. He goes on to suggest that a “just” domestic society, that ignored possible 
obligations to less well-off peoples, could in some senses, justify ignoring obligations to 
less well-off peoples, in order to create a more just domestic society, if they were 
economically self-sufficient, but if some part of their wealth resulted from a relationship 
with that less well-off society, principles of justice that are limited to a domestic society, 
fail to make sense, and could even be considered exploitative. 
International interdependence involves a complex and substantial pattern of 
social interaction, which produces benefits and burdens that would not exist if 
national economies were autarkic. In view of these considerations, Rawls’s 
passing concern for the law of nations seems to miss the point of international 
justice altogether. In an interdependent world confining principles of social 
justice to domestic societies has the effect of taxing poor nations so that others 
may benefit from living in “just” regimes.127 
 
 Beitz considers that, there is no basic difference in the social cooperation, 
between the domestic society within a state and global society, that would reasonably 
justify ignoring the obligations of justice, created by economic interdependence, 
between states. He quotes from ATOJ128 to support his contention that, Rawls argues 
for, the establishment of institutions to support justice in a society, and makes the claim 
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that, there is an obligation for individuals, to work towards establishing institutions to 
support justice, in societies where they don’t exist. 
 Beitz takes the position that, the method and principles of ATOJ, make sense in 
considering justice in global society. He suggests an expansion of the Original Position, 
rather than a second one as Rawls outlines in TLOP. He considers that, this would readily 
be accomplished by extending the Veil of Ignorance, to include ignorance of citizenship 
or nationality, in an interdependent society.129 Beitz feels that, a global difference 
principle would make sense, as a result of the deliberations in this situation. Individual 
persons in the Original Position, would be aware that, there would be winners and 
losers in global economic interactions, and would want to be sure, that if they ended up 
among the least advantaged, which in global society is a fairly high proportion, their 
lives would be as good as possible. He suggests many of the advantages and 
disadvantages of wealth and economic success in global society, can be understood to 
be arbitrary.130 (This is very different than Rawls’ position that most of the success and 
failure in international society is a result of a society’s good or bad choices.) 
The parties would view the distribution of natural resources much as Rawls says 
the parties to the domestic original-position deliberations view the distribution 
of natural talents. In that context he says that natural endowments are, “neither 
just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that men are born into society at any particular 
position. These are simply natural facts. What is just or unjust is the way that 
institutions deal with these facts.131 
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 Beitz suggests the argument for a “global difference principle,” ought not to be 
based so much on the extent of interaction, as instead, above a threshold where it 
becomes an important economic factor, it should be based on the non-voluntary nature 
of the economic integration. In this sense, a situation is implied, where a particular 
trade relationship is conducted on unfavorable terms, which create economic hardship 
for one of the participants, but the alternative of not participating is worse. Thomas 
Pogge supports this point in World Poverty and Human Rights,132 when he suggests 
defenses of the WTO based on the argument that developing countries are better off 
with it than they would be without, are problematic because, for while this may be true 
prima facie, developing countries could have been much better off, with a different 
WTO regime. Another way of thinking about this sense of involuntariness is to consider 
the states that have turned their backs on international economic integration. It is hard 
to argue that autarky has been a great choice, for countries suggested by Beitz such as 
Cambodia or Albania or others such as North Korea.133 
 A strength of Beitz’s argument is that he is not arguing any particular existing 
distribution is unjust, but that the cooperative social activity of international trade, is 
the type of cooperative activity in human society, that ought to be subject to principles 
of justice.  
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 Beitz then critiques the morality of states position, that in global considerations 
of justice, the state is both the only appropriate agent, and the only appropriate subject 
of normative concerns. He considers that, it doesn’t make sense to take states, as the 
basis of a global difference principle, for it is highly unlikely, that the entire population 
of a state will be identical with the particular persons receiving the most benefit, or 
suffering the highest costs of an economic relationship. This is easily noted in actual 
practice, as in many cases international trade, or international capital flows benefit 
some members of a society immensely, while negatively impacting other sections. The 
situation appears to hold, more or less, equally true, for both wealthy developed 
countries, and poorer developing countries.  
It is important to be clear who are the subjects of a global difference principle, 
especially because it has been questioned whether such a principle should apply 
to states rather than persons. It seems obvious that an international difference 
principal applies to persons in the sense that it is the globally least advantaged 
representative person (or group of persons) whose advantage is to be 
maximized....[T]here is no a priori reason to think that the membership of this 
group will be coextensive with that of any existing state.134 
 
 Beitz explains that, a global difference principle would not, necessarily, require 
transfers from rich to poor countries; although some sort of inter-country redistribution 
would be likely, there would also need to be a focus on intra-state inequalities, and 
redistribution. Beitz explains that, any international obligation of states would be 
derivative of obligations acquired by persons participating in global society.135  
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 In the afterword to the 1999 edition of Political Theory and International 
Relations, Beitz explains that he understands the argument that there is a particular 
value in the ability of a self-governing community of persons, to live under institutions 
they create, in a society structured according to the values they embrace. This is an 
argument that Rawls accepts in TLPO, when he is defending his position, that justice in 
global society, must necessarily reject the individual focus of the conception of justice in 
ATOJ, and consider Peoples to be relevant focus of justice in global society. Beitz 
discusses Michael Walzer’s communitarian opposition to the violation of sovereignty, 
involved in any interference with the domestic order of a society. He critiques the 
position taken by Walzer, that benevolent intervention in the domestic affairs of a 
political community in the interests of addressing a perceived injustice in the society 
may be wrong or unjust, in cases where it ignores a consensus of members of that 
community, that the institutions and political structure, are a fit with the values and 
traditions of the society. Beitz accepts that there are cases where this is a concern, and 
that political communities that are organized justly, according to an actual consensus of 
their citizens, would have a very strong right to non-interference in their domestic 
affairs. However, he explains the actual number of situations, where there was a 
reasonable case for intervention, in a political community with a population in 
consensus that, its institutions were just, would be extremely small.136 For purposes of 
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justice in global society, it would likely make more sense to recognize, and work with 
exceptions, than to abandon the individual completely, as an agent or subject of justice. 
 Beitz suggests that, if needed, some sort of redistribution in international 
society, could be achieved fairly reasonably, through eliminating tariffs, and non-tariff 
barriers to trade for poor-country products, as well as creating a system of special 
drawing rights from the IMF for very impoverished countries. He feels these would be 
more effective mechanisms of redistribution, than relying on direct transfers between 
states.137 Almost all arguments in favor of free trade, are based on the idea that trade 
produces a net benefit over not engaging in trade, be it through comparative advantage, 
absolute advantage or simply the relative efficiency of market mechanisms. If 
international trade is a positive sum game, which all its supporters (excepting the 
mercantilists) make the case that it is, then it would seem to be reasonable to argue 
that the net gains ought to be divided, at least somewhat fairly, between the 
participants. On the other hand, if trade, or particular types of trade, are in fact zero 
sum games, where some of the participants use various types of power, to induce the 
others to participate in a scheme which simply redistributes the inputs, in a way that 
favors themselves, then a just institution of trade, would attempt to eliminate this sort 
of activity. 
 It is important to bear in mind that, Beitz is not taking the position, that the state 
is irrelevant to justice, but rather the scope of the state is smaller than the scope of 
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human social cooperative projects, which make individuals who are involved in them 
better or worse off, and generate obligations of justice. The state continues to be of 
importance, but is no longer the trump interest in international relations.  
Iris Young and a Social Connection Model 
 Iris Young makes a case for a model of justice in global society that, she argues, 
responds to difficulties she perceives, in both the utilitarian model, and what she calls a 
contractarian model, for justice in global society. She explains that Rawls’ conception of 
justice in global society, that he develops in TLOP, is an example of the contractarian 
model, but she also discusses David Miller, who also has a conception of justice in global 
society, that is similar to Rawls, in the sense of differentiating between the obligations 
of justice within a state ,and those of global society.138 She uses Singer (discussed in the 
next chapter) and Peter Unger, as her examples of Utilitarian models. 
 Young’s position on justice in global society, is what she describes as, a “social 
connection model of responsibility,” where moral obligations stem from shared 
involvement in social processes. 
The social connection model of responsibility says that all agents who contribute 
by their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice have 
responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices.139  
 
 Young begins by briefly examining the contractarian and utilitarian models, and 
explaining their basic features. She explains that, both David Miller and John Rawls 
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consider that, the scope of obligations of justice is based on membership in a political 
community. Young explains that, Miller particularly (but Rawls also to a large extent) 
understands obligations of justice, to come from living together under a common 
constitution. She understands Miller, as recognizing the obligation to create institutions 
to support conceptions of justice, as only occurring within a nation state under those 
conditions.  
 As I understand the logic of this position, it holds that obligations of justice 
presuppose the existence of shared political institutions. It is incoherent to say 
that relations between people are unjust or just on this interpretation, in the 
absence of shared institutions for adjudicating such claims or regulating their 
relations. Some more or less stringent obligations obtain between persons 
across political jurisdictions because they are human but they are not obligations 
of justice.140 
 
 This would mean that, although some normative obligations would exist for how 
we treat each other in global society, they would be categorically different from those 
that someone like Rawls conceives in ATOJ.  
 She then looks at the utilitarian position. Young explains that, she understands 
that the contractarian position, stands in opposition to the cosmopolitan / utilitarian 
position. For cosmopolitan utilitarians, no particular relationship, can change the 
obligations of justice that exist for all moral agents. The scope of the obligations for 
utilitarians is universal, and comprised of an obligation to limit all suffering. Young 
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explains, in this conception, political membership is really only relevant instrumentally, 
in the logistics of how the obligations can be met.141  
  Young feels that, both of these conceptions of justice have some important 
problems. She feels the criticisms often made of the utilitarian position, that, its 
obligations are too demanding, have some validity, and this is compounded by the fact 
that, the obligations do not seem to differentiate between those that you interact with, 
and may be involved in affecting their background conditions of justice, and those that 
you have no interaction with.142  
[A]gainst the cosmopolitan-utilitarian position , I believe some account must be 
give of the nature of social relationships that ground claims that people have 
obligations to one another. It is not enough to say that people are human.143 
 
 Young explains that she also agrees with the critiques of the contractarian 
position, that the conception that obligations of justice are limited in scope to members 
of a political community (because obligations of justice can only be derived from 
membership in a political community,) is too arbitrary, and doesn’t effectively address 
the reality of contemporary global interactions.  
Political Communities have evolved in contingent and arbitrary ways more 
connected with power than moral right. People often stand in dense 
relationships with others prior to, apart from, or outside political communities. 
These relationships may be such that their actions affect one another in ways 
that tend to produce conflict. Or they could cooperate with numbers of others in 
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ongoing practises and institutions that meet some shared objectives. In such 
social relations we expect fair terms of conflict resolution and cooperation.”144 
 
 Young suggests a problem with the view that the existence of the nation-state 
creates the obligations of justice, is that, the social connection creates the moral basis 
for the political institution, rather than the opposite.145  
 A social contract theory like that of John Locke argues the need and desire for 
political institutions arises because socially connected persons with multiple and 
sometimes conflicting institutional commitments recognize that their 
relationships are liable to conflict and inequalities of power that can lead to 
mistrust, violence, exploitation and domination. The moral status of political 
institutions arises from the obligations of justice generated by social connection, 
as some of the instruments through which these obligations can be 
discharged.146 
 
 Young claims that, the position Rawls and Miller hold on the relation between 
political institutions and moral obligation, is misconceived. Miller feels it is the 
agreement to create the institutions that creates obligations of justice.147 Young on the 
other hand, argues it is, the fact that, people already have a dense web of obligations to 
each other that, motivates the formation of political institutions in order to manage the 
social obligations effectively. This is fairly interesting to argue from Locke. It is hard to 
say if it would be best to understand Locke, as considering that there is only a very thin 
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obligation in the state of nature, that becomes a thick and comprehensive 
understanding of justice, when the individuals come together as a commonwealth, or 
whether the social connections existing in the state of nature, already create a thick 
conception of justice, that coming together as a commonwealth structures, and 
provides a framework for fulfilling. 
 Young agrees with Beitz’s position that, an international society exists, even 
though there is no comprehensive political constitution regulating it. Because there are 
economic relations that operate across international borders, as well as, a huge variety 
of institutional structures of various types, that entail social interactions that affect 
people’s lives for the better of for the worse, there is, in fact an existing international 
society, even though it lacks regulation by a comprehensive political structure.148 She 
explains that her model of justice in global society is also shaped by Onora O’Neill’s 
conception of the scope of obligations of justice, as being defined by, the extent of the 
interactions that a particular moral agent has with others.  
 Young claims, that the best way to understand obligations of justice, is to think 
of them in terms of social structures. Young explains that social structures have been 
defined in many different and complex ways by different social theorists, but that, she is 
going to take a fairly simple definition. She quotes Peter Blau, defining social structure 
as:  
[M]ultidimensional space of differentiated social positions among which the 
population is distributed. The social associations of people provide both the 
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criterion for distinguishing social positions and the connections among them that 
make them elements of a single social structure.149 
 
 For Young, social structures can be understood as the background organization 
of societies that positions persons in relation to each other, in the sense of, both status 
and the links and types of linkages they have with others. The types of linkages and 
statuses that people hold in social structures, largely determine the opportunities, 
possible actions, and relationships (and the types of relationships) they will have with 
others, within the social system. 
 Young says that, she takes the same position she outlines for Beitz, and O’Neill, 
and also suggests for Pogge, that transnational social structures do exist, and that, these 
structures can generate injustices.150 Her definition of structural injustice makes clear, 
the foundation of her argument for the scope of obligations of justice in global society. 
Structural Injustice exists when social processes put large categories of persons 
under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of means to develop and 
exercise their capacities, at the same time as they allow others to dominate or 
have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities. 
Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct from the wrongful action of 
an individual moral agent or the willfully repressive policies of a state. Structural 
injustice occurs as a consequence of  many individuals and institutions acting in 
pursuit of their particular goals and interests, within given institutional rules and 
accepted norms. All the persons who participate by their actions in the ongoing 
schemes of cooperation that constitute these structures are responsible for 
them, in the sense that they are part of the process that causes them. They are 
not responsible in the sense of having directed the process or intended its 
outcomes.151 
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 Young explains that, structural injustice occurring in social structures results 
from constraints and enabling factors, that are not simply a result of the rules or norms 
enforced by the institutions, but also, and very importantly, incentive structures. These 
incentive structures, according to Young, may make particular actions attractive and of 
little cost to some, while at the same time, have high costs or constrain the options for 
others. Because these are complex relationships, mediated through a variety of 
structures and institutions, it is often not immediately or directly noticeable for those 
making choices, what the results of particular actions may be for others also affected by 
the system.152 
 Young contrasts the social connection model for justice with what she describes 
as the liability model, which she explains, is a very commonly understood model for 
justice, because it is the court litigation model. It is an adversarial model, and finds one 
party to blame (liable) and the other party largely free of blame, in cases of injustice. 
She feels that in many cases, this is not an appropriate or effective model for addressing 
issues of justice in global society. Young explains that, in the case of structural injustice, 
it is not enough when a particular injustice is identified, to consider the wrongs that 
individual actors have contributed to the injustice. The example she uses to illustrate 
this, is mean bosses, working workers to exhaustion. The bosses have a responsibility to 
treat employees according to certain standards, but finding the boss to blame may not 
address the larger situation that causes a boss to make the decision to treat employees 
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exploitatively. More than likely, there is a background structure of conditions and 
relations that contribute to the situation. Young says that, in the complex social 
processes that typify global economic interactions, the responsibility for injustice may 
involve actors distant, or only indirectly connected, to the process, and even those 
suffering from injustice, may not be free from some involvement in the forces that 
create it. An explanation of the structural social processes that encourage the injustice, 
and a consideration of how all those with a stake, or influence in the processes, can act 
to change the situation, may end up being a more effective solution.153 Young describes 
power, privilege, interest and collective ability as the factors relevant to determining, 
who needs to take action, and who will likely be able to take action; who will want to 
take action, or avoid it; and how action can and needs to be collective. 
 After explaining the social connection model of responsibility for justice in global 
society, Young addresses, two of the main positions, she understands as attempts to 
justify the frontiers of states, countries, or peoples as the reasonable limits of 
obligations of justice. She begins with an account, as to why, she feels the approach of 
limiting justice to the borders of states is flawed. 
Political actors often wish to define political jurisdictions that include some and 
exclude others; when they have the power to implement their will, they claim 
that those who have been made jurisdictional outsiders have no claims of justice 
on the insider state or its subjects. Since the definition of jurisdictions is so often 
a result of victor’s spoils or expedient resolution of conflict, it cannot be a basis 
for the moral justification of the scope of obligations of justice.154 
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 An interesting point that Young makes in relation to the problematic nature of 
defining obligations of justice by political jurisdiction, concerns the past actions of the 
government of South Africa. The South African government allocated marginal 
territories to various groups of designated black citizens, and then declared those 
territories as independent states, with no claim on the white government, of the 
country of South Africa. Almost everyone outside South Africa (and a large number 
within,) considered the actions illegitimate, and grossly unjust, but as Young points out, 
they are not outrageously unjust, as far as examples in the history of the formation of 
states go. And under a conception of justice, that saw countries united under a 
constitution, or based on national or ethnic groups, as having a special status for justice, 
have been fairly reasonable. 
 Young gives a definition of her understanding of a nationalist understanding, 
regarding the limits of justice in global society, which is very similar to the 
understanding expressed by Rawls, of the limits of justice for peoples in TLOP.  
Members of a nation have some moral obligations to outsiders—obligations of 
hospitality, to keep agreements made, or to respect the autonomy of other 
nations. However miserable and needy outsiders may be, though, and however 
much insiders have for themselves, they have no obligations of redistributive 
justice to those outsiders. Other nations have a moral obligation to take care of 
their own. If the members of other nations fail in their obligation to take care of 
their own, then we have no obligation to make up for that failure, and outsiders 
have no claim of justice upon us; we may owe them obligations of charity only if 
it is strictly impossible for the members of the other nations to take care of their 
own.155 
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 Young is concerned with the problem of how to make reasonable sense of 
nationalism, as a foundation for the moral basis of responsibility to others. She suggests 
that it suffers from problems, both because the historical social process of formation of 
national identity does not necessarily entail any particular moral status, and because, in 
many states, there may be several identifiable national groups. She explains that, it can 
also be the case that, there is no strong force of national identity separating a particular 
state from other states. 
The claim that members of national groups have obligations of justice only to 
fellow nationals, however, appears to be based on contingent psychological and 
historical circumstances rather than moral principle. That claim runs into the 
difficult problem of multicultural societies, moreover, where a single common 
national identity is weak or where national and cultural minorities are 
suppressed in order to promote the unified  national identities.156  
 
 Young explains that, defending nationalism as the basis for obligations of justice, 
relies on the argument that, people having feelings of identification with specific others, 
is a reasonable basis, on which to make judgments about your responsibilities to treat 
others justly. Her claim is that obligations of justice are in fact more important generally 
when people do not recognize shared identity or have a feeling of some type of cultural 
or social connection. Young says, moral obligations for justice must have a more solid 
foundation, than familiarity or shared cultural identity.157  
 Young describes those who take the nationalist approach, as having two 
different positions in regard to, how to manage the obligations of justice in a 
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multicultural state, partition or assimilation, and she considers neither particularly 
satisfactory. The partitionist option means separating each cultural group into its own 
state. This is obviously problematic, even in the fairly simple cases, but in many cases, 
the groups have a long history of living in dense social connection, and also in 
interspersion with one another, making it, even more, confusing and difficult to 
reasonably separate them into states. The situation itself may even be the result, of 
earlier historical attempts at exclusion, separation or partition.158 Assimilation also has 
serious concerns for justice, as it may mean denial of the legitimacy of cultural forms, 
and loss of the right to support culturally valuable institutions. It can be a position that, 
supports domination of legitimate minority cultural values. 
 Young describes the associationist position, (which is to a large extent Rawls’ 
position) as being that, those living together under a common constitution have 
obligations of justice to each other, based on the conception, that this creates a 
framework, (the state) under which they can pursue their ends as persons and as a 
society. The obligation of justice, stems from the fact that, they live together within the 
framework and to some extent the society rises, or falls together. Young acknowledges, 
there are very likely some obligations, that people living together in this way, have to 
each other, that they do not have to outsiders, such as supporting the framework, so 
that, it enables all members to flourish. However, she maintains, (similarly to Beitz) 
there is really nothing in the obligations to the shared political community, that shows 
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those within it have no relations with others outside it, that would not also generate 
obligations of justice.159 
 Young works to describe how her alternative model for relations of justice in 
global society could function. She explains that, economic and environmental 
interactions often involve connections and effects, which are in a variety of ways, 
unrestrained by international borders.  
The operations of trade, finance, investment, and production are global in their 
implications, and within those processes some people benefit more than others. 
In this sense there exists a global society spanned by issues and obligations of 
justice. In such a world as this the borders of state jurisdictions sometimes 
function to allow some people wrongly to ignore the interests of others whose 
lives their actions affect, simply because they lie outside those borders.160 
 
 Young claims that the situation in which many forms of social interaction, that 
have important consequences for people being better or worse off in their lives, occur in 
a transnational or global context, can mean in some cases that state borders allow us to 
ignore, or separate ourselves from, the moral consequences of these interactions. 
Again, particularly as a concern for international trade, and the ability to limit 
unaccounted environmental or social costs to international economic activity, the 
conception of the state as the limit of obligations of justice, makes it particularly difficult 
to promote just interaction. 
Perhaps even more challenging to principles of democracy and the rule of law, 
the activities of some international actors, such as transnational corporations, 
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sometimes escape the regulatory net of any state because they can shift 
jurisdictions.161 
 
 Young claims that, although social relations of the types to which justice ought to 
apply, are often global in scope, she does not mean to claim, that all persons in the 
world have exactly the same obligations of justice to all others. She explains that, the 
density and scope of social and economic ties are the factors that, influence the 
strength of obligations of justice. She suggests that, in many situations it will be the 
case, that those social and economic ties are densest within state communities.  
 Young also explains that, although obligations of justice extend globally, it 
doesn’t mean that every individual must consider all other individuals globally, in each 
of their decisions. This is because Young, in the same way as Rawls, considers that, in 
many senses the obligations of justice are really obligations concerning the organization 
of institutions, rather than those of individuals. This is similar to the idea Rawls argues 
for, that justice in societies, should be understood as procedural. 
Obligations of social justice are not primarily owed by individuals to individuals... 
Instead, they concern primarily the organization of institutions. Individuals 
usually cannot act alone to promote justice; they must act collectively to adjust 
the terms of their relationships and rectify the unjust consequences of past and 
present social structures, whether intended or not. They need authoritative 
institutions through which to act collectively.162 
 
 Young feels that the scope of political institutions ought to reflect the scope of 
obligations of justice. Therefore, if the scope of obligations of justice is in fact global, as 
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Young argues, then the institutions ought also to be global in scope. Here Young is 
aware of the concern to protect rights of distinct peoples to self-determination.  
 The concept of relational autonomy is put forward by Young, as a way of thinking 
about how effective political institutions might exist in a global context, while still 
maintaining self-determination for peoples, and regional and state based political 
communities. She suggests that, the concept of relational autonomy can be used, to 
move the principle of self-determination away from independence, in the sense of a lack 
of obligations to others, to autonomy, in the context of interdependent relationships.163  
 Young suggests that, a useful way of thinking of this is as freedom conceived of 
as non- domination, rather than non-interference, with interference meaning that, one 
agent limits or stops another’s action, limiting or worsening their options.164 Domination 
would be the situation, when one agent has the power available to interfere with 
another arbitrarily, or without consideration of the interests, or concerns of those 
affected. Interference would not be arbitrary, when it is designed to reduce domination, 
and occurs in consultation with the interests and opinions, of the affected. Non-
domination would be understood, as a situation where, social structures and institutions 
are in place to ensure freedom from domination, in the sense of, the ability of others to 
interfere arbitrarily with the agent’s ability to pursue their ends.165 
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 Young considers this a reasonable way of thinking about, how to balance 
obligations of justice, that are global, with a desire for self-determination of individual 
communities and societies.  
On such an interpretation, self-determination for peoples means that they have 
a right  to their own governance institutions through which they decide on their 
goals and interpret their way of life. Other people ought not to constrain, 
dominate, or interfere with those decisions and interpretations for the sake of 
their own ends, or according to their judgement of what way of life is best, or in 
order to subordinate a people to a larger ‘national’ unit. Peoples, that is, ought 
to be free from domination. Because a people stands in interdependent relations 
with others, however a people cannot ignore the claims and interests of those 
others when the former’s actions potentially affect the latter. In so far as 
outsiders are affected by the activities of self-determining people, those others 
have a legitimate claim to have their interests and needs taken into account 
even though they are outside the government jurisdiction.166 
 
 Young feels that self-determination for states, in the interests of justice on 
several levels, (global and regarding the rights of groups within states), ought to actually 
mean non-domination. And that, states ought to have no more right to non-
interference, than indigenous or ethnic groups, that desire self-determination. There is a 
presumption of non-interference, but the presumption would be open to review, in 
situations required to prevent harmful domination, or to enlist cooperation for projects, 
which could not be achieved, other than collectively.167 
  Here Young takes a very similar position to Rawls’, that promoting freedom for 
individuals requires effective institutions that will work to support the freedoms. Young 
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takes the same position at the global level; that only effective institutions can 
reasonably support non-domination in global society. Young is concerned that these 
regulating institutions be inclusively democratic, in much the same way as Rawls is 
concerned about ensuring that all interests can be represented in his just society.  
 Young sees the institutions as separate and based on function,168 and sees them 
as, global, but within a federated type of system, where only specifically global issues, 
would be dealt with at the global level. She explains that a very important purpose, for 
the global institutions would be to create conditions that protected local autonomous 
units (peoples, ethnic groups, regional communities...) from domination. These 
institutions would also be able to protect both individuals and groups from harm caused 
by powerful private economic actors. While under the current regime, weak or 
vulnerable state actors often lack the power to protect their citizens from these types of 
harm, and wealthy powerful states with the power to act, will either not have an 
interest in intervening, or consider it an internal matter of the another sovereign 
state.169  
 Young sees global institutions, in the sense of their closeness to the concerns of 
individuals and communities they may be working with, as being little different than the 
current state system, within which, it is very common, for local and regional interests to 
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end up seeing their concerns sacrificed in the melee of national politics. She sees a 
principle of subsidiarity, which is a commitment to dealing with issues at the most local 
level that encompasses all those who have a stake in the particular issue, as a key issue 
in effective democracy, for states and global institutions. 
A global environmental regulatory decision-making body, for example, would not 
need to be any more removed from ordinary citizens than many national 
regulatory bodies currently are. Once we move beyond a local level, any polity is 
an ‘imagined community’ whose interests and problems must be discursively 
constructed as affecting everyone, because people do not experience most of 
the others in the polity. I believe that this problem is no bigger for transnational 
and global regulation than it is for large nation-states.170 
 
 Young is very concerned that, these institutions be required to ensure their 
activities and decision making processes be transparent and public. She argues that 
many of the institutions currently charged with regulating international economic 
activity, including the IMF and WTO, are not transparent, and their leaders are not 
accountable to the public for their decisions.171 Young explains that, there is already a 
fairly well developed public sphere of global civil society, and this, along with effective 
communication technology, can support effectively democratic global institutions. 
 Young makes the argument that, contract theory is a window into thinking about 
the obligation or necessity of creating political institutions. That the necessity of 
creating institutions in a society, is based on conditions under which people are 
interacting, and the ways their lives are affected by their relations with others. She 
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argues that a global society exists, but that it is not effectively regulated by political 
institutions that ensure justice for its members. Locke’s state of nature is actually 
surprisingly similar to international order, in the sense that, there is a conception of the 
existence of liberties and rights in international relations, but in the current regime it is 
the job of each state, to ensure enforcement of those rights.172 (In the same way as each 
individual is responsible for this in Locke’s state of nature.) Hobbes posited a much less 
hopeful state of nature, but in a sense his state of nature might be understood to 
present the same message: social interactions that are sufficiently comprehensive to 
affect people’s lives in important ways, suggest the need for effective political 
institutions.  
[O]ntologically and morally, though not necessarily temporally, social connection 
is prior to political institutions. This is the great insight of social contract theory. 
The social connections of civil society may exist without political institutions to 
govern them. A society consists in connected or mutually influencing institutions 
and practices through which people enact their projects and seek their 
happiness, and in doing so they affect the conditions under which others act, 
often profoundly. A social contract theory like that of John Locke argues that the 
need and desire for political institutions arises because socially connected 
persons with multiple and sometimes conflicting institutional commitments 
recognize that their relationships are liable to conflict and that inequalities of 
power can lead to mistrust, violence, exploitation, and domination. It is these 
structural relationships and vulnerabilities that generate obligations of justice. 
They create the need for public regulation and strong institutions to implement 
such regulation, so that people can maximize their ability to act jointly and 
minimize violent conflict among them.173  
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CHAPTER TWO 
UTILITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 Peter Singer’s utilitarian position is an alternative to Rawls’ contractarian 
approach to justice. In A Theory of Justice (ATOJ), Rawls specifically outlines why he 
rejects a Utilitarian conception of justice for society. Interestingly, Singer’s discussion of 
trade and international economic institutions avoids most of Rawls’ concerns, as he is 
mainly focussed on how particular functions of the international economic order, 
particularly the WTO potentially harm the worst off in global society. Singer supports a 
much more stringent duty of assistance than he feels Rawls allows for in The Law of 
Peoples (TLOP), but similar to Rawls, it would be focussed on those who were extremely 
impoverished. Many commentators have noted that Singer’s utilitarian obligation for 
individuals living in wealthy developed states makes good logical sense, but requires so 
much of individuals that they reject it. Singer does definitely call for aid both from states 
and from individuals, but he also has some very valuable conceptions for institutional 
reform in order to create a more just international economic order. 
 Thomas Pogge has a human rights based position on global justice, structured to 
counter some of the problems he sees with Utilitarian positions such as Singer’s which 
he feels is not unreasonable, but fails to motivate action. Pogge is also building a 
position that he feels defeats the positions of those like Rawls who hold that the 
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obligations of justice between states are different in type than those within states. His 
position is what Young describes as a liability model, placing blame on the citizens and 
governments of wealthy developed countries, for their responsibility in causing 
unnecessary death and suffering of millions of impoverished people in poor countries. 
His position is that spelling out the responsibility for harm destroys the claim that 
national borders are a reasonable limit for obligations of justice. He takes the position 
that a global society does indeed exist, and its institutions are unjust and in need of 
reform. He sees obligations as existing directly between individuals in global society, and 
understands benefitting from the unjust structures of international economic 
institutions as being complicit in harming the world’s worst off.  
Singer: The Utilitarian Position 
 Peter Singer is a well-known philosopher who has been active in the area of 
ethics and global justice for 40 years, since the publication of Famine, Affluence and 
Morality in 1971. Singer is a Utilitarian and is his work has been very influential in 
bringing some issues which were not considered subjects for debate out into public 
discussion. Much of Singer’s work in global justice reflects a focus on the question of our 
obligations to others who we don’t know, never encounter personally, and are citizens 
of other countries. In general Singer has always held the position that ethical obligations 
between persons are not limited by state boundaries.  
 Singer is a fairly straightforward classical Utilitarian, holding the position, that 
when we address ethical issues we should evaluate the possible alternatives, and have a 
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moral obligation to undertake the action which will produce the greatest good for the 
greatest number (or the least suffering). When Singer addresses ethical issues, he 
normally does not spend very much time worrying about how we can identify what the 
greatest good or happiness is, as most of the issues he addresses concern mainly the 
mitigation of suffering. The exception to some extent is his work around the ethics of 
human interactions with animals, where he spends considerable effort building a case 
that animal suffering is pain, which is relevantly similar or identical to human pain.1 
Singer often considers life, as free from avoidable pain as possible, and not lacking in 
basic necessities, to be a relevant good; the happiness or pleasure of classical 
Utilitarianism. As a committed Utilitarian, Singer in general, is willing to sacrifice a 
smaller loss for a great gain. He does not base his ethical thinking on rights, and 
considers life a value like all others. He is willing, at least in his thought, to sacrifice life if 
the possible benefit is very great. He does not consider life to have an absolute value, 
but rather considers its value to be greater or lesser depending upon the quality and 
quantity of pains and pleasures it is capable of experiencing.2 He has been heavily 
criticized in some cases for the conclusions he has reached as a result. 
 Although he has often written on obligations of global justice, in One World 
Singer works through concerns about globalization, and takes a particular critical focus 
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on the role of international trade and the WTO in international economic order.3 He also 
weighs in on some problems with Rawls’ TLOP, both from a Utilitarian perspective and 
in relation to his perspective on ATOJ. Singer, in much of his argument, focuses on his 
position of an obligation for individuals in wealthy societies to act to provide aid, 
through government and non-government agencies to the worst off in global society. 
However, he also provides a Utilitarian take on what reforms would be necessary to 
produce a more just global society and international trade regime.  
 In One World Singer’s topic is globalization generally, and he is concerned with 
global environmental issues and international law, particularly as it relates to 
humanitarian intervention as well as international economics and trade. He focuses on 
the WTO and trade in one chapter but other sections of his argument are also relevant 
for conceiving of how a just regime of international trade could be structured.  
 Singer takes the creation of the WTO to be evidence of the great extent of global 
economic interdependence, in fact he describes it as a single global economy.  
The increasing degree to which there is a single world economy is reflected in 
the development of new forms of global governance, the most controversial of 
which is has been the WTO, but the WTO is not itself the creator of the world 
economy.4 
 
 While still introducing the topic of globalization, Singer discusses the issue of 
trade in international capital and the effect it has on restricting the economic policy 
options of national governments. He uses Thomas Friedman’s conception of the 
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“Golden Straitjacket” and the Electronic Herd5 to explain the way in which the mobility 
of global capital restricts the possible economic policy options for the governments of 
states. At this point Singer really doesn’t consider whether this is on the whole a 
positive or negative situation. In fact, while he brings up Friedman’s idea of the Golden 
Straitjacket and the Electronic Herd  several times he doesn’t really include trade in 
financial capital in his concerns about international trade.  Singer doesn’t discuss 
concerns over the free trade in financial capital to any great extent, which is a bit 
unfortunate, since his presentation of the main argument in favor of the WTO is based 
partially on comparative advantage, and right from the beginning of his discussion of 
globalization he refers to Friedman’s electronic herd. 
 Singer’s discussion of international trade focuses on the WTO, its role in the 
global economy and the effects its particular structure and policies have on different 
segments of global society. This is well worthwhile, because he addresses many of the 
important critiques of the WTO and its policies. He introduces the topic by noting that 
according to the Polaris institute, the WTO is a mechanism for accelerating and 
extending transfer of sovereignty from states to corporations.6 
                                                          
5 Friedman, Thomas. The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor, 2000). According to Friedman the 
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services and free markets for both foreign goods and capital. These are very much the main 
characteristics of the Washington Consensus (See Williamson, 2004). The electronic herd according to 
Friedman is mobile global capital, that will move from place to place seeking the highest rate of return. 
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 He explains that his goal is to consider four charges that have been repeatedly 
brought against the WTO by its opponents and protestors at its meetings in various sites 
around the world. The four charges are:  
1. That the WTO place economic considerations ahead of concerns for the 
environmental, animal welfare and even human rights 
2. That the WTO erodes national sovereignty 
3. That it is undemocratic 
4. That the WTO increases inequality; or (a stronger charge) it makes the rich richer 
and leaves the world’s poorest people even worse off than they would have 
been.7 
 
Singer explains that the rationale behind the creation of the WTO and its policies is a 
belief in the efficiency of free market approaches to international trade. He explains 
that there is an economic theoretical foundation for the approach. Combining the 
assumption that voluntary exchange must always improve the position of all parties or 
they wouldn’t participate and the theories of comparative and absolute advantage in 
international trade, he explains that according to well accepted theory the WTO policy 
should benefit the worst off. 
The belief is based on the usual rationale of the market, that if two people have 
different abilities to make products that they both desire, they will do better if 
they each work in the areas of production where they are most efficient (or least 
inefficient) relative to the other person, and then exchange, rather than if they 
both try to make the full range of products they want. 
…Moreover this exchange should be particularly good for countries with 
low labor costs, because they will be able to produce goods more cheaply than 
countries with high labor costs. Hence we can expect the demand for labor in 
these countries to rise, and once the supply of labor begins to tighten, wages 
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should ride too. Thus a free market should have the effect of making the world 
as a whole more prosperous, but specifically of assisting the poorest nations.8 
 
 Singer takes the position that if a focus on free trade as primary concern of the 
WTO functions as it is claimed, it should benefit everyone who participates, and 
particularly it should be of greatest benefit to countries where people are poor and 
wages are low. Free trade should give them a competitive advantage which will 
specifically help poor countries while increasing the aggregate benefit to all. As a 
utilitarian, Singer has a strong interest in increasing aggregate benefit, and has often 
argued that most people living in wealthy countries have an obligation to make 
considerable sacrifices to assist people living in poverty in least developed countries, so 
he would understand economic redistribution involving a leveling down of global wages 
to assist the worst off, especially if accompanied by overall aggregate economic benefit, 
as a positive development. 
1st Charge:  
The WTO Places Economic Considerations Ahead of Concerns for the Environmental, 
Animal Welfare and Human Rights. 
 Singer looks at whether the charge that WTO places economic considerations 
ahead of concerns for the environmental, animal welfare and even human rights is 
reasonable. He argues that it is. His argument is based on an examination of decisions of 
the appellate body of the WTO and GATT 1994 Article XX which concerns general 
exceptions to the terms of the agreement (Singer mostly considers the section (b) 
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relating to human, animal or plant life or health). He explains that while the WTO claims 
that Article XX means that accusing it of valuing free trade over human rights, and 
environmental and animal welfare concerns is unreasonable, the reality is that in most 
cases it has done just that.9 
 Singer explains that how this normally occurs is through a product versus process 
rule.10 This rule means that it would be legitimate to ban a particular product that can 
be proven to be harmful to the environment, animal welfare or human rights, under the 
condition that the product is also under the same restriction in the country doing so. 
However, it would not be permissible to ban a product that was in effect the same as 
one which is not banned in the country applying the ban on the basis that the imported 
product is produced in a way that is against the regulations or laws of the country 
banning it. Singer gives to specific examples; the banning of fur imports from countries 
which allow leg hold traps to be used in trapping furs which was attempted by the 
European Union, and the banning of tuna which has been caught in nets which also 
capture dolphins. In both cases the Apellate Body of the WTO decided that the bans 
were unfairly protectionist, and would result in sanction if maintained. The WTO argues 
that discriminating on the basis that the process by which a product is produced violates 
regulations of the country making the import ban, could allow countries to use 
environmental, animal welfare, or other regulations to unfairly protect their own 
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industries. Singer concludes that the charge that the WTO places economic 
considerations ahead of concerns for the environmental, animal welfare and human 
rights is a valid criticism, and a source of injustice in the current global economic order. 
2nd Charge:  
The WTO Erodes National Sovereignty. 
 Singer looks at the charge that the WTO erodes national sovereignty. The WTO 
maintains that this makes little sense as signing on to the WTO agreements is voluntary 
and a country can choose to leave the agreement at any time.11 Singer explains that 
while in a sense the membership is voluntary, countries sign on because the economic 
cost of being shut out of the main trade agreement in the world is very high. There are 
tradeoffs, but being completely shut out is worse. Singer also suggests that once signed 
on, it is hard to leave the WTO for poor countries particularly, because the decision 
might cause disruption of developing sectors of the economy reliant on trade, but also 
because of the possible flight of foreign capital. 
 Singer explains the loss of sovereignty using the example of the desire of South 
Africa to manufacture generic versions of patented HIV/ AIDS drugs to supply its citizens 
at about 1-3% of the $10,000 USD/ year cost of the patented versions. When it 
suggested it would do this, South Africa was threatened by the US, that it would apply 
trade sanctions to make up the prospective damages. Singer explains that the US was 
backed up on this by the WTO, and only extremely negative reactions around the world 
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stopped the US from taking action.12 He explains that South Africa would be restricted in 
its ability to deal with its most serious crisis because of its membership in the WTO. 
 Singer ends up taking the position that the WTO does erode national sovereignty 
to some extent. His concern is that this can be problematic, when it lessens a country’s 
ability to address health and economic development issues, or at least the options 
available to do so.13  
 Singer’s position on this seems to be that while there are concerns with the 
limitations to sovereignty, some of the concerns are more about in what ways 
sovereignty is being limited. In some cases where health and development policy is 
restricted in ways that harm or restrict efforts to minimize harm to poor people in less 
developed countries this is extremely negative. While if the impositions on national 
sovereignty caused by the trade organization were based on environmental, animal 
welfare and human rights concerns, it would actually be a positive feature, if 
membership was sufficiently valuable that governments would be motivated to bring 
national environmental and social regulations in line with the expectations. The concern 
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compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS agreement in protection of public health. Singer 
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putting India on a priority watch list for countries that violate IPR. Uma Purushothamam, “Trade Issues 
hot up between New Delhi and Washington” (Indian Review of Global Affairs, Feb 2014) accessed at 
http://www.irgamag.com/topics1/economy-watch/item/7626-trade-issues-hot-up-between-new-delhi-
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in this case is more if the policies and decision-making structures are fair and just, than 
whether it erodes national sovereignty. 
3rd Charge:  
The WTO Is Undemocratic. 
 Singer explains that the concern for loss of sovereignty leads him on to the 3rd 
charge; that the WTO is undemocratic. Singer notes that the WTO explains on its 
website that far from being undemocratic, it is democratic to the greatest extent 
possible, in that it does almost all of its decision—making on the basis of consensus of 
its membership, meaning that all members are basically equal.14 And in fact, this is true 
most decisions within the WTO are based on consensus of all members. The Apellate 
Body does not operate in this way, but could not be expected to, since it is in a sense an 
adversarial process between states. Singer explains the problem of this decision-making 
style is that in effect it is rule by veto, with any member being able to halt a decision for 
whatever reason they see fit. 
 Singer doesn’t spend a lot of time discussing why this is a problem at the WTO, 
although he does comment that it tends to favor the status quo. He moves on to discuss 
another concern, which is that much of the organizing and negotiating of the content of 
agreements, goes on in back rooms between the wealthy developed countries, with 
little opportunity for input from developing countries.15 Singer also touches on the 
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15 Stiglitz and Charlton. Fair Trade. Stiglitz in 2005, explains it is called “Green Rooming” and the WTO has 
officially enacted policies against it. Stiglitz remarks that there have been moves to reduce this officially, 
but that it still goes on unofficially. 
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ability of developing countries to afford effective delegations which allow real 
participation in negotiation. He notes that Geneva, as one of the most expensive cities 
in the world, is a very costly place for highly impoverished countries to maintain 
effective delegations even if they have access to people with the training and 
experience. He explains that the backroom deals, and the great imbalance in capacity at 
the WTO make it undemocratic regardless of the official structure. 
 It’s worth considering, that the effective “rule by veto” decision-making 
structure has actually had the effect of paralyzing the negotiating process. The WTO has 
been stalled in negotiating any real change to agreements for a decade, because 
entrenched oppositional positions over the situation of developing countries mean 
nothing can proceed.16 Decision-making by consensus requires reasonableness on the 
part of the decision makers to each other’s positions on all sides. In general this is not a 
feature of international trade negotiations which are traditionally heavily focussed on 
rational self-interest. Singer feels that the charge that the WTO is undemocratic is fairly 
well supported and the situation justifies measures to reform it.17 
4th Charge:  
The WTO Takes from the Poor to Give to the Rich. 
 Singer points out that really there are two different questions: Has inequality 
increased during the period of global economic liberalization? And, have the poor 
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become worse off? Singer starts by looking at the situation of the worst off. He cites 
commonly used World Bank figures of approximately 1.2 billion people, or about 20% of 
the global human population, living on an income of $1/ day, and about 2.8 billion living 
on less than $2/ day.18 Singer explains that living under the $1/day poverty line is truly a 
terrible situation, where people can’t regularly access food that fills basic nutrition 
requirements, safe water supplies, even basic medical care, or education.  
This is absolute poverty, which has been described as a condition of life so 
characterized by malnutrition, illiteracy, disease, squalid surroundings, high 
infant mortality and low life expectancy as to be beneath any reasonable 
definition of human decency.19 
 
Singer explains that according to the World Bank, the number of people living below the 
world poverty lines has slightly risen since 1987 as a total number, but has decreased as 
a portion of the world’s total population.20 Singer is of the opinion that it is a grave 
problem that anyone is living under the conditions of extreme poverty. He suggests that 
it is a good thing, from a utilitarian position, that a higher proportion of persons, are 
living, at least minimally decent, human lives, than in the past, but on the other hand, he 
is very concerned that there are still many people living in extreme poverty. 
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line. 
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 It is easier to evaluate Singer’s position on absolute poverty after considering his 
position on increasing inequality. Singer states that for a Utilitarian Inequality is not 
significant in itself. It matters because of its impact on welfare.21 His concern is not the 
gap between rich and poor, but people’s welfare. Singer says sometimes greater 
inequality will create a decrease in overall welfare, which may be linked to slower 
economic growth, and it may hamper people’s self-esteem. However, in situations 
where people are struggling to meet basic needs, inequality is less of a concern. He 
claims that a small increase in the wealth of someone who is extremely impoverished 
may mean an important difference in welfare, and it will not matter that the neighbor 
has received more.22  
 Singer is also interested in trying to compare how the level of inequality between 
states compares with the level of inequality within states and also individually in the 
world. Is inequality rising between individuals in a similar way, to the way, it is rising 
between societies. He speculates that it may well be even higher when considered by 
individuals or household, as poor people in wealthy societies and wealth people in 
poorer societies would tend to even the difference out. He notes if you were to look at 
the top quintile of individuals versus the bottom quintile of individuals globally the 
inequality might be even more pronounced.23  
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23 Singer, One World, 82-4. Singer suggests the data is not easily available to determine this. There is data 
on Gini Coefficients by country, but the GINI index tables available through the World Bank are not really 
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 Singer also looks at other indicators of quality of life in order to evaluate the 
situation. He suggests that life expectancy and nutrition are likely also good indicators of 
whether the situation of the worst off has been made better or worse. Singer quotes UN 
figures that show life expectancy increasing in developing countries, and the number of 
those suffering from malnutrition decreasing since the 1960s. He also notes the UN 
human development index has been slowly but steadily increasing for least developed 
countries since 1963.24 
 In the end, Singer decides that it is very difficult to ascertain whether the fourth 
charge is true. Singer explains that it is obvious from statistics that economic inequality 
is increasing between wealthy and poor societies, particularly at the extremes of wealth 
and poverty. He takes the position though, that in some senses economic inequality may 
be less important than whether the poor are actually worse off, and it is difficult to 
discern whether the poor are actually made worse off by the WTO than they would be 
without, and while the number of persons living in extreme poverty has stayed fairly 
consistent, the proportion of the world population living in that condition has 
diminished considerably. 
Room for Improvement 
 One of the areas where Singer definitely feels the international economic order 
could function better is in the control of negative externalities, unaccounted negative 
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3rd party effects of all types including, environmental, social, and animal welfare. 25 He 
claims that the current international trade regime facilitated by the approach of the 
WTO, has created, what he describes as a ‘tragedy of the commons’ effect in the global 
environment.26 He explains within states (at least “well governed”27 states) government 
regulation for the most part creates a situation where producers are made accountable 
for either assuring they do not incur, or paying for the remediation of, most 
environmental (and social) costs.  
 In international trade generally, many individual countries are not particularly 
interested in stopping their producers from externalizing costs which will not be directly 
paid by their own citizens. Even worse, it is not uncommon for the ruling elites of some 
countries to be unconcerned about negative externalities that affect less favored or less 
powerful sectors of their own population. Singer quotes Herman Daly in the claim that 
in a trade regime where there is little focus on these issues, much of global production 
shifts to societies where little attention is paid to accounting for these costs, and in the 
long term this will be very negative for efficiency of the global economy.28 
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26 Singer is making reference to the problem of managing an open access commons, where there is an 
incentive for each individual not to manage for conservation, if they cannot be sure all others will 
conserve. The individual will reap all the benefit of the exploitation and the cost will be spread among the 
users of the commons. Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” Science 162 no. 3859 (1968): 1243  
Accessed at: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243.full. 
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 Singer feels that in the interests of a fairer and more just trade regime, the WTO 
needs to be reformed in favor of ensuring the reduction of the ability of producers to 
profit from differing environmental, social and animal welfare regulation between 
countries. Rather than actively trying to block countries attempting to restricting these 
types of harms, the WTO either needs to take on the work of ensuring regulation is in 
place to limit them, or work closely with another organization created for the task. 
Singer suggests there is some difference of opinion on this between rich and poor 
countries, with poor countries being concerned they will be held accountable to 
standards set by wealthy developed countries that make it difficult for them to 
compete.29 
 Singer also explicitly supports Pogge’s position on the problems of both the 
International Resource Privilege and the International Borrowing Privilege. He considers 
that a process of recognition of legitimate governance and effective democratic 
governance, would be an important part of creating a more just trade regime.30  He 
explains there is some work going on in this area and he contrasts the Summit of the 
Americas agreement on democracy, and the European Union,31 with the WTO. He 
suggests these types of agreements put strong pressure on governments to meet 
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30 Singer, One World, 96-7. He explains that Thomas Pogge pointed them out to him. 
 
31 These are very different types of agreements, the Summit of the Americas is a very loose association 
which is working towards a free trade zone in the Americas, while the European Union is much more 
comprehensive agreement.  
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standards for democratic legitimacy and human rights, whereas the WTO tends to erode 
this pressure with a focus on free markets at almost any cost. 
 Singer brings up Article 36 of the GATT 1994 agreement, which sets out, that the 
partners in the agreement agree that positive measures are required to ensure less 
developed members can share in the benefits of international trade in a manner that 
reflects their need for economic development.32 It is his opinion that WTO needs to be 
refocused on fulfilling this part of its mandate, rather than being strictly focussed on 
market liberalization. Singer says currently the words sound nice, but have no effect on 
policy. 
Global Justice Requires a New Understanding of Sovereignty. 
 Singer reaches the conclusion, to a large extent as a result of his consideration of 
the tradition and practice of international law in relation to humanitarian intervention, 
but also after considering many of the problems of negative externalities and problems 
with the democratic structure of international institutions, in particular the WTO, that 
global justice in a highly interdependent world will require rethinking our traditional 
thinking concerning the sovereignty of states. He sees a strong need for a shift in the 
understanding of national sovereignty from non-intervention to an understanding of a 
duty to protect regardless of state boundaries.33 
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 Singer considers a variety of arguments, that he claims, have been used to create 
a separation between the moral obligations that are owed between individuals who are 
citizens of the same state and a lesser, weaker obligation across national borders. After 
looking at the arguments, he fails to find a valid conception of why states have a special 
status that global society would not. He defines the arguments he finds most relevant, 
then suggests why he finds that they do not compel him to change his position. 
 Compatriots as extended kin: Singer suggests this that this is to a certain extent 
Walzer’s argument, that members of a state are in some way almost like family, you 
have a different obligation to them because we recognize the relationship as an 
important part of our society.34Singer rejects this as being similar to feeling you have an 
obligation on the basis of race. He suggests it is in some ways the same sort of thing as 
the “White Australia” policy on immigration.  
 Community of Reciprocity:  Singer explains that this position entails citizens 
having special obligations to one another, because they are involved in a collective 
enterprise for the common good, living according to specific standards and making 
sacrifices to benefit one another. Singer doesn’t mention it, but the collective action of a 
group of people to govern themselves in the interests of the group is also Walzer’s 
argument. There is some strength in this argument. Singer addresses this in a way that 
seems quite effective. He argues that, membership in the community of reciprocity is 
arbitrary; people are born into it, and do nothing to deserve or not deserve 
                                                          
34 Singer, One World, 168. 
132 
membership. Some members do very little to support these obligations, or even actively 
subvert them. He explains that when we consider the wealthy developed countries, 
there are huge numbers of outsiders that arbitrarily were born outside the community, 
but would do almost anything to become a member. Many of them would be at least 
equal to the actual members in their reciprocal contribution and sacrifice to the 
community if included. Singer suggests there is no good reason why in light of the 
arbitrary nature of membership, that something special is owed to members, and not to 
those excluded.35  
 The Efficiency of Nations: Singer also examines the argument that the state has a 
particular value because it is an efficient way of complying with our obligations to 
others. He explains that the argument is that the state has the virtue of being able to 
provide the structures that facilitate just relations in a society. There is definitely some 
truth to this position, a just society requires the social structures be set up in a way that 
we can satisfy the obligations to each other that come out of enjoying the benefits of 
living in a society. Singer points out that if that was as far as it went, it would make 
sense but the problem is that the allocation of resources between states is such that 
some will completely lack the ability to discharge these obligations, so it may work for 
some people, but it is extremely inefficient from a global perspective. 
While it may, other things being equal, be more efficient for states to look after 
their own citizens, this is not the case if wealth is so unequally distributed that a 
typical affluent couple in one country spends more on going to the theater than 
many in other countries have to live on for a full year. In these circumstances, 
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the argument from efficiency, understood in terms of gaining the maximum 
efficiency from each available dollar, far from being a defense of duties toward 
our compatriots, provides grounds for holding that any such duties are 
overwhelmed by the much greater good that we can do abroad. 36 
 
 The Imagined Community: Singer suggests that the imagined community adds 
something to the reciprocity argument. He explains that he gets this understanding from 
Benedict Anderson’s “imagined political communities” conception of nationalism.37The 
conception is that even though the citizens do not for the most part know each other 
they feel a bond between them resulting from sharing and upholding common 
institutions and values (The values suggested by Singer are the values of political 
liberalism, but they could feasibly be other values.) Singer suggests that the argument is 
valuable as a description of the rise of nationalism in modern states, but is descriptive 
rather than normatively prescriptive. He sees no reason why it would not apply in a very 
similar way to an imagined global community, with appropriate institutions and values. 
Singer’s comment is that imagining ourselves as part of a national community is fine 
when it means broadening our perspective to include others, but it is less attractive if it 
narrows our conceptions.38 
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traditional arguments for the “special” position of the state as an actor in global society helps make it 
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Singer and The Law of Peoples 
 Singer refers to A Theory of Justice as the most influential work written on justice 
in 20th Century America, but he sees serious problems with Rawls’ TLOP. Interestingly, 
one of the things that strikes Singer as problematic in TLOP is that they don’t even get 
the chance to consider classical utilitarianism as a principle in the Original Position, 
whereas in ATOJ it was one of the theories on the table. Singer suggests that choosing 
classical utilitarianism could be a possibility in the Original Position, in a way in which is 
not in the current state of international relations, where it is not even close to being on 
the table for leaders of wealthy developed countries. His point makes some sense. If it’s 
on the table for the 1st Original Position, it would seem to be a principle that might be 
considered for the 2nd.  
 Singer also critiques the position on redistribution that Rawls takes in TLOP. He 
argues that Rawls objection to redistribution in TLOP is based on an argument that most 
of the differences in economic success in societies, are based on decisions made by the 
societies internally, and that this is exactly the same objection used within societies to 
deny redistribution to assist the less economically successful members.39Singer 
considers this highly flawed thinking, for someone who was so concerned about 
addressing this situation in ATOJ. 
 Singer supports the “duty of assistance,” but is concerned about the focus of the 
assistance on changing the culture and political institutions of burdened societies, so 
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that they may reorganize and become liberal or decent societies. His concern is that the 
duty of assistance does not make addressing the poverty and suffering of individual 
people a clear concern. He explains that, Rawls may have meant for a very strong focus 
on relieving severe poverty to be part of the duty of assistance, but it is not clearly 
spelled out as such.40He claims that the issue of a billion people living in extreme, life 
threatening, poverty, and what the citizens of wealthy developed countries ought to do 
about it, seems to completely escape Rawls attention in TLOP.  
Singer: On the Institutions of a Just Trade Regime 
 Singer takes the position that global institutions are a key to a more ethical 
future in global society. He feels that we are almost inevitably looking towards an era of 
a coming world community. He explains that there is considerable resistance to this on 
several fronts. He suggests that there is self-interested resistance on the part of wealthy 
developed states that don’t wish to compromise their privileged position. However he 
also suggests there are larger concerns that a full world government would be at best an 
unmanageable bureaucracy and at worst an unchallengeable tyranny.41 
 Singer suggests the approach that might be preferable is reform of the current 
international institutions to make them more focused on justice in global society. He 
gives the example of the discussion between the ILO and the WTO about the 
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development of global labor standards.42 Singer sees a possibility in bringing some of 
the institutions of the international economic order, which are currently tied closely to 
the concerns of wealthy developed countries, closer to relevant areas of the UN, which 
already have expertise and are in some ways more democratic.43 
 Singer’s utilitarian approach to justice in international trade starts with the 
position that the free trade model of international trade may be the best model for 
trade if it functions as advertised, although his opinion is, that the results are not totally 
clear, as to whether or not the focus on unrestricted free trade has actually been 
effective in reducing extreme poverty. The proportion of people living in poverty has 
decreased as the human population has increased, but the absolute number of very 
poor people has not decreased. Singer mentions several times that as a utilitarian he 
does not have a problem with inequality as such, concerns only arise when it somehow 
causes actual harm. For the most part this is nearly a universal position on inequality, 
and the concern for the relation between economic inequality and diminished ability to 
take advantage of political freedoms and educational, social and economic 
opportunities is commonly held,44 (although there is also a concern that inequality may 
cause envy or shame, and this is less universally considered held to be a harm). Singer 
supports his argument, that the WTO has consistently allowed its position in favor of 
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free trade to trump the ability of individual countries to address negative externalities, 
which are causing harm to people animals or the environment, with specific examples. It 
is particularly damning that this is occurring, even as it seems that there is little clear 
evidence that the free trade policy focus is delivering poverty reduction for the worst off 
in an effective way. Singer’s position on institutional reform in the current international 
trade regime is consistent with Rawls’ position on the role of institutions in a society in 
ATOJ. However his utilitarian orientation motivates him to take a cosmopolitan position 
on justice in international society. Similar to Beitz and Young, he rejects the argument 
for limiting obligations of justice to co-citizens of a country. Singer feels the very strong 
obligation to take effective action against extreme poverty requires the creation of 
international economic institutions that will focus on ensuring the benefit of the worst 
off, and will act to limit opportunities to profit from externalities based on nonexistent, 
or unenforced environmental, animal welfare and labor regulations.  
Pogge: The Rights Model and Reaction to The Law of Peoples 
The Human Rights Model 
 Thomas Pogge has a well-developed model for global justice, which seems to 
have been developed in part to address problems that he sees with both Rawls’ position 
on justice in global society and that of the utilitarian position. His model is largely, a 
rights based conception, of justice, where liability from damages that one is responsible 
for causing is the driving force behind the argument for obligations of justice. The rights 
based, liability model addresses weaknesses in both Rawls’ argument and the Utilitarian 
argument of Singer. The strength of Pogge’s model in relation to the project of applying 
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the ATOJ institutional model of justice to international trade, is that Pogge is critical of 
Rawls’ decision to limit his theory of justice to domestic societies, and disputes the 
position Rawls takes on the special status of states or peoples in the international order. 
Rawls takes the position that liberal individualist obligations of justice exist only within 
states, Pogge takes Rawls’ claim in TLOP that peoples have an obligation to protect 
human rights seriously and clearly shows that Rawls position on international justice 
fails. His approach at the same time deals with some of the problems that Singer’s 
position faces. The obligation to act in order to alleviate the suffering from extreme 
poverty, in Singer’s model, derives from the fact that there is a very grave problem that 
we can assist in resolving without very great cost to ourselves, so we therefore have a 
duty to act. Singer has used the analogy of a child drowning in a shallow pond. If you can 
act save that child by wading into the pond with very little risk to yourself, then almost 
anyone would consider that the right thing to do. Singer suggests, that you would still 
do so, if you were wearing expensive new shoes that would be ruined, and you would 
consider it immoral to allow the child to drown to save even a $1000 pair of shoes. 
Singer likens this to those of us living comfortable lives in wealthy countries allowing 
children, who could be saved with only a small sacrifice, to die from the effects of 
poverty.45 Many people dismiss the obligation, with the claim that they have no 
responsibility, as they have not contributed to the problem. Pogge effectively addresses 
why this position is mistaken. 
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 A rights model of justice, at its most basic, takes a conception of human rights, 
that is the basic entitlements all persons are considered to have on the basis of being 
human (there are rights approaches using rights other than human rights, but Pogge 
uses basic human rights), and considers the duties required of all others to ensure that 
all persons are able to enjoy those rights. Rights are in a very real sense, an agreement, 
they only exist when we acknowledge both the idea of persons possessing the right, and 
an obligation on the part of all others with whom they interact, to act in accordance 
with a duty to support that right. Making a claim that an individual has a right entails 
duties for others.  Pogge sticks specifically to rights with negative duties, or the so-called 
“negative rights.” Negative rights are called this because the duty they entail is a duty to 
refrain from something. As far as they are conceived of as negative rights, the right to 
liberty entails a duty to refrain from actions that restrict that individual’s liberty (usually 
within the limit that they not restrict the liberty of others). A negative right to life entails 
a duty not to cause someone’s death.46 Pogge carefully chooses a very basic conception 
of negative rights, one that even a fairly strongly committed libertarian would accept, 
because his argument for global justice, will be built from a position that no one, 
accepting any type of human rights commitment will be able to deny. Pogge’s argument 
sticks to the most basic and widely accepted human rights, which entail negative duties, 
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a right to liberty,47 and a right to life, these are based on a “harm to others”48 argument 
that is not a controversial. Pogge actually tends to focus most directly in building his 
case on a right to life. 
 Pogge argues that in the case of current international society, important 
obligations of justice exist across international borders, because actions undertaken by 
states and individuals cause harm that violates basic human rights of other individuals in 
a global context. His argument is that we have a duty to act to end suffering and death 
from severe poverty in global society based on the fact that citizens of wealthy 
developed countries are to blame for this, as a result of actions our governments take in 
our name. We have an obligation to force our governments to change the conditions 
that are causing harm, and repair, as much as is feasible, the harm caused. This part of 
his argument is especially important as this approach effectively negates arguments that 
make the claim that there is something special about the bond between members of a 
state political community, which creates dense obligations of justice between them, and 
which do not extend to members of other states. Rawls makes the case that the 
difference principle would not apply to international relations, but does accept that 
human rights definitely do. Pogge’s position is that it is basic human rights which 
obligate us to act for economic justice in global society. Particular bonds between 
citizens of a state, do not permit them to systematically violate human rights of others 
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48 See Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (Toronto: Oxford, 1987), 31-63. 
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on a massive scale, which is what he argues the current global economic order is doing. 
And it is not accidental, or unavoidable that global economic order is structured this 
way.  
 Pogge argues that the harm wealthy developed countries are liable for is 
extreme poverty, and that this harm causes illness, suffering and death. His claim is that 
about 18 million persons die each year as a result of the effects of extreme poverty, and 
360 million in the last 20 years. He notes that this is more than died in all wars and all 
types of government repression during the 20th century.49 This is a statistic he has used 
several times. It makes his point clearly; globally, poverty is a very serious harm. 
 Pogge makes the claim that wealthy powerful developed countries50 have used 
their wealth and power to organize the international economic order in their own favor, 
so that the benefits of international economic activity accrue in a highly skewed 
manner, to wealthy developed countries at the expense of poor developing countries. 
He makes the case that it is historically true that colonialism and imperialism created a 
highly unfair world order, and it is also the case that the current international world 
order is unjust and harms poor persons.  
 Whether the historical injustices of colonialism and imperialism have created an 
unjust world order, is an important question, as it could be considered a direct harm in 
itself, that merits correcting. It also bears very powerfully on the present, as far as the 
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unequal bargaining position of poorer less developed countries in the current world 
economic order. Many commentators who take the position that the obligations of 
justice are very limited between sovereign states take the position that, for states, most 
of differences in wealth and position in the international economic order are a result of 
internal, domestic factors, attitudes and decisions made by a people and their rulers 
over time. Pogge calls this position explanatory nationalism, and he considers it to be 
largely in error.51 He argues that people who hold this position seriously underestimate 
the influence of world order on the internal structure of domestic societies, and the role 
of international interactions in shaping their character and institutions.  
 This introduces two of Pogge’s influential conceptions of injustices that occur in 
developing societies as a result of of the structure and legal understandings of the 
current international economic order, the “international resource privilege” and the 
“international borrowing privilege.” Pogge believes that there are powerful negative 
interactions between the practices of international economics and the incentives for 
good government, just institutions, and continuing poverty that result from the current 
international economic order. The first of these involves the sale of natural resources. 
Pogge points out that one would think there should be a correlation between a country 
possessing a natural endowment of valuable resources and the level of wealth in the 
society, as there is constant demand in international markets for supplies of energy and 
mineral resources. He argues that the correlation is in fact somewhat negative, and that 
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many developing countries with endowments of resources are actually poorer, and in 
general less democratic, than those that have little.52  
Our cross-country regression confirms our theoretical insights. We find that a 
one percentage increase in the size of the natural resource sector [relative to 
GDP] generates a decrease by a half percentage point in the probability of 
survival of democratic regimes.53 
 
 The current structure of international trade relations accepts that any 
government that has the power to exert control over the population of a country and 
maintain, at least for the most part, power over the apparatus of government, can 
legitimately authorize the sale of the resources of that country on the international 
market. That government may be maintaining itself in power by force, and in no way 
represent the interests of the majority of citizens, but in our current legal conception of 
international trade it is perfectly legitimate for that government to sell, or authorize the 
sale of the resources of that country. If this transaction were to happen inside a country, 
even one with very poor law enforcement, if someone took by force or simply without 
consent, the property of others, or the property of a community and sold it to a third 
party, the third party would be considered to be accepting stolen property. They might 
get away with it, but they would never be able to legitimately make the claim that it had 
been acquired justly. Pogge explains that this feature of the international trade in 
resources creates an incentive to bad and undemocratic government in developing 
countries with large resource endowments. It creates a situation where prospective 
                                                          
52 Pogge’s position can be found in Politics As Usual, World Poverty & Human Rights, and Real World 
Justice.  
 
53 Pogge, Politics as Usual, location 1224-8. 
144 
dictators are aware that if they seize power and can hold onto it, even if it requires 
dominating the population with violence, that they will have access to a revenue stream 
from the sale of resources on the international market.54 They can use the proceeds to 
enrich themselves and to finance the militaries they require to hold onto power.  
All petrostates or resource-dependent countries in Africa fail to initiate 
meaningful political reforms. … [B]esides South Africa, transition to democracy 
has been successful only in resource-poor countries.55 
 
 Pogge also suggests that this situation also pushes down the prices of resources 
on world markets, as the concern for these types of governments is to get the money 
quick, rather than to extract maximum possible benefit for the society from their use.56  
The low prices of natural resources on world markets are heavily influenced by the 
“international resource privilege.” The true significance in natural resources is their use 
value for all people, including future persons. Pogge sees the low prices of resources on 
world markets as being reflective of a negative externality, imposed by powerful 
wealthy states, in collusion with wealthy and often corrupt elites of developing 
countries, on the populations of countries with these resources.57 
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 The second, related, situation in the international economic order, which Pogge 
argues is harming less developed countries and their citizens, is the ability of any rulers, 
who can maintain control over the structures of government, to take loans from finance 
institutions in the international community, regardless of whether they legitimately 
represent the interests of the population, and almost regardless of how they achieved 
control over the reins of power.58 He points out that governments that do not represent 
the interests of their citizens in any legitimate manner, can borrow huge sums from 
banks in developed countries, and spend the money in any way they wish with no 
accountability for where it goes or what it is used for. The citizens of these countries are 
left with the debt, which Pogge claims, they cannot default on without seriously 
worsening their position in the economic order.59When the dictatorships are thrown off, 
and new democratic governments try to put in place policies and structures that will 
support economic development and pull citizens out of poverty, their ability to do so is 
often severely limited by obligations to service the interest on massive debt loads 
accumulated by previous governments. This situation ends up being not only an 
incentive for prospective dictators to seize power and to remain in power, but also a 
huge impediment to rising out of poverty, when a sizeable part of the GDP, of most 
developing countries is eaten up by the cost of interest payments to the financial 
institutions of wealthy developed countries.  
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 Pogge argues that the structure and activities of international of international 
economic institutions is heavily skewed in favor of wealthy developed countries at the 
expense of poor countries. He comments on the WTO, and its TRIPS (trade related 
aspects of intellectual property rights) and TRIMs (Trade-Related Investment Measures) 
agreements,60 which are a part of it, and he suggests, reflect the design of global 
institutions to favor wealthy developing countries. 
 TRIPS and TRIMs and the WTO are actually an interesting case in relation to 
arguments that international economic institutions favor wealthy developed countries. 
At least partially in response to critiques of the structure of the World Bank and the IMF, 
which give the greatest administrative control to the countries that contribute the most 
to them, thus leaving countries which actually use them with virtually no input into their 
policies or operating principles, the WTO, which did not come into existence until 1995, 
has what was argued to be, a more democratic structure. The WTO is based on all 
members having representation in a consensus based decision-making structure. In a 
sense it is much more egalitarian. The problem for fairness, is the fact that the WTO 
came into existence, already carrying 50 years of trade agreements, negotiated almost 
exclusively by wealthy developed countries. The body of agreements that made up the 
GATT, (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was consolidated by GATT members 
who were in the process of creating the WTO, as GATT 1994, and became the basis of 
the WTO. TRIPS and TRIMs were both negotiated into GATT 1994 for inclusion in the 
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WTO. Poorer developing countries had mostly not been involved in GATT negotiations 
throughout its history, and its agreements represented (in general) the interests of 
wealthy developed countries, in trade between themselves. They had established the 
basis of protection for many sectors considered to be of strategic importance, such as 
agriculture. Since the creation of the WTO, very little has shifted in the basic trade 
agreements. The structure of the decision-making makes it so that any member can 
veto a decision, so almost no negotiations have ended in ratified agreements. In a sense 
that would seem like at least a level playing field, but the background agreements are 
heavily weighted towards the interests of wealthy developed countries, so inability to 
effect change is in fact strongly in the favor of wealthy developed countries. 
 Pogge admits that many people make the claim, that, even though there are 
problems with the global institutional order generally, and the WTO specifically, it is still 
the case that those living in poverty are better off under the current order, than they 
would be without them. The concern is that it is unfair to blame the WTO, and the 
current global order, for the millions of deaths that occur from poverty, because 
without the WTO there would be even more. For Pogge’s position it is important, that 
the chosen structure of the WTO actually be to blame for causing harm that could be 
prevented. (For my own position, the blame is not particularly the issue, but rather the 
argument that the international economic order could be arranged in a way that 
resulted in much less harm.)  He has three separate lines of argument that he uses to 
fortify his position his claims against the WTO and the international economic order. 
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 Pogge starts by addressing the argument that the poverty rate, and the rate of 
deaths from extreme poverty under the current international economic regime, are 
lower than they have been historically, and thus the WTO can hardly be blamed for 
what poverty exists. He points out that even if the poverty rate is lower now than it 
would have been had the WTO not replaced the previous regime, and even if the rate of 
deaths from poverty is lower than it would be without an organized system of 
international trade, in some sort of hypothetical state of nature, this can’t ever justify 
the current regime which causes harm in ways that are reasonably avoidable.61His 
argument is very convincing on this point, suggesting that these types of strategies take 
the position, that anything you do to people is ok as long as they are better off than they 
were at some historical, or even hypothetical time. 
 He examines the claim that because membership in the WTO is voluntary, and 
developing countries, where the vast majority of the global poor live, have willingly 
become members of the WTO under conditions that are available to evaluate before 
joining, and that countries are free to leave the WTO if they perceive it to be harmful to 
their interests, it is wrong to call the WTO unjust. Pogge calls this the position of “volenti 
non fit iniuria,”62 which is the conception that no injustice can be done to the 
consenting. He claims that this position fails, as no one can consent to give up basic 
rights, the argument being, that people who are desperate can be manipulated into a 
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position where they will consent to anything, which is why basic human rights must be 
inalienable. This is a very reasonable argument and is analogous to Locke’s position, that 
any agreement to sell oneself into slavery must be invalid, which is accepted even by 
libertarians.63 
 Pogge continues his argument by explaining, that it is obviously wrong, to think 
that the leaders of developing countries, can legitimately consent to giving up the 
human right not to be harmed or killed for their citizens. He uses the analogy of children 
not being able to give up their rights, and anyone who permits children to do so, could 
not be said to be legitimately acting in their interest. Making this point even stronger, is 
the situation that many of the worst off countries are in no way effective democracies. 
Pogge suggests that when people consent to cooperating with schemes that harm their 
interests, they often do so because they are being forced into situations where the 
options are extremely limited. He makes the claim that poor countries do not get 
fairness from the WTO, but a country that didn’t sign up would be worse off. Pogge 
quotes a World Bank World Development Report64 in his discussion of why developed 
countries have so much power to negotiate trade agreements and terms of trade in 
their favor. He explains that they have the biggest, most valuable, markets even though 
they have only 16% of world population, and produce 75% of products. Access to their 
capital, technology and markets allow them to negotiate hard, as the costs are very high 
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of being shut out, and generally they also have negotiating expertise and capacity that 
less well-off states do not.65 He makes an analogy to the situation of small continental 
European states being better off cooperating with a fascist regime in 1940 than not, 
which he explains, really doesn’t prove much about what their choices would have 
been, or their situation like, if there had been other options.66 
 Pogge also addresses the claim, that it is wrong to blame the WTO and the 
structure of the current international economic order for causing harm to the poor, 
because much of the poverty and resulting harm, is a result of bad decision-making by 
poor country rulers, and flawed institutions within these poor countries. He has already 
addressed this claim, with his discussion of explanatory nationalism, and arguments 
against the thesis that the causes of poverty are mostly domestic. The concern is that 
the argument develops into a claim, that if some countries, such as the Asian tigers, 
have been able to pull themselves out of poverty under the WTO regime, then it stands 
to reason, that other countries should also be able to overcome harmful poverty, under 
the existing order. There are problems with this claim, as these countries can’t really be 
understood to have achieved their economic success under conditions typical of the 
current regime, but Pogge does develop his own argument in response.  He introduces 
the concept of synergistic harm, in which two factors combine to make something much 
worse. He suggests that the global order, combined with problems of institutions and 
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governance in many poor countries, are synergistic in this sense, so that even if it is the 
case that the government and institutions of a country hurt the ability of its citizens to 
satisfy their needs effectively, when this combines with the conditions created by the 
WTO and the structure of international economic order, the problems are powerfully 
exacerbated. Examples of this are the resource privileges and borrowing privileges of 
corrupt and undemocratic governments, already discussed. Pogge argues that while the 
institutional arrangements and governance of in poor countries have almost no effect 
on global order, global institutions can have powerful effects on the structures of poor 
countries.67 This seems to be a very strong argument for an obligation to create just 
economic institutions for trade in global society, even aside from any other concerns 
about unfairness in the current order. 
Global Justice and The Law of Peoples 
Thomas Pogge, in general, supports the application of a conception of justice similar 
to Rawls’ domestic theory of justice presented in A Theory of Justice (ATOJ) at the global 
level.68  Like many who are familiar with both ATOJ and The Law of Peoples (TLOP), 
Pogge feels there is a fairly strong disconnect between the conception of justice 
defended in ATOJ and that proposed in TLOP. Rawls explains in the argument for the 
difference, between them, that A Theory of Justice is meant to apply to a single society. 
In The Law of Peoples he explains that the conception of justice he put forward for a 
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single society cannot make sense in the international context, for what he calls “The 
Society of Peoples.”69  
Pogge observes in World Poverty and Human Rights, that he in some senses 
supports the moral contextualism he attributes to David Miller and to Rawls.70 He notes 
that he agrees that a critical moral contextualism is appropriate, that the same moral 
principles or principles of justice, do not necessarily apply in all circumstances, contrary 
to what a moral universalist position would hold. In this case, Pogge accepts Rawls’ 
position in ATOJ, in which the difference principle is an organizing principal for basic 
structure of society, explaining that it is put in place so that individuals can pursue their 
own interests with a fair framework of institutions structuring their activities. Pogge 
argues that moral universalists, who claim that, if it makes sense as a principle of justice 
in society, it should also make sense as a principle of moral conduct for the individual, 
have it wrong. He explains that the difference principle in society, frees individuals from 
strict individual moral concern, in order that they may realize their own conception of 
the good.71  The idea being, that Rawls’ principles would set up a framework, which 
could support a just society, whose members did not necessarily share comprehensive 
moral doctrines. Pogge’s claim is that Rawls (and Miller) just have their contexts wrong 
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in their understanding of justice in global society. This grounds much of Pogge’s 
consideration of Rawls’ position on global justice in TLOP. 
In ATOJ the conception of justice is strongly based on liberal individualism, where 
the basic unit of moral concern is the individual. Rawls is concerned that good 
institutions will function to form a good society, but he is clearly focussed on the moral 
value of each individual being free to reach their potential within society, with each 
individual being assured a true equal opportunity to do so. In TLOP he abandons liberal 
moral individualism completely, it just does not seem to fit in his conception of justice at 
the international level, and it doesn’t make it into his “Realistic Utopia” of a society of 
peoples. In TLOP the concerns of the individual have no weight in the 2nd Original 
Position, the negotiators who participate in this behind the Veil of Ignorance are 
Peoples are conceived of as putting the independence of their society as the highest 
value. Rawls defends this by only allowing representatives of well-ordered societies to 
be represented, but this also seems problematic.  
Pogge writes, “While Rawls's domestic theory gives weight only to individuals and 
their interests, his international theory gives no weight to individuals and their 
interests.”72 That is, Pogge claims that in his domestic theory of justice Rawls gives 
absolutely no weight to the interests of collectives or associations; he makes no 
allowance for them to have a moral standing at all in his system, aside from their value 
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for individuals who choose them.73 Whereas in the international system he gives them 
all the moral weight, allowing almost none at all for the individual. At the same time he 
excludes states that are not what he describes as liberal or decent, from both the 
process of choosing the Law of Peoples, and from the actual rules governing relations 
between peoples in the Society of Peoples. Pogge explains that Rawls’ Law of Peoples 
conception of justice leaves out most of the people who most strongly need justice. It 
just doesn’t make sense in relation to the positions Rawls took in ATOJ.  
 Pogge explains that Rawls’ does make an attempt to justify it saying that to 
include decent hierarchical peoples, (who are also governed with common good in 
mind) he must include only peoples not individuals.74 Pogge says that this justification 
fails, and he does not understand how the conception of justice in TLOP can make any 
sense in relation to that which Rawls put forward in ATOJ. His argument is that, it is hard 
to accept that in international society liberal conceptions must be discarded to respect 
non-liberal positions. 
[W]hy should the appropriate mutual accommodation between those who endorse 
and those who reject normative individualism be a theory that rejects it? Seeing how 
Rawls's international theory of justice disregards the basic liberties of persons 
outside well-ordered societies, truncates the basic liberties of persons in decent 
societies, and tolerates poverty and huge inequalities worldwide, why should liberals 
find it appealing?75 
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 Pogge is also straight out skeptical, of Rawls concern for not violating the 
sovereignty of non-liberal (decent or otherwise) states in the name of imposing 
principles calling for more equality. He points out that, in the actual world, non-liberal 
states are normally the poorer, economically less well-off countries, and are likely to be 
open to global economic reform in the interests of greater equality, while liberal states 
resist it.76 Pogge feels that many persons living in impoverished countries, with bad 
government, would consider interventions in good conscience, focussed on improving 
their economic situation, or assuring their political rights, to be a positive thing.  
 However, Pogge acknowledges that some commentators feel there is serious 
validity to Rawls’ argument. Stephen Macedo defends Rawls’ much thinner and smaller 
conception of justice in TLOP, by considering that there is a moral standing that self-
governing collectives owe to each other. Claiming that a self-governing collective has a 
moral right to organize itself in a certain way, and that other moral self-governing 
collectives ought to respect the decision about how the society will operate.77 Macedo’s 
basic argument is that a liberal individualism forced onto the highly diverse forms of 
collective self-governing society internationally would not be just, but rather would 
violate respect owed between peoples.  
 This is definitely worth considering but it seems actually hard to argue that there 
is a very strong difference between international society and a multicultural liberal 
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nation-state in this. Pogge suggests that in many ways international society fits very well 
with Rawls’ definition of a society made in ATOJ. 
Since the world at large seems to fit Rawls's stipulations, (being self-contained, 
more or less self-sufficient, and a closed system isolated from other societies)—
certainly better than any national societies do—how about structuring it in 
accordance with the public criterion of social justice Rawls proposes in his 
domestic theory? Rawls not only denies that we ought to do this, but even insists 
that we ought not. But what reasons can he offer?78  
 
He argues, the reality of contemporary global society is, that interdependence, 
economic and otherwise, creates moral obligations, not dissimilar in nature from those 
that exist within states, across international borders. Pogge continues with another 
related point that others such as Beitz have touched on. In his domestic theory of 
justice, Rawls has argued that his theory is meant to apply to the situation of a closed 
system, which he feels must exist at some level. He explains that Rawls describes it as 
self-sufficient and self-contained.79 Pogge takes the position that the world as a whole 
fits the description Rawls is using better than any state, that it is really the more 
appropriate level to apply his domestic theory of justice to. He accepts that Rawls has 
clearly stated his opposition to a world state, but also considers that Rawls use of Kant 
to support his contention that a world state could not be just and effective, might not 
be seen as the most convincing evidence of the contemporary infeasibility of the 
project. Pogge suggests that even if a world government is infeasible that would not 
invalidate the application of the domestic theory of justice to international society, as 
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the domestic theory does not specify the exact institutions, but rather the principles 
behind them. He argues that it might require the creation of an effective global 
institutional order that acted to secure basic liberties and construct a just economic 
order.  
 Pogge also suggests that Rawls, according to the positions he takes in TLOP, 
would consider it wrong even if the majority of the world’s people wanted to design an 
institutional world order according to Rawls’ domestic theory because they would be 
imposing the liberal order on decent peoples. In this case it seems Pogge might be off-
base somewhat, as this situation is totally different from what Rawls considers in TLOP. 
There he is considering a just foreign policy for a liberal society in a world that has not 
accepted the domestic theory, with the idea that it would be the type of foreign policy 
that, when adopted by liberal societies would work towards ending injustices regardless 
of what else occurred. In the case Pogge is suggesting, Rawls problems with a world 
state would probably continue, but it seems likely that he would not object to some 
type of global institutional order if it was the case that the majority of persons were 
working towards it.80  
Pogge considers, that a variety of commentators have pointed out it is never 
extremely clear what “peoples” are and how to tell one from another.81 Are they a 
nation within a state? What about national groups which are divided between states or 
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completely within one? What about when individuals may have more than one 
affiliation (aboriginal person living in Canada)? In any event there are some serious 
problems trying to understand how Rawls gets from his position in ATOJ to his position 
in TLOP.  
Thomas Pogge explains that even if he supported the claim that Rawls makes in 
TLOP, that a strictly liberal individualist conception of justice was too problematic in a 
culturally diverse international society, and that it required compromise to respect the 
right of collectives to govern themselves in a way they see as appropriate, he still feels 
like far too much has been given up and the compromise that results abandons much 
that was of value most that would support the sort of liberal principles outlined in ATOJ 
or any conception of liberal rights at all. 
Reforms for a Just International Economic Order 
 Pogge has a well-developed conception of what he believes would be required to 
respond to the harms caused by the current international order, and reform it to create 
a more just global economic order. It has been developing over time and consists of 
several different sections.  
 The first area of Pogge’s proposal for a more just economic order is a concern 
with shifting institutional moral analysis beyond the state,82 as he doesn’t feel that the 
state is the appropriate level of concern for moral analysis in global society. Pogge’s 
position is that our concern ought to be not so much an international economic regime 
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may hurt states but how it treats individuals. This is important because we know that 
most arguments that support the state as the basis of moral analysis in world order, do 
so because they believe the state has some sort of crucial or irreplaceable role in justice 
for the individual. Pogge makes a strong case that there is a widespread failure to assure 
individual rights in this way under the current international economic order.  
 Pogge also makes the argument that the current international institutional order 
also fails, because it does not allow individuals to pursue their own interests within a 
framework that will allow them to do so without generally harming others. He explains 
that partiality of concern, is acceptable and accepted in many situations where the 
setting is at least minimally fair, but in the current world order the world’s worst off, are 
harmed by the partiality of the wealthy and powerful states that are able to undermine 
the conditions of background fairness and shift the structure of the economic 
institutions so that outcomes are in their favor at the expense of the poor. 
 Pogge favors institutional reform over other possible approaches to addressing 
the harm done to those suffering the effects of avoidable poverty. He considers this 
approach to be more effective and in a sense less demanding than approaches such as 
Singer’s call for the wealthy, both countries and persons, to provide aid which would 
alleviate the suffering of the worst off.83 He argues that rule changes are preferable to 
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changes in particular conduct, as it is easier to predict the results and it is easier to 
maintain in the long term.84 
 Pogge also argues that the amount of development aid required to end the 
worst suffering from poverty (about 300bn) is so far from what is actually being 
contributed by wealthy developed countries, that institutional reform seems a much 
more plausible project. Pogge explains the opportunity cost of the reform for citizens of 
affluent countries is considerably lower, and the benefit for citizens of poor countries is 
much higher, than attempting to achieve elimination of severe poverty through aid 
while maintaining the current international economic order.85 
 Strengthening this, Pogge also sees a negative duty to avoid contributing to 
maintenance of an unjust global institutional order that harms the poor. If you are 
profiting from the maintenance of such a global order, (which Pogge has argued the 
citizens of wealthy developed countries are), then he claims you have violated your duty 
not to harm others, and have an obligation to work to end the harm.86   
In the modern world, the rules governing economic transactions—both 
nationally and internationally—are the most important causal determinants of 
the extent and depth of severe poverty and other human-rights deficits. They are 
most important because of their great impact on the economic distribution 
within the jurisdiction to which they apply.87 
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 Pogge argues for a reform to the WTO, particularly in the area of Intellectual 
Property Rights, which favor corporations based in wealthy countries, over the ability of 
poor countries to assist their citizens in satisfying basic needs. He also pushes for 
assistance for developing countries in effective participation at the WTO, considering 
assistance in maintaining effective delegations at the WTO, and measures to ensure that 
poor countries have access to expertise in complex trade negotiations and are assisted 
in developing their own capacity, vital. Pogge is also very concerned that the WTO put in 
place accounting for negative externalities in international trade.  
 One of the major reforms to the global institutional order that Pogge has been 
arguing for is the creation of a reasonably neutral Democracy Panel, to arbitrate over 
when a country can legitimately considered to be governed democratically in the 
interests of its people.88 Pogge conceives the Democracy Panel as a permanent 
establishment of the United Nations, with sufficient staff to monitor elections and verify 
developments within countries. A part of the process of creating it would include the 
task of formulating a basic general criterion, regarding what constitutes a legitimate 
representative democracy, with additional specific criteria being developed as needed. 
Pogge considers the permanent general background criteria as being an important 
safety feature, which would help the Democracy Panel, avoid having its basic 
effectiveness eroded by members of the panel shifting, or attempting to shift, the 
criteria to suit various national interests. The Democracy Panel is Pogge’s strategy for 
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halting the international borrowing privilege, which facilitates non-democratic 
governments (that do not represent citizens), staying in power, and also ends up 
creating a heavy debt burden, that limits the ability of poor countries, to develop 
successful economies, even after government in the interest of the citizens is restored. 
The strategy would require governments to put in place a constitutional amendment 
which gave notice that in the event that the situation arose, through a military coup or 
other means, that the country ceased to be governed under the parameters set out by 
the democratic constitution, that it would be illegal for the government to allow the 
public to serve any debt taken on by a government ruling outside the parameters of the 
democratic constitution. The constitutional amendment would set out the neutral UN 
Democracy Panel as the arbiter of what would be required of a constitution to be 
considered legitimately democratic and when in fact a government would be considered 
to be a legitimate democratic government governing within the parameters of the 
accepted constitution and when it would not be. The Democracy Panel would only 
monitor countries which had signed on to be monitored, and would only affirm whether 
or not a government was ruling in accordance with its constitution, if the constitution 
was judged within the parameters of the criteria set out by the panel.  
 Pogge considers that because it has been such an accepted and profitable 
practice for so long, the constitutional amendment might not immediately stop banks 
from wealthy powerful countries from lending to dictators and non-democratic 
governments. Dictators could simply declare the constitution or the constitutional 
amendment invalid. However he feels, that wealthy developed countries would feel 
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strong international condemnation for intervening on behalf of their banks, to make 
poor, weak fledgling democracies pay debts, that banks had allowed to be incurred, 
knowing that it was unlawful. The Democracy Panel would bring neutrality and 
legitimacy to the process, and banks that were concerned that they would not want to 
lend to illegitimate government borrowers, would be able to make a quick check, that a 
loan they were considering was not going to a government that was considered 
illegitimate, with a legal constitutional amendment on record making the loans illegal in 
the country they were dealing with. It would make the process clear for banks and 
reasonably standardized. 
 Pogge considers that the effect of this might be, that governments that came to 
power by force, would see little benefit in continuing to service existing debts, as they 
would, for the most part, be themselves shut out of international borrowing. This in turn 
would make financial institutions very concerned about the risk involved in loans to 
democracies that were weak or newly established, as if they were to fail, it would be 
likely that a non-democratic government that pushed them out would refuse to pay the 
loans. The result of this would be that loans would be difficult to arrange, and carry 
even higher interest for these countries, which in many cases would already be among 
the most needy. Pogge’s solution is a Democracy Fund which would serve as insurance 
against failure to pay. Countries would pay into the insurance scheme, and in the 
situation that a democratic government was to fail and be replaced by a non-democratic 
government that refused to make payments on the loans, the insurance would cover 
the banks losses. Pogge argues that with the ability to take international loans to 
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support their activities curtailed, the actual incentive to seize power by force would be 
reduced. 
 The same Democracy Panel would also go towards restricting the problem of the 
International Resource Privilege. In the same way, a country would add an amendment 
to its constitution to the effect that only a legitimate democratic government can 
authorize the sale of public property and natural resources. It would function the same 
way as the borrowing amendment, the government of the country would advise the 
Democracy Panel of the amendment, and the panel would begin to monitor whether 
the government of that country was in accordance with its constitution. If a democratic 
government was replaced by a non-democratic government, or no longer fulfilled the 
democratic requirements of the constitution, the Democracy Panel would note, that it 
was no longer a government which, according to its own legitimate constitution, legally 
possessed the right to authorize the sale of public property and resources of the 
country. Pogge notes that this process would not likely cause an immediate halt, to all 
sales of resources by governments that don’t represent the interests of their citizens, as 
maintaining the cheap flows of natural resources, is a matter of powerful self interest 
for persons living in wealthy developed countries. He suggests though, that it would 
bring clarity to the situation. No one could reasonably deny that the purchases were 
illegal and unethical, and in clear contravention of the actual laws of the country as this 
would be made transparent by the Democracy Panel, available for consultation, before 
concluding major resource deals.  
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 Pogge feels these reforms are particularly valuable, because the international 
borrowing privilege and the international resource privilege contribute powerfully to the 
inability of many developing countries to succeed economically and lift their citizens out 
of poverty, but also, he argues, because they are important reforms for achieving 
democracy in global society. He feels they promote democracy for both developing and 
developed countries. In developing countries the reforms would undermine the 
benefits, which would be dictators could expect would accrue to them, lessening in the 
economic incentives to seize power by force in a weak or newly established democracy. 
They would also lessen the ability of those that gained power by force to maintain 
power by denying them access to loans or streams of cash from resource sales to use in 
maintaining military forces or other tools of domination. It might also mean that newly 
established democracies might have less crushing debt burdens which diverted 
resources from social programs and economic development.  
 Pogge also feels the reforms would improve democracy in wealthy developed 
societies. He explains that there is, in wealthy developed countries, a democracy deficit 
around foreign policy, most members of these societies have little understanding of the 
effects of their foreign policy on developing countries, and have not approved it, in the 
sense of knowing the options and their impacts, and selecting it. The reforms, would 
help citizens of wealthy developed countries hold their governments accountable, 
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helping them to choose not to support a harmful international economic order, once 
the situation is made more transparent.89 
 Pogge also considers that ending extreme poverty requires a cosmopolitan 
understanding of our moral obligations to others in global society. He means that we 
acknowledge our own duty as individuals to uphold or at least not violate the rights of 
all others, who are members of our global society. He explains that if a global society did 
not exist, if we were all members of isolated, separated cultures whose lives had little 
influence on one another across those boundaries, then those obligations would not 
exist, but because we live in a global society, where our interactions may have effect on 
the chances of others, across the boundaries of cultures and states, and are participants 
in a global institutional order,90 all of us are potentially responsible for the rights of all 
others. He argues that the most effective way to uphold our duties in this case is to 
reform the global institutional order. For these institutions to be successful in creating a 
background framework that in general structures economic interactions in international 
society in a way that supports the rights of all individuals, Pogge argues that, we need to 
modify the way we conceive state sovereignty. He is arguing for a vertical dispersion of 
sovereignty.91  
From the standpoint of a cosmopolitan morality—which centers on the 
fundamental needs and interests of individual human beings, and of all human 
beings—the concentration of sovereignty at one level is no longer defensible. 
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...the proposal is that governmental authority—or sovereignty—be 
widely dispersed in the vertical dimension. What we need is both centralization 
and decentralization...And their political allegiance and loyalties should be 
widely dispersed over these units: neighborhood, town, county, province, state, 
region, and world at large. 92 
 
 Pogge’s position is that we need to move decision-making to the level closest to 
all those affected by it, but, that also ensures inclusion of all those with a relevant 
interest in the decision-making process. Some authority in decision-making processes 
may need to move from the level of states to global institutions, and some can shift to 
social structures below that level. Pogge feels that the current understanding of state 
sovereignty allows a justification of competitive self interest to interfere with the duty 
to ensure that the rights of all individuals are protected. 
 Pogge takes the position that Rawls took in ATOJ, on the role of markets in a 
society, that self-regulating free markets by their nature produce inequalities, which 
over time can result in extreme poverty and/ or exclusion from effective political 
participation and medical and educational opportunities. Pogge supports developing an 
institutional framework, structured to act and react, to skew market results towards 
equity.93 He argues that this is more stable, and more just, than a system of 
redistribution, which takes away a surplus accumulated by some individuals (that they 
understand themselves as entitled to, through participation in the accepted institutional 
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system), and redistributing it to others, who have been less successful within the 
system. 
The Global Resource Dividend 
 A key part of his recipe for creating an achievable just international economic 
order, is what he calls the Global Resource Dividend (GRD). Pogge argues that because 
we are complicit in the violation of the rights of the poor, and participate to our benefit, 
in a system that harms them, we have a duty to support measures that would redress or 
mitigate this harm. He explains the three grounds he sees as basis for this, that the 
injustice we are responsible for includes the following: “The effects of shared social 
institutions”; a result of “Uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources”; 
and  “The effects of a common and violent history.”94 
 The proposal is not that we create a system of resources as common property, 
but that we understand that the poor have a basic interest in how all finite natural 
resources are used. He explains that he is formulating it in relation to the three grounds 
that are the basis for our responsibility for injustice, particularly the idea that there has 
been an uncompensated radical exclusion from the use of the world’s resources. He 
explains this is justified, because the other grounds would be addressed by virtual any 
arrangement that addressed the problem of poverty. It will take the form of a dividend 
that users must pay when they use non-renewable natural resources. The dividend will 
go into a fund to be used in the reduction and elimination of extreme poverty. “This 
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payment they must make is called a dividend because it is based on the idea that the 
global poor own an inalienable stake in all limited natural resources.”95 
 He calls the Global Resource Dividend a modest proposal in the sense Rawls use 
“realistic” in his discussion of the idea of realistic utopia, which is that it makes sense, 
and could be implementable and sustainable, in the world as we know it. He leaves each 
government in control of the use and management of resources within their territories, 
and explains the level must be such that it can be reasonably implemented and 
sustained.96  
 Pogge explains that one might think that the amount of the dividend would have 
to be very high to be effective in addressing the harm of extreme poverty, but he claims, 
in relation to the gravity of the situation, it is actually fairly low. He suggests that about 
$312 billion annually or approximately 1% of the global aggregate income would be 
appropriate. And he explains that this is a similar amount to what would be needed to 
bring the 2.8 billion persons (40% of the global population), who live on incomes below 
it, up to the $2/ Day poverty line used by the World Bank Group.97 He explains that the 
amount is fairly insignificant for wealthy developed countries.98 And it would not be 
particularly economically onerous to pay. Pogge suggests  $2/barrel GRD on crude oil 
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extraction would raise 18% of the total required and would cost probably about 
$.05/gallon for the end user.99 In the long term it might require a lesser GRD to sustain 
much greater equity in the global economic order, and that could be considered when 
the priority of elimination of extreme poverty had been addressed.  
 Pogge explains that the criteria used to select which resources to apply the GRD 
to, and in what way, would be important. He suggests that it would require 
consideration of what resources could relatively easily be monitored, in their 
consumption, production or discharge into the atmosphere. As well as, how a 
reasonably cost effective accounting and collection, could function (obviously related), 
and how the overall cost of the GRD to consumers of the end products could be kept as 
low as possible, while still satisfying the goals. He argues that the GRD could also be 
heavily focussed on encouraging conservation and minimizing environmental damage. 
 Pogge points out that disbursement of the fund, to those who will use them to 
satisfy their basic needs, also needs to be structured as efficiently as possible. He 
suggests that specific expertise would be needed to design the details, but that some 
basic ideas seem fairly clear. In many cases it would occur through governments, with 
incentives, (in the form of further funds) to ensure the funds were used effectively in 
poverty reduction. In the cases of governments that failed to distribute the benefits 
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fairly and efficiently to citizens, in response to incentives, the funds could be used by a 
variety of organizations to provide services for those people.  
 Pogge considers that the GRD proposal fits with his concern for institutional 
reform and promotion of a just global economic order. He argues that it would be much 
less costly for the results received, less difficult to sustain, and probably more likely to 
succeed than any scheme of development assistance. Pogge is concerned though that 
the GRD would have a higher cost than the millennium development goal target of 0.7% 
of GDP, agreed to by wealthy developed countries. And he is also concerned there 
would be some resistance, because the transparency in disbursement would make the 
GRD less useful as a political tool, than development aid currently is.  
 Pogge considers that once agreed to and implemented, the GRD would be 
reasonably enforceable, in the same way that the WTO enforces sanctions on countries 
which violate agreements. The mechanism is through imposition of tariffs, on imports 
coming from countries which are in non-compliance. He explains that since the 
proportion of GDP related to exports and imports, is quite high in most wealthy 
developed countries, the cost of trade sanctions could very quickly add up to the cost of 
the GRD, making enforcement relatively simple if a majority of wealthy developed states 
are participating. 
 Pogge makes a very strong case, that the current international order, which was 
imposed by wealthy and powerful countries, and is maintained by them, violates the 
rights of the poor and weak members of a global society, causing them harm. His 
argument that responsibility for causing harm to others, creates an obligation to act in 
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order to remedy that harm, is powerful and difficult to ignore ethically. Many of both 
Pogge’s explanations for the mechanisms of harm, and his solutions to the harm, 
consider a large picture of the international economic order, and it can be difficult to 
separate trade issues from larger concerns. Pogge’s solutions address unjust issues in 
trade such as the International Resource Privilege, and International Borrowing 
Privilege, but also use the interconnection of trade as mechanism to address other 
issues, such as with the Global Resource Dividend.  
 Although Pogge’s position is very strong, his model has also been criticized for its 
limitations. Iris Young considers it to be problematic, in that it focuses blame, holding 
wealthy developed countries responsible for the problem, and ignoring the complexity 
of the interactions. Pogge actually does address this with his conception of synergistic 
harm, but he mostly uses it to point out that even when there is a serious problem in 
the countries which are extremely impoverished, the actions of wealthy developed 
countries have made it much worse. It is also the case that there can be an intuitive 
feeling that blaming and shaming wealthy countries, could generate more defensive 
resistance, than positive reform. However, Pogge’s argument is strong, and his 
proposals are comprehensive and in many cases reasonable. If it were a case going to 
global court, Pogge’s approach would seem to be the model to choose.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SELF-REGULATING FREE MARKET IN FREE TRADE 
Mercantilism 
In Europe the expansion of trade and the growth of banking systems were 
accompanied by a new way of understanding wealth. Mercantilism was not so much a 
full-fledged economic system, as it was a specific way of understanding wealth. Wealth 
was to be seen as the accumulation of precious metals rather than control of productive 
land. 
The historical model for international economics that has traditionally opposed 
free market models for trade is the mercantilist orientation to international trade. Laura 
LaHaye (a GATT research economist) defines it as a form of economic nationalism, in 
which the goal is to restrain imports while maximizing exports, in order to extract the 
most benefit from trade for the nation state.1 Maximizing exports while minimizing 
imports will cause gold to flow into the country. 
 Basically mercantilism is protectionism, where domestic markets for most goods 
that are producible within the country, are protected legally, against all foreign 
competition. In the early emergence of mercantilism that accompanies colonization of 
the Americas, generally, the mercantilist protectionism took the form of complete ban 
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of imports of manufactured goods from foreign competitors (example: New Spain 
[Mexico and Latin America] in the 16th and 17th C and British American Colonies under 
the Navigation Acts in the 17th and 18th C). Later in the mercantilist period protectionism 
began to take the form it has in current discourse, of protecting markets using high 
tariffs on imported goods to make competition from imports impractical or unprofitable 
rather than strictly illegal (example: British Corn Laws in the first half of the 19thC).  
England began the first large-scale and integrative approach to mercantilism 
during the Elizabethan Era (1558–1603). An early statement on national balance of trade 
appeared in Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm of England, 1549: “We must 
always take heed that we buy no more from strangers than we sell them, for so should 
we impoverish ourselves and enrich them.”2 
The mercantilist model is based on the idea that international trade produces no 
net gain for those participating in it, and that someone wins in international trade only 
through someone else losing. In mercantilism, trade is understood to be a zero-sum 
game, in which the outputs exactly equal the inputs, with the only change being the 
distribution. This perspective ties closely with the realist position in international 
relations, based on the conception of international relations in general as being a zero-
sum game. These approaches to trade and international relations developed side by side 
in the early modern period. (The idea that international trade must be strictly a zero-
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sum game is generally rejected today, even by those who are fairly strongly 
protectionist.) 
Thomas Mun is generally considered to have stated the doctrine of mercantilism 
most clearly in his work, England’s Treasure by Foreign Trade.3 The key point of Mun’s 
conception of successful international trade is his discussion of “balance of trade.” 
Certainly there were mercantilists and mercantilist orientation to trade before Mun, but 
Mun uses the concept of balance of trade to make the tenets of the doctrine explicit. To 
maintain a positive balance of trade is the central concern in trade and is more 
important than any other economic policy, monetary, fiscal or otherwise.4 The trade 
balance referred to is the ratio of exports to imports. A positive balance of trade would 
be where the state is able to export a higher value of goods than the value of goods that 
is imported. The positive balance of trade is achieved both through protectionist 
measures to avoid foreign competition in domestic markets, and attempting to create 
captive overseas markets for one’s own products, either through military force or 
political pressure.  
Mun’s position on international trade, in relation to considerations of justice, is 
obviously problematic. It is clear that a mercantilist position in international trade is a 
position that does not accept the concept of obligations to protect one’s trading 
partners from poverty, and clearly it would be working against equality, at least in 
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balance of trade. However, it was also the case that early capitalism or proto-capitalism 
was explosively far ahead of the moral thought of the day, which was just beginning to 
consider the problematic nature of genocide and slavery, associated with the colonial 
economic expansion of the period. So it not really surprising, that trade practices based 
on creating economic inequalities were adopted without much reflection on their 
fairness.  
Mercantilism can be understood to belong to the pre-capitalist state (although it 
is not a complete either/or situation in England), where there are often strong social 
structural ties between resources and official status or position within society. Free 
markets, in the capitalist sense, are still developing. Although markets existed in various 
forms from very early times, the “market mechanism,” which controls prices via supply 
and demand, is still not the main model for distribution of resources, particularly labor 
and other factors of production. In international trade in the mercantilist model, there is 
little distinction between the state and business.  
The East India Company, for example, is almost identical with the state, acting 
basically as the foreign policy arm of the state (or at least acting with the understanding 
of close support of the military). It attempts to structure its relations with colonies in 
such a way as to create a dependence, that supports a favorable balance of trade at the 
expense of the colony. The trade relationship itself, even when undertaken in private 
interest, is not separate from government. 
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The Free Trade Model 
In international trade there are two main branches of support for the free trade 
model, that arose in opposition to mercantilism. The first of these is based on Adam 
Smith’s conception of a free market economy being “led by an invisible hand” towards 
the best results for society as a whole. If everyone involved in a competitive market is 
allowed to freely make economic decisions in their own self interest, not only will 
participants in the exchange benefit, but resources will be allocated efficiently to the 
overall benefit of society. The concept of “society” is simply expanded from the nation 
to the global market. The second branch consists of the theories that arise in the late 
18th and early 19th centuries. This branch divides into two sub-arguments, absolute and 
comparative advantage, in support of the free trade model for international trade.  
An important consideration in discussing the free trade model or self-regulating 
free market model for international trade, is what exactly, is being allowed to be 
exchanged freely when we discuss free trade. Through much of the history of trade the 
actual exchange consisted of finished goods or products, although it was also fairly 
common for natural resources to be exchanged, in some circumstances. In general, 
capital and labor were not considered to be subject to trade across international 
borders for a variety of reasons (although immigration has definitely been a labor 
market factor at times). In the contemporary debate on international trade it is certainly 
the case that, capital is one of the important items being traded across international 
borders. The trade in capital is different in some ways than the trade in goods or 
178 
 
products in the traditional sense, and has game changing effects on international trade, 
regarding who benefits under which conditions. There are several contested positions 
on how trade in capital fits with the argument supporting the free trade model. Trade in 
capital came into the WTO from GATT under TRIMs (Trade Related Investment 
Measures) and it is an important feature of international trade today.  
It is worth noting that, although protectionism made a comeback in the 1930s, 
few economists support it today. As Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin note:  
While many aspects of the Great Depression continue to be debated, there is all-
but-universal agreement that the adoption of restrictive trade policies was 
destructive and counterproductive and that similarly succumbing to 
protectionism in our current slump should be avoided at all cost. Lacking other 
instruments with which to support economic activity, governments erected tariff 
and nontariff barriers to trade in a desperate effort to direct spending to 
merchandise produced at home rather than abroad. But with other governments 
responding in kind, the distribution of demand across countries remained 
unchanged at the end of this round of global tariff hikes. The main effect was to 
destroy trade which, despite the economic recovery in most countries after 
1933, failed to reach its 1929 peak, as measured by volume, by the end of the 
decade. The benefits of comparative advantage were lost. Recrimination over 
beggar-thy-neighbour trade policies made it more difficult to agree on other 
measures to halt the slump.5 
 
Absolute Competitive Advantage: Adam Smith 
Adam Smith challenges the mercantilist view that maintaining a positive balance 
of trade is of overwhelming importance (thus necessitating that domestic industries be 
protected). In The Wealth of Nations, Smith writes:  
                                                          
5 Eichengreen, Barry and Irwin, Douglas. (2009) The Protectionist Temptation: Lessons from the Great 
Depression for today. Vox: http://www.voxeu.org/article/protectionist-temptation-lessons-great-
depression-today. Based on article: The Slide To Protectionism in the Great Depression: 
Who Succumbed and Why? Eichengreen, Barry and Irwin, Douglas. NBER Working Paper 15142 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15142. Both accessed May 2013. 
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What is prudent in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in that 
of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper 
than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with them with some part 
of our industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage. . . . In 
every country, it always is and must be in the interest of the great body of the 
people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition 
is so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor 
could it have ever been called into question, had not the interested sophistry of 
merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind. Their 
interest is, in this respect, directly opposite to that of the great body of the 
people.6 
 
The basic premise of Smith’s model is that all members of society individually, 
making economic decisions in their own self-interest, will, in the aggregate, produce the 
best overall result for society as a whole. Any planned intervention in the market to 
achieve specific results or benefit particular segments of society, at best, yields lowered 
efficiency and reduced aggregate benefit to society. Smith famously argued for an 
economy “led by an invisible hand”: 
Every individual necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the society as 
great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote public interest, 
nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of the 
domestic over foreign industry he intends only his own security; and by directing 
that industry in such a manner that its produce may be of the greatest value, he 
intends only his own gain; and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end that was no part of his intention. He generally, 
indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he 
is promoting it.7 
 
                                                          
6 Quoted by Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, p. 38. 
 
7 Smith, Adam. Book 4, chapter 2 of “Wealth of Nations,” In The Real Price of Everything, ed. Michael 
Lewis (New York: Sterling, 2007), 312.  
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 This type of market-based economic system is now commonly known as “laissez 
faire,” a usefully descriptive term, as the model consists of leaving the participants in 
the market alone to do what they think is in their own interest (which, according to the 
theory, will be society’s interest as well). Free markets are known as “self-regulating” 
because without regulatory input they automatically perform the crucial economic tasks 
of deciding what the appropriate price for any good or service should be (high enough 
to motivate producers to supply it, while keeping it sufficiently low that consumers can 
afford to buy it) and determining the appropriate quantity to be supplied to market. 
According to the premises that underlie the case for the self-regulating free market in 
economics, the only real role for regulative governance in this model, is the 
enforcement of contract and property law, and those anti-monopoly statutes that keep 
the economy competitive, since, in a free competitive economy, production and pricing 
decisions are already being handled in the most efficient manner achievable. It is also 
claimed to be a just model, for it allows owners of resources the greatest possible 
liberty with respect to how they will make use of their own resources, and rewards 
them according to their productive contribution. 
 Adam Smith formulated the theory of absolute advantage in international trade, 
which is in accord with his theory of the efficiency of self-regulating free markets. 
Absolute advantage is the idea that many countries will have some climactic, 
geographic, or other advantage in producing a specific good or service. Each country 
ought to, as much as possible, concentrate in producing the product they are the most 
181 
 
efficient at producing, and import those things they produce less efficiently than other 
countries. In this way they would use their labor resources as efficiently as possible, 
(perhaps even gaining economies of scale as well) and would create more overall value 
of products with the same labor input, than would have been possible producing things 
that were produced less efficiently, in the country than elsewhere.  
If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves 
can make it, better buy it of them with some produce of our own industry, 
employed in a way in which we have some advantage.8 
 
The theory of absolute advantage should motivate countries to pursue free trade 
policies, for any tariffs or quotas in place to protect less efficient industry from foreign 
competition, will only make it more expensive to import the needed products, when the 
countries concentrate on producing the products where they possess an absolute 
advantage. The other side of this would be that, if other countries had barriers in place 
against your products, it would tend to negate some of the advantage and make your 
product less competitive. According to the theory of absolute advantage, protectionist 
measures such as tariffs (or even subsidies to less efficient industries), while protecting 
certain producers, end up hurting the countries involved, since the efficiency strengths 
that each possess cannot be exploited effectively. 
 Of course, there are countries that would not possess an absolute advantage in 
any product. (One can imagine some of the poorer countries in today’s world being in 
this situation.) They would tend not to benefit from trade in Smith’s conception, (except 
                                                          
8 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 313. 
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for necessary things they might not be able to acquire otherwise) and for these 
countries absolute advantage is not very useful. They could in fact benefit from putting 
in place protectionist measures. Smith also, interestingly, suggests that, it is worth 
deliberating on whether or not it is a good idea to rapidly move to free trade in areas 
that have been protected and are major sources of employment in a country.9 
Comparative Advantage: David Ricardo 
David Ricardo wrote On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation in 1817. 
The book has many strengths and is considered one of the founding works of modern 
economics as a discipline. Its single most lasting contribution is the theory of 
“comparative advantage” in international trade. The theory was not entirely new, but 
Ricardo was the first to state it clearly and effectively detail how it would function. It 
builds upon Adam Smith’s theory of absolute competitive advantage, but it departs 
importantly in maintaining that, even in situations where a country has no absolute 
advantage in the production of any good, it can still specialize in production of the 
goods at which it is relatively more efficient at producing than the other goods it 
produces and gain a benefit in trade. 
Ricardo works with the example of England and Portugal to describe how the 
comparative advantage functions. 
If Portugal had no commercial connection with other countries, instead of 
employing a great part of her capital and industry in the production of wines, 
with which she purchases for her own use the cloth and hardware of other 
                                                          
9 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 320-321. 
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countries, she would be obliged to devote a part of that capital to the 
manufacture of those commodities, which she would thus obtain probably 
inferior in quality as well as quantity.10 
 
Ricardo uses the example of cloth and wine, both of which are produced more 
efficiently in Portugal than in England. In this example Ricardo considers only labor but 
in theory it works even considering other factors of production. England requires the 
labor of 100 men for a year to produce a unit of cloth and the labor of 120 men for a 
year to produce a unit of wine. Portugal requires the labor of 80 men for a year to 
produce a unit of wine and the labor of 90 men for a year to produce a unit of cloth. 
Portugal is more efficient than England, in absolute terms, in both cloth and wine. It 
takes more men to produce a unit of cloth in E than it does in P (100 vs. 80) and more to 
produce a unit of wine (120 vs. 90). 
So, without specialization, these 390 men will produce 2 units of cloth and 2 of 
wine. But if England specializes in cloth, its 220 men will produce 2.2 units of cloth. (200 
men produce 2 units. The extra 20 produces another 0.2.) If P specializes in wine, its 170 
men will produce 2.125 (160 men will produce 2. The extra 10 will produce 10 x (1/80)). 
Clearly more of each product is produced via such specialization, so an exchange could 
be arranged that would benefit both countries.  
And indeed, the free market will arrange such an exchange. Consider the 
situation of a British importer. Both cloth and wine are produced more efficiently in 
                                                          
10 Ricardo, David. “On The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,” in The Real Price of Everything. 
ed. Michael Lewis ( New York: Sterling, 2007), 818. 
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Portugal than in Britain. Which should they import? Well, British importers will find it 
profitable to import wine from Portugal, where they need only exchange 8/9 units of 
cloth to obtain a unit of wine from Portugal (the exchange rate of cloth for wine in 
Portugal), but that wine that is equal to 120/100 = 6/5 units of cloth in England. That is 
to say, their outlay of 8/9 units of cloth gives them a product worth 6/5 units of cloth, a 
profit of (6/5-8/9)/(8/9) = 35%. (Transportation costs are ignored in the example.) 
However, if they chose to import cloth, they would have had to pay 9/8 units of 
wine to the Portuguese to get a unit of cloth (since wine is easier to produce than cloth 
in Portugal), which is worth only 5/6 units of wine in England. That is to say, they would 
lose money. 
So British importers will find it profitable to import wine from Portugal, and, by 
parity of reasoning, Portuguese importers will find it profitable to import cloth from 
Britain. To import a unit of cloth, they need only pay 5/6 units of wine, but that cloth, in 
Portugal, is worth 9/8 units of wine. They too make a 35% rate of profit (exactly the 
same rate as the British importer)—and would lose money trying to import wine. 
We can see in Ricardo’s example, that specialization in the production of the 
most, relatively, efficiently produced product, and allowing Smith’s invisible hand to 
work its magic, works to the benefit of both countries. Thus, it would seem like it would 
be a terrible move for anyone concerned about poverty, to resist trade liberalization. 
Ricardo uses this very simplified example with only two products and two countries, but 
the theory scales with many products and many countries. Without much difficulty 
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economists can construct a much more complicated model embracing many products 
and many countries. However, in recent years there has been a growing concern that 
some of the conditions (particularly immobility of capital, but also to some extent labor 
mobility) necessary for comparative advantage to hold in international trade have 
diminished or disappeared. There is a large division over how to understand this. Some 
are convinced that this negates the case for free trade, others that comparative 
advantage does not hold, but that the case for free trade remains, and still others 
maintain that factor mobility in no way affects the validity of comparative advantage.11  
Floating-Exchange-Rate Free Trade: Milton Friedman 
 Milton Friedman supports free market economics in almost all situations. He 
argues his case on the basis of the value of freedom and efficiency. The two efficiency 
concerns are; one, determining what consumers actually want, and two, providing 
incentives to producers to satisfy those wants, without wasting inputs. He also argues 
that economic freedom is an essential component of personal freedom. One cannot 
really be free if one is not free to dispose of one’s property in the manner in which one 
chooses for oneself. He also argues that inequality is a good thing. Wealthy people 
provide resources for innovation, a market for new products that, eventually become 
accessible to the general public, and a counterfoil to the concentration of political 
power in the hands of charismatic politicians. 
                                                          
11 Ralph Gomory and Herman Daly for the first position, Jagdish Bhagwati for the second position and 
Milton Friedman assumes the third, but does not explicitly explain why. 
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Friedman’s ideas (along with the similar ideas of his one-time colleague at the 
University of Chicago, Friedrich von Hayek) were taken up by government leaders at the 
end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, after spiking world energy costs 
contributed to economic slowdown and stagnation in the mid 1970s. They became the 
ruling ideas of the US and Britain, and the main ideological influence of international 
financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. The push to transform the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) was also animated by these same ideas. 
Friedman’s position is actually more “radical” than those calling for global trade 
agreements that reduce trade barriers. He claims that, the best way to move to free 
trade is to unilaterally drop one’s own tariffs, regardless of what others do.  
Given that we should move to free trade, how should we do so? The method we 
have tried to adopt is reciprocal negotiation of tariff reductions with other 
countries. This seems to me the wrong procedure. In the first place it ensures a 
slow pace. He who moves fastest moves alone. In the second place it fosters an 
erroneous view of the basic problem. It makes it appear as if tariffs help the 
country imposing them but hurt other countries, as if when we reduce a tariff we 
give up something good and should get something in return in the form of a 
reduction of tariffs imposed by other countries. In truth the situation is quite 
different. Our tariffs hurt us as well as other countries. We would be benefited 
by dispensing with our tariffs even if other countries did not. We would of course 
be benefited even more if they reduced theirs but our benefiting does not 
require that they reduce theirs.12  
 
                                                          
12 Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 73. 
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Friedman admits there may be exceptions to this but, apart from a very few 
genuine national security concerns (like trade in weapons), he dismisses them as largely 
theoretical, and of little practical importance.13  
 For Friedman, a major concern in international trade is international currency 
convertibility. He argued forcefully that a free-floating, market-based currency exchange 
rate would be preferable to the international system of fixed exchange rates in effect at 
the time. He provides an example of why a fixed-rate system of currency exchange is 
problematic, and in the long term, unsustainable in international trade.14 
Suppose for simplicity that Japan and the US are the only two countries involved 
in trade and at some exchange rate, say 1000 yen to the dollar, Japan could 
produce every single item capable of entering into foreign trade more cheaply 
than the U.S. At that exchange rate the Japanese could sell much to us, we 
nothing to them. Suppose we pay them in paper dollars. What would the 
Japanese exporters do with the dollars? They cannot eat them, wear them or live 
in them. If they were willing simply to hold them, then the printing industry 
printing the dollar bills would be a magnificent export industry. Its output would 
enable us all to have the good things of life provided nearly free by the 
Japanese.15 
 
Friedman argues that this sort of situation is unsustainable, because no one in 
Japan would choose to buy a dollar with 1000 yen, when a 1000 yen could be used to 
purchase more of everything than a dollar could. The exporter would need to sell his 
                                                          
13 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 83. 
 
14 During the post–war, fixed-exchange-rate period, protectionists argued their case by warning that 
without such measures, we would soon lose all our jobs to low-wage parts of the world (like Japan at the 
time). His example is meant to show that this cannot happen if exchange rates are market-determined, 
not government-determined. 
 
15 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 65. 
188 
 
dollars for yen, in order to pay his workers, and other for Japanese inputs to produce his 
export goods, but no one would want to give up yen for dollars, at a price where 
everything you could buy with a dollar could be purchased more cheaply with 1000 yen. 
Nothing produced by the US and available for purchase with dollars is competitive in 
price, with anything produced in Japan and available for purchase in yen. You would 
always be able to buy more of a product with 1000 yen in Japan than you could buy of 
the same product with 1 dollar in the US.  
Friedman argues that if we are going to be able to access the benefits of free 
international trade, currencies must be allowed to be bought and sold in a free market 
without price controls, so that the price reflects the value of what can be bought with it. 
The exchange rate between any two given currencies, will naturally balance at a level 
where some products are a better value purchased with each of the currencies, because 
if there is nothing that would make it worthwhile to sell some of your currency to 
purchase the other, no currency would be exchanged. For example if there was nothing 
that holders of yen wanted to purchase with dollars at a particular price, then no yen 
would be sold for dollars, until those holding dollars offered a low enough price, that 
there were things that could be bought at a better price with dollars. (If the value of the 
dollar dropped to, say, 500y, then 1000y would buy $2 worth of American goods, twice 
as much as it would before.) The argument is simply an application of supply and 
demand.  
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A key point Friedman makes is that this argument in no way depends on the 
incomes or standards of living of the workers in the countries. Friedman says that if the 
workers in one country, under this system, have a lower standard of living than in 
another, this is the result of them being less productive than the workers in the better 
off countries. Friedman uses the (perhaps reasonable at that time) example of US 
workers being on average four times more productive than the Japanese worker, as a 
result of factors such as training, and access to capital and land (resources or raw 
materials). He explains that it would not be a wise use of resources for US workers to 
produce any product where their efficiency of production is below the average. They 
would be most productively employed, producing things they were more than four 
times as productive at producing, and importing those things they would produce less 
efficiently, from Japan. Friedman’s explanation is taking into account both Smith’s 
theory of absolute advantage, and Ricardo’s comparative advantage. It would apply 
whether there were some things the Japanese worker produced more efficiently than 
the American worker or not, as it would be advantageous to produce whatever could be 
produced relatively more efficiently, and trade for those things that could only be 
produced less efficiently, even if the Japanese worker in the example produced 
everything less efficiently than the US worker. Regardless of the absolute productivity of 
each side in the exchange, both countries in the example could enjoy a greater quantity 
of products (produced with the same quantity of inputs) by specializing where they have 
an advantage.  
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Ricardo’s theory, invoking hours of labor as the cost of production, implicitly 
assumes, given the gold standard of his time, that wages are equal in both countries. 
Friedman shows that free international trade needs to be accompanied by a free 
international market for money in the contemporary environment, where a better 
understanding of macroeconomics and monetary policy had convinced mainstream 
economists that a gold standard for currency was problematic and likely impossible to 
sustain. Friedman’s argument for free international trade is based on both the claimed 
efficiency of free markets compared to government direction, manipulation or 
intervention in the economy and also the theory of comparative advantage which can 
lead to a better material lifestyle for all countries concerned.  
Friedman’s arguments, in general, are focussed only on the ability to produce 
efficiently the greatest quantity of what is needed in an economy. His prescription is the 
same for rich and poor countries alike: unrestricted free trade. He does not address the 
question of inter-state inequality. As noted above, he does not feel that inequality is an 
important domestic concern. In fact, he argues, it has certain positive benefits.16 
Friedman, as a self-professed classical liberal, agrees that any harm one party 
does to another in the productive process, unless agreed to by both parties, is 
problematic. Such externalities, called by him “neighborhood effects,” do permit, in 
                                                          
16 Friedman is strongly opposed to any attempts by government to redistribute wealth via progressive 
taxation, though he does allow that a negative-income-tax safety net is justified, on the grounds that large 
numbers of impoverished people constitute a negative “neighborhood effect.” As he puts it, it is 
acceptable for top 90% of us to tax ourselves to aid the bottom 10%, but it not acceptable for the bottom 
90% to tax the upper 10% at a higher rate so as to decrease their (the 90%) tax burdens. (See Capitalism 
and Freedom, Chapter X and XII.) 
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some circumstances, government intervention. He does not discuss externalities 
connected to international trade, but his insistence that government intervention itself 
generates negative externalities would likely make him wary of international 
agreements that impose, or sanction restrictions on free trade. 
Globalization as a Poverty-Reduction Strategy: Jagdish Bhagwati 
 Jagdish Bhagwati, whose background is that of a development economist from 
India, a poorer developing economy, takes a strong normative position supporting the 
free trade model for international trade as a means of addressing the concern for 
alleviating extreme poverty.  
 Bhagwati, coming from a country where extreme poverty has been a large long 
term problem, believes that unrestricted free trade and removal of barriers to 
international trade are the most appropriate solutions to this problem. He argues that 
those who protest against free trade, the WTO and rapidly increasing globalization are 
wrong-headed, for their policy proposals (to the extent that they have any) would 
actually harm the poor.  
 Bhagwati starts his argument with the claim, “trade enhances growth, and 
growth reduces poverty.”17 The claim that trade enhances growth is reasonably non-
                                                          
17 Bhagwati, Jagdish. In Defense of Globalization. (New York: Oxford, 2004), 53. 
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controversial, especially if growth is being measured strictly as increasing GDP (although 
the World Bank claims this is the case even using the UN Quality of Life Index).18  
The second part of Bhagwati’s claim is based on his support for the “trickle 
down” theory of distribution in economics. He definitely supports “trickle down” 
economics, claiming that he has researched and found that internationally across 
countries in very different political and economic situations, there is very little 
difference in the pattern of the distribution of wealth. 19  
Countries seemed to have somewhat similar income distributions regardless of 
their political and economic cast. So the primary inference I made was that if 
there was no way to significantly affect the share of the pie going to the bottom 
30 percent, the most important thing was to grow the pie. 
In this view, growth was not a passive trickle down strategy for helping 
the poor. It was an active pull-up strategy instead.20 
 
 Bhagwati makes the claim that for India “trickle down” was an active strategy 
for poverty reduction, in the sense that believing they could not achieve a more equal 
distribution of resources, they have been trying to increase the total productiveness of 
the Indian economy, so that even the smallest relative share of it would be larger. 
 Adopting “trickle down” as a strategy of poverty reduction means that Bhagwati 
makes reducing poverty a much higher value than reducing or limiting inequality. In fact 
                                                          
18 Dollar, David and Kray, Aart. Trade, growth, and poverty, Volume 1.(2002) The World Bank: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&piPK=64165421&theSitePK=47791
6&menuPK=64216926&entityID=000094946_02082304142939 (accessed July 2011). 
 
19 “Trickle Down” economics is the idea that making the rich richer is an effective way of fighting poverty.  
 
20 Bhagwati. In Defense, 54. 
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Bhagwati’s position is that, inequality is not an important concern in international 
economics and development. In fact, he considers the efforts of the World Bank to 
measure inequality within societies, to be silly. 
And this lunacy—how else can one describe it?—extends to what the World 
Bank, with its abundance of economists aid funds, has been doing in recent 
years, which is to put all households of the world onto one chart to measure 
inequality of incomes.21 
 
It is pretty much necessary that he take this position on inequality if he is to 
endorse “trickle down” economics as a poverty reduction strategy. Indeed, I think that a 
cogent argument could be made that relative inequality is less important than assuring 
that everyone has their basic needs satisfied. Singer supports this position (that relative 
inequality is more acceptable than extreme poverty, not trickle-down). Rawls allows 
inequality (but doesn’t explicitly support trickle-down) in his influential Theory of Justice, 
if it improves the position of the worst off. 22  
 Bhagwati does address the issue of externalities, at fairly serious length, in his 
support for a free market model of international trade. His argument takes three 
different approaches to addressing the concern. While Bhagwati accepts that, there are 
many concerns expressed by critics of globalization regarding labor exploitation and the 
social or cultural costs of international competition for labor, his strategy in this 
                                                          
21 Bhagwati. In Defense, 67. 
 
22 Rawls, A Theory. Rawls specifically limits his principles of justice in A Theory of Justice to within a 
particular economy. This makes sense in relation Bhagwati’s discussion of trickle down and inequality in 
the Indian economy, but Rawls would not support their application to relations between states as he 
states clearly in Law of Peoples.  
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situation is to point out that, those expressing the concern are largely mistaken about 
the costs, or misunderstand the true causes of the problems.23 His position on many of 
the social and human rights costs of the externalities is that, they would be worse 
without the removal of barriers to trade, and that increasing trade is actually the 
solution, to many of the problems people who are against a self-regulating free market 
for international trade, cite as evidence in their support. 
 Bhagwati takes the position that the problem of externalities in the free market 
model of international trade, is generally, not a concern that affects the viability of the 
model very strongly, since most of the issues are either misunderstood, misrepresented 
or far outweighed by the benefits achieved by the model.  
 An example of this would be his dismissal of the problems for women that have 
been pointed out by anti-globalization activists. Bhagwati takes on the concerns for the 
rights of women workers in Export Processing Zones (EPZs).24 Bhagwati doesn’t cite 
particular sources, but explains that many authors have claimed that young women are 
exploited as laborers in these zones, for low wages, in often problematic working 
conditions.25 He argues that the reality is that, in these situations, these women are 
                                                          
23 Bhagwati, In Defense, 82. 
 
24 An Export Processing Zone is a an area usually around a port or adjacent to a border where special 
tariff/ taxation rules apply, incentives to establish businesses funded by foreign capital are provided, and 
in some cases special environmental and / or labor laws have been put in place to encourage foreign 
producers to locate facilities there that produce goods for export markets. For example the 
“Maquiladora” Zones in Northern Mexico, where goods and materials can be imported, processed and 
exported again without paying tariffs unless they are marketed in Mexico.  
 
25 Bhagwati doesn’t cite sources but it is easy to find a variety of sources for this claim, including Klein, 
Naomi Klein’s No Logo (1999) and Iris Young’s Global Challenges, 165-167. 
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almost always better off than they would be without the option of working in the EPZ 
industries, and in fact, are normally better off than the standard for labor in the 
country.26 In the case of the very high rate of crime against women in the Mexican 
Maquiladora zones near the border with the U.S. Bhagwati argues that this is really not 
a factor associated with the EPZ but rather a background factor which just happens to 
coincide with the area.27 
Bhagwati takes the same sort of position regarding the concern that the WTO 
ignores issues of environmental and animal welfare. He argues that, most of the 
environmental concerns are overstated or unproven, and explains that environmental 
issues are generally not a focus of concern for trade economists. 
The environmentalists tend to value the environment over income, whereas 
trade (and other) economists conventionally tend to value income over 
environment. 
…In fact whereas environmentalists often disdain markets, prescriptions 
such as the regulatory imposition of “polluter pay” taxes amount to nothing 
more than demands to create the missing markets.28 
 
 He suggests the reality is that, what environmentalists actually want is best 
achieved, by ensuring environmental values are included in the calculation of costs of 
doing business. In fact, his position is not so far from Singer’s in the end: that the issue 
of externalities in international trade is one where, because of weaknesses in the 
                                                          
26 Bhagwati, In Defense, 83-84. 
 
27 In fact the explosion of violent crime accompanying the unofficial move of the Mexican government 
from quietly permitting specific groups to operate, to a war on drugs seems to corroborate Bhagwati’s 
position. 
 
28 Bhagwati, In Defense, 136-137. 
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international law, the control over the ability of producers to externalize costs in 
international trade, is much weaker than within territorial states. The most effective 
approach is to ensure environmental values are effectively assigned value in trade. 
Bhagwati admits there are some issues with externalities in international trade, but he 
feels that the value of an unrestricted free trade model for international trade is so 
strong for alleviating poverty in countries such as India, that these externalities, which 
he sees as exaggerated, are worth tolerating.29  
 In summary, Bhagwati argues that the case in favor of the free-trade model for 
international trade, is both very strong and fairly clear. His position can be understood 
as being that, free trade promotes economic growth much more effectively than any 
other trade regime, that economic growth is the only way to effectively fight poverty, 
and that any of the downsides, such as inequality, or environmental, cultural and human 
rights concerns are either, not really true, or are heavily outweighed by the benefits of 
economic growth. 
Critiques of the Free Trade Model 
 The self-regulating free market model for international trade has more than two 
centuries of support, starting with Adam Smith, and has been shown to be a model that 
in general produces economic growth.30 However, it has also raised a variety concerns, 
                                                          
29 Bhagwati, In Defense, 137-145. 
 
30 Dollar, David and Kraay, Aart. “Spreading the Wealth” Foreign Affairs 81, no.1 (2002) 120-133. 
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even for ideal situations—and ideal free market conditions have never been achieved, 
and may well be unachievable.31 
In opposition to the free market model stands protectionism. “Protectionism” 
actually describes several orientations to trade, ranging from isolationism to expansively 
nationalistic mercantilist and strategic tariff models, and also includes several prominent 
economic development strategies. The protectionist model was, in the early stages of 
capitalism, the traditional model for international trade, but protectionism as economic 
theory (not always as a practice) has been out of fashion for more than thirty years, and 
economists who supported it have until very recently been considered cranks or 
backwards socialist holdovers. Recently, however, there has been new support for some 
sorts of protectionism, mostly in the form of critiques of the efficiency and real 
sustainability of the free trade model. 
 One of the key issues with the free-market model is that market solutions tend 
to create inequality. Those that advocate them have often admitted this, such as 
Bhagwati who simply dismisses inequality as a problem, or Friedman, who suggests 
methods for easing the situation for those in the home country who are inevitably less 
successful in competition. While the economic-growth aspect is important, there are 
many who regard inequality per se a serious issue both within societies and between 
                                                          
31 For example Polanyi, in The Great Transformation, argues the economic problems created by the self-
regulating market tend to become unbearable for some portions of society, so that governments are 
forced to intercede before social tensions tear the society apart. 
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states on the international stage, which indicates that it might be worth considering 
other options. 
Bhagwati’s dismissal of inequality as an important issue in economic justice is 
problematic. While his position, can derive support from the idea that satisfying basic 
needs is more important than equality, it seems clear that if it was possible to supply 
basic needs without worsening the problems associated with very pronounced 
inequalities, there would be a strong obligation to choose that other option as being 
much more just than “trickle-down” economics.32 
A justice concern when considering the free-trade model, (is actually brought up 
by Bhagwati, when he argues that effective participation for the poor in democratic 
systems is an important factor for alleviating poverty and ensuring their voices are 
heard so their needs can be met. 
But the ability of the poor to access the growth process and to share in the 
prosperity depends at least as much on their ability to get their voices heard in 
the political process. Without a voice, it is highly unlikely they will get 
appropriate and effective legislation.33 
 
He makes this argument for democratic participation and effective democratic 
structures as a tool in fighting poverty, almost at the same time as he points out that the 
democratic structure of the WTO is heavily undermined by disparities of wealth and 
power.  
                                                          
32 There are some prominent economists, among them Nobel-laureate Joseph Stiglitz who argue that 
trickle-down economics has been strongly and repeatedly discredited. We will examine Stiglitz in some 
detail below. 
 
33 Bhagwati, In Defense, 58. 
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The United States is protected only by its size and its ability as a hegemon to 
browbeat other nation-states into not passing such legislation.[such legislation 
as would go against its interest] But that leaves a gaping incoherence and 
cynicism in the world at the inherent asymmetry and injustice of a WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism that implicitly, even if perhaps unwittingly, favors the 
powerful.34 
 
This would seem to be a serious inconsistency in his case, for he also argues that you 
can effectively fight poverty by increasing inequality. 
Another concern about Bhagwati’s argument in support of the free-market 
model of international trade is that, in the end, his support is based almost completely 
on the idea that trade will increase GDP, and increasing GDP will alleviate poverty. It 
certainly is the case that increasing GDP may alleviate poverty (especially in the very 
weakest economies), but while increasing GDP may be necessary in alleviating poverty, 
it is not a foregone conclusion that simply increasing GDP will mean that more wealth is 
available to the most impoverished members of a society. Certainly, the most 
impoverished countries need their GDP to increase by many times to lift the poorest out 
of danger, if they retain their extremely unequal distributions of wealth. In fact it is 
often the case that, countries can create conditions that allow some to amass huge 
amounts of wealth, while the poorest seem to reap little benefit. (An example of this 
would be Mexico, which is a middle income country is the home of Carlos Slim, 
sometimes listed as the world’s richest man, but also a country of grinding poverty, 
which for many at the bottom has actually shifted very little since the 1980s.) 
                                                          
34 Bhagwati, In Defense, 157. 
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Comparative Advantage Is Likely False: Ralph Gomory 
One of the strongest arguments for protectionism is put forward by economist 
Ralph Gomory, research professor at Stern School of Business at New York University, 
and President of the Alfred P Sloan Foundation 1989-2007, who argues effectively that, 
a complete focus on free trade is not in the national interest of wealthy developed 
countries. Gomory argues that the theory of comparative advantage has some serious 
problems when applied to real world economies.  
The first problem pointed out by Gomory is that comparative advantage will only 
function to the extent that all countries involved in the trade, be it bilateral or complex 
and multilateral, possess a comparative advantage, in some trade good for which there 
is sufficient demand to support the goods they will import.35 This is important for the 
US, as Gomory points out, where this is not currently the case, with manufactured 
goods being imported from countries with cheap labor. Gomory argued, in Global Trade 
and Conflicting National Interests (2000), that it seemed impossible that the workers of 
the US and other developed wealthy economies, could continue to create 10 to 100 
times more value per unit of labor-input, than countries such as China. And that it is 
likely to be difficult in the long run, to export enough of anything, to countries with 
labor costs 10 to 100 times lower, to be able to pay for imports at our current level of 
                                                          
35 Ralph E. Gomory And William J. Baumol, Global Trade And Conflicting National Interests (Cambridge: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2001). 
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consumption. He claimed that it would likely lead to a levelling down of standard of 
living, in the long term.  
Ten years later Gomory is no longer suggesting this as a mere possibility. He now 
arguesthat, it has happened. There is no way produce anything that has demand as an 
export comparable with the level of imports, and that our imports are now basically 
being paid for with IOUs in the form of Treasury Bills.36  
It should be recalled that paying for imports with pieces of paper, is exactly what 
Milton Friedman suggested would be a great export industry, if it were possible. Of 
course Friedman claimed it wouldn’t be possible. Gomory agrees the practice is 
ultimately unsustainable, but argues that, it will drain the resources of the countries 
practicing it during the time it is being practiced.37 Friedman claimed that, it wouldn’t be 
possible, and the reality is that he was right. Although the Treasury Bill “IOUs” are, in 
one sense, just pieces of paper, the reason they are accepted in trade, when we 
produce nothing now that the Chinese want to buy from us, is that they could be used 
to buy assets in the US comprised of the wealth that has been accumulated over the last 
two centuries. The Chinese don’t want much that we produce now, (We might earn 
some exchange selling designs of some high technology items to them, but they don’t 
                                                          
36 Gomory, Ralph. Manufacturing and the Limits of Comparative Advantage.(2009) Huffington Post. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ralph-gomory/manufacturing-and-the-lim_b_227870.html (Accessed 
Oct. 2012). 
 
37 Canada is also doing this with China and paying for it in Canadian Treasury Bills which are being put to 
use in buying rights to resource extraction in Canada—particularly the oil sands reserves in Alberta, a case 
I plan to look at in some depth.  
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need to buy them since they get them when those items are produced in Chinese 
factories anyway) but considerable wealth is held in the US in the form of financial 
capital, resources and real estate. For the time being Treasury Bills are still attractive, as 
they are supported by the accumulated wealth of the US economy. It is a lot of wealth 
but it is not infinite, and a huge amount has already been traded off. When it is gone the 
trade in pieces of paper for imported manufactured goods will be over.  
Each year we make up for the year’s huge trade deficit, not by shipping gold, but 
by shipping IOU’s: treasury bills which are essentially promises to pay later. As 
Warren Buffet puts it, “we are selling the nation out from under us.” When we 
come to pay this enormous accumulation later we will then be poor indeed.38 
  
Related to the concern for the problems with the theory of comparative 
advantage, but also an important issue on its own, is the problem of speculative flows of 
international capital. International capital speculation may interfere with assumptions 
of the theory of comparative advantage (which presumes capital and labor to be 
confined within national borders) and has created massive instability in international 
economics. While free flows of capital may benefit those who are in a position to 
speculate, the instability can damage an economy by producing recessionary 
unemployment. Even Bhagwati, who is a strong advocate of the free-trade model, is 
                                                          
38 Gomory, Ralph. “Manufacturing and the Limits of Comparative Advantage,” Huffington Post 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ralph-gomory/manufacturing-and-the-lim_b_227870.html (accessed 
Oct. 2012). The Warren Buffett quote can be found in the Fortune magazine archives:  
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/11/10/352872/index.htm.  
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strongly opposed to unrestricted flows of capital or capital account convertibility 
(promotion of which has been an important part of WTO and IMF policy).39  
Friedman argues that without the ability for currency to flow freely between 
countries the free market model is not sustainable. In Capitalism and Freedom, he does 
not explicitly equate a free market for currency with a free market for capital. (He only 
discusses the money necessary to pay for goods.) However in practice the two are 
difficult to separate, and policy that began with the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT, predecessor of the WTO) and has continued into the WTO, requires 
members to make commitments to liberalizing or deregulating financial services within 
their countries.  
 Another serious problem with the free-trade model is the assumption of 
perpetual economic growth in competitive international capitalism and the reality of a 
world of limited resources, which will be examined in more detail later in the chapter. 
The Development of Underdevelopment: Andre Gunder Frank 
Free Trade has gained such overwhelming support from economists in recent 
years, that it is considered shocking when a prominent mainstream economist steps out 
of the orthodox dogma and questions the assumptions of free trade. Princeton 
economist Alan Blinder is quoted in the Wall Street Journal: 
Like 99% of economists since the days of Adam Smith, I am a free trader down to 
my toes.” [However this is shifting to some extent.] Mr. Blinder has changed his 
                                                          
39 Bhagwati, In Defense, 8, 203-205. See also Session 17: The future of trade in financial services: 
Safeguarding stability. Report written by Melinda St. Louis, Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch: 
www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public...e/session17_summ_e.doc (Nov. 2011). 
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message -- helping lead a growing band of economists and policy makers who 
say the downsides of trade in today’s economy are deeper than they once 
realized. 40  
 
However, in the immediate post-war period, characterized by decolonization and 
the rise of independent countries in what was then called the “Third World,” alternative 
development strategies were often proposed that involved a degree of protectionism. 
Infant Industry Protection and Import Substitution are closely related models for 
economic development that, rely on protectionist approaches to international trade. In 
general, the difference can be understood as, Infant Industry Protection being a 
targeted protectionism, that allows specific, selected industries to develop behind a 
protective curtain of tariffs, while Import Substitution is a more generalized effort to 
make imported products more expensive than domestically produced products across 
an economy, so that, the domestic industries will develop to produce goods that, were 
once generally imported.41  
Infant Industry Protection and Import Substitution models of development have 
two different branches of argument supporting them. The first branch argues that, 
creating a protected environment where competition with external competitors is 
                                                          
40 As reported in The Wall Street Journal, Wednesday 28 March 2007, page A1, in “Pain from Free Trade 
Spurs Second Thoughts.” 
 
41 An interesting difference is that Infant Industry Protection is almost always a direct-tariff-based policy 
choice whereas Import Substitution can sometimes be the accidental effect of currency exchange values 
and international economic conditions. The latter occurred in Mexico starting in the 1930s when 
devaluation of the peso created an Import Substitution effect that was so positive for most Mexicans from 
lower and mid income brackets that it was supported by protectionist policy until the end of the 1970s. 
Canada also experiences this effect when the US dollar climbs to the point that US imports increase 
strongly in price over an extended period. 
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avoided, is an effective way of producing industries that will eventually be 
internationally competitive and able to survive without protection, developing an 
economy that will eventually no longer need protection. The idea here is that, an 
economic development strategy can be (and has been) used to build poorer 
underdeveloped economies into wealthy developed countries.  
The second branch is more focussed on economic justice for the citizens of the 
country adopting the policy. It holds that, Import Substitution can be used to foster the 
growth of industries that will provide high quality employment and good quality of life 
to the citizens of a country, where most citizens are currently locked into low-skilled, 
low-paying agriculture and unskilled urban labor employment. Changing this situation is 
difficult, not only because it is difficult for new start-ups in industry to compete 
internationally, but also because international competitors have little interest in losing 
the market they have in that country to domestic competition, and will arrange to slow 
it as much as is in their power. The focus here is not completely separate from the first 
position, but it has a much stronger focus on economic justice for citizens. 
Andre Gunder Frank has taken an even stronger line regarding this situation. 
“Underdevelopment,” he argues, is not a static condition from which poor countries 
have not yet emerged, but is the result of what he calls the “Development of 
Underdevelopment.”42 The development of underdevelopment is understood as the 
                                                          
42 Gunder Frank, Andre. Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and 
Brazil (Monthly Review Press U of T, 1969; digitized 2007). 
 
206 
 
situation, which was in many ways an extension of colonialism, whereby wealthy 
developed countries created an economic relationship with poor countries, through 
control over terms-of-trade and control of investment in developing country economies. 
Developing countries thus developed only in ways that tended to profit the wealthy 
developed countries, which were able to use the underdeveloped countries as sources 
of inexpensive raw materials and markets for manufactured goods.  
Gunder Frank has argued that it is possible to circumvent this exploitative 
relationship by cutting off the unequal trade relationship, and focussing on using the 
countries own resources to satisfy domestic needs and wants that had been previously 
satisfied by imports, paid for by exporting raw materials. 
This argument for Import Substitution protectionism has a strong moral 
character. The argument in Development of Underdevelopment is that, the 
underdevelopment of many poor country economies is no accident, but is a result of 
terms of trade and investment policies of developed countries.  
Joseph Stiglitz, ex–White House and World Bank chief economist, and Nobel 
Laureate in economics, makes the same point (the idea that underdevelopment is 
planned rather than accidental) when discussing the situation of Korea in the 1960s. 
International economic advisors and the IMF suggested that the best course for Korea 
would be to focus on rice agriculture where they possessed a comparative or even 
absolute advantage.43 The Korean government resisted this, because the rate of return 
                                                          
43Charlton, Andrew and Stiglitz, Joseph. Fair Trade for All (New York: Oxford, 2006). 
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on labor for rice is so much less than for industrial manufactured goods that even very 
successful rice farming meant poverty for those working in the industry. (Luckily for 
Korea, it was an important ally during the Cold War period, and was thus supported by 
the United States in its quest for industrial development, which has, in fact, been 
stunning.)  
The argument for Import Substitution, in the case of Gunder Frank’s 
“development of underdevelopment,” is a protectionist position on international trade 
for developing countries, taken on the basis that wealthy developed countries are 
generally using their wealth and power to create conditions, (terms of trade) that 
contribute to the underdevelopment of many poor country economies. Import 
Substitution is often dismissed by many development economists, (such as Bhagwati) 
because it seems to ignore the efficiencies (and ability to increase everyone’s material 
well being) provided by comparative advantage. However, Gunder Frank and others 
who support the theory of Import Substitution, do not generally ignore Comparative 
Advantage (although some do), but rather judge that the unfair unequal exchange that 
results from promoting international trade under less than ideal conditions, created by 
the bargaining power wealthy developed countries have over less developed countries, 
negates the benefits of it. 
Stiglitz, who is very concerned about global social justice, has pointed out that 
for many countries, particularly in Latin America, the “post-reform” period after import-
substitution industrialization policies were discarded in favor of Washington-Consensus-
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style free markets and trade liberalization, has in many cases seen less consistent 
economic growth, and what growth that has occurred has mostly accrued to the 
wealthiest 10% of Latin American societies. 
Indeed, at this juncture, the growth record of the so-called post-reform era looks no 
better, and in some countries much worse, than in the widely criticized import-
substitution period of the 1950s and 1960s when Latin countries tried to 
industrialize by discouraging imports. Indeed, reform critics point out that the burst 
of growth in the early l990s was little more than a “catch-up” that did not even 
make up for the lost decade of the 1980s.44 
 
Free Trade and a Race to the Bottom: Joseph Stiglitz 
Joseph Stiglitz also suggests that there is almost certainly another strong 
argument for some form of protectionism in international trade, or at least the need to 
take a close look at how trade is regulated. He suggests that international wage 
competition, based on the fact capital and resources are generally free to move 
wherever the cheapest labor can be found, while labor is generally bound by the 
frontiers of territorial states, is leading to a situation where wages for labor are 
becoming a lower and lower share of the global economy, with the share of the very 
rich who hold capital ever increasing.45 Since wage earners must spend a much higher 
percentage of their income just to live day to day than the very rich, increasing 
concentration of income in the hands of those who are already wealthy, means that 
                                                          
44 Stiglitz, Joseph. “Globalism’s Discontents” in The American Prospect Magazine (winter 2002) accessed 
at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Global_Economy/Globalisms_Discontents.html (July, 2011). 
 
45 Stiglitz, Joseph. “The global crisis, social protection and jobs” in International Labour Review 148, nos 1–
2 (2009). Also see: Piketty, Thomas, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Belknap, 2014) 
chapters 5 and 6.  
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there is a strong possibility of a reduction in global aggregate effective demand. 
According to Stiglitz, this can lead to stagnation in economies around the world, if there 
is no strategy to address it.  
In fact, Stiglitz blames the trend towards international labor competition, and 
hence the reduced aggregate demand, for contributing to the type of monetary policy 
that led to the 2007-8 financial crisis. Basically his claim is that the strategy was to 
increase US aggregate demand, by using credit to replace the money many people no 
longer had, due to the shift to international sources of labor, such as China. 
The problem that Keynes recognized was that wages can be too flexible. Indeed, 
when wages fall, people’s income falls and their ability to demand goods falls as 
well. Lack of aggregate demand was the problem with the Great Depression, just 
as lack of aggregate demand is the problem today. 46 
 
Economists such as Stiglitz understand this to be a problem, but the dominant 
paradigm in economics, beginning in the 1970s, and continuing strong today, has been 
“supply–side economics,” which focuses on the supply side of the market equation, and 
how to make the factors of production come together in the most efficient manner. 
Supply-side economics takes the demand side of the supply-and-demand operation of 
markets for granted, assuming that if the supply side is functioning as efficiently as 
possible, there will be sufficient demand for products at a high enough price level to 
support their production.47 
                                                          
46 Stiglitz, Joseph. “The global crisis,” 10. 
 
47 Kohler, Gernot. What is Global Keynsianism?(1998). 
http://wsarch.ucr.edu/archive/papers/kohler/kohler2.htm (accessed Feb 2012). Supply side economics 
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The concern for those that disagree with supply-side economics is that, if it is the 
case that international competition on wages tends to bring down the proportion of the 
value of the economy paid out in wages on a general global scale, we may well be 
looking at a situation where decreasing effective demand on the part of consumers 
globally, leads to economic stagnation, and even a global recession.  
Environmental and Ecological Economics Critiques 
Environmental Economics and Ecological Economics have both become 
important areas of international economics and trade. The ideas of both are becoming 
increasingly involved in international environmental and economic discourse, 
particularly since the Brundtland Commission (World Commission on the Environment 
and Development) report to the United Nations.48  
 The Brundtland Commission report was the first official, extensive, description of 
the links between international trade and environmental problems. The concept of 
sustainable development comes into common use and is defined in the report. Some of 
the key concerns noted were the connections between protectionism on the part of 
industrialized countries against manufactured goods coming from less developed 
countries, and the need for the least developed countries to sell mineral and energy 
                                                          
doesn’t consider the demand side to be magic. Rather, the argument is that the cost of the factors of 
production, paid in wages and to holders of resources, will put money in the hands of consumers.  
 
48 Report of the World Commission on the Environment and Development: Our Common Future (United 
Nations, 1987).  
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resources to generate foreign exchange.49 This is accompanied by an increasing shift 
from the use of domestic energy and non-renewable resources, to the use of imported 
energy and non-renewable resources in wealthy developed countries. The problem was 
that developing countries, which were relying on exports of non-renewable resources, 
were often doing so, at the expense of environmental preservation, and maintaining a 
supply of resources for the future. The commission generally took the position that 
resource use was becoming less intensive per capita in developed countries, with 
increasing technological development, and that technology increases would likely ease 
some of the pressures on non-renewable resources caused by economic growth. An 
important understanding developed by the report, was that environmental concerns 
were not separable from concerns about trade and development, and that it is 
necessary to have effective cooperation on both, to address issues of poverty, as well as 
environmental degradation. Since the Brundtland Commission report, environmental 
issues have been an issue that arises consistently in international trade, although 
environmental concerns have often been more visible in protests against the WTO, than 
in its negotiating agenda. 
 
 
                                                          
49 Report of the World Commission on the Environment and Development: Our Common Future (United 
Nations, 1987), 3I. 
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Environmental Economics and the Concerns of Resource Scarcity and Environmental 
Degradation 
 Environmental economics is considered a separate field from ecological 
economics, and they approach environmental issues with very different perspectives. In 
general, environmental economics is a branch of conventional neoclassical economics, 
which applies the tools and paradigms of neoclassical economics to environmental 
issues. There are two broad areas Environmental Economics addresses, which are 
relevant for considering the environmental/ecological concerns for justice in 
international trade. The areas are usually considered to be resource scarcity, questions 
about the long term supply of productive resources, and the concern over 
environmental degradation, pollution and destruction, or damage to desired features of 
the natural environment.  
 Concerns about the environment and the resources necessary to maintain a 
productive economy, capable of satisfying the needs and wants of human beings, are 
almost as old as the field of economics itself. Thomas Malthus, a contemporary and 
friend of David Ricardo, wrote An Essay on the Principle of Population50 in 1798, which 
was famously concerned with the different growth rates of human population and 
human capacity to produce food. He suggested limits on population growth would be 
required soon, or catastrophic shortages of food would arise. He based his argument on 
                                                          
50 Malthus, Thomas. An Essay on the Principle of Population (London: John Murray, 1826) Ch II, accessed 
at: http://www.econlib.org/library/Malthus/malPop1.html#Chapter%20II. 
 
 
213 
 
the idea that, because usable agricultural land was limited (with the best land already in 
use), there would be diminishing marginal returns to investment in agricultural 
production. Humans would put more labor and capital into farming, but as the extent of 
land was limited, this would bring less and less improvement, as the available land was 
used more intensively (the idea being that beyond a certain point adding more plows 
and laborers will not increase the yield much on a specific acreage of land).  
 In the period after the Second World War, the 1950s and early 1960s, there was 
considerable interest in the academic community, in the harm the massive industrial 
development occurring in wealthy industrial economies was causing in the 
environment.51 Both the concerns regarding possible depletion or impending scarcity of 
resources, and about pollution and environmental degradation were of interest. 
 In the area of depletion of resources, the findings of Harold Barnett and 
Chandler Morse have become an important foundation of environmental economics. 
Barnett and Morse were interested in the question of whether or not the basic idea of 
Malthus’ concern for scarcity of natural resources was testable. They understood 
scarcity in the sense of economic scarcity in a market. They considered, if resources 
were becoming increasingly scarce, they should be able to see the evidence of 
increasing scarcity, in a historical rise in prices over time,52 the idea being that, if 
                                                          
51 There was considerable pollution and degradation observable by this point, more in fact than is visible 
now in wealthy developed countries. Popular interest in environmental issues, followed academic interest 
for the most part.  
 
52 Barnett, Harold J; Morse, Chandler, Scarcity and Growth: The Economics of Natural Resource Availability 
(New York: Johns Hopkins / Resources for the Future, 1963). 
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resources were becoming scarce, the cost of extracting the resources and getting them 
to market should be increasing over time. They examined a wide variety of resources, 
including agricultural products, lumber, metals, minerals, petroleum and coal from the 
1860s to the 1960s. They found the costs for bringing resources to market had 
decreased rather than increased. They thus claim that the hypothesis of increasing 
resource scarcity, made by Malthus, seems to fail, as what they found was increasing, 
rather than diminishing, returns to resource production. It seemed as if, their research 
showed resources becoming economically more plentiful. They also checked the cost of 
resource production against other types of production, to control for technology 
improvements, and found resource production costs were decreasing even in relation to 
other types of production. 
 In Scarcity and Growth, Barnett and Morse suggest that calls for conservation of 
natural resources were not the correct approach to ensuring the future viability of the 
economy. In fact, they claimed it would have a perverse effect, as it would stifle 
innovation. They argued that, natural resources were a less important component of the 
assets that we should pass to future generations than the technological development, 
knowledge and capital, which would lead to substitution of new resources, and would 
more than make up for any depletion of specific natural resources. Their findings, and 
the position they developed from them, have become the supporting basis for the 
conception of unlimited economic growth. 
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 The concern for managing harmful pollution and environmental degradation also 
has a long history in economic thought. A.C. Pigou is credited with being the first 
economist to work on the problem of what we now call externalities. In The Economics 
of Welfare, Pigou was concerned with what he called uncompensated services or 
disservices, experienced by third parties to economic transactions. 53 These were costs 
or benefits of producing a good or service that were not paid (or compensation received 
for) by the supplier of a good or service in a market transaction. Pigou accounted for 
them with a figure he called social net product, which was an expression of the actual 
benefit of production of any good or service for society, including these uncompensated 
services and disservices.54 Uncompensated disservices would lower the “social net 
product”, and uncompensated services would have the opposite effect. He included the 
effects of pollution, and other problems caused by production, on others in the 
environment where it was produced. His solution was for the government to regulate or 
tax these uncompensated disservices, so as to force the producer to pay the social net 
cost or refrain from producing the uncompensated disservices. The idea eventually 
became known as internalizing externalities.55  
                                                          
53 Pigou, A.C. The Economics of Welfare. (London: MacMillan and Co., 1932) accessed at: 
http://www.econlib.org/library/NPDBooks/Pigou/pgEW.html.  
 
54 Pigou, The Economics, Chap II.IX.10-12. 
 
55 A Canadian economist Scott Gordon, came up with the terms in relation to fisheries. I learned this in 
William Jaeger’s Environmental Economics for Tree Huggers and Other Skeptics, (Washington DC: Island 
Press, 2005). 
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 In 1960, Ronald Coase took Pigou’s idea of the uncompensated 3rd party 
disservice, known as a negative externality, and applied his concern for achieving 
maximum efficiency in use of economic resources to the problem. Coase felt that much 
government regulation and many of the taxes directed at motivating producers to 
internalize negative externalities into their production costs, or restricting their 
productive activity to avoid them, are extremely inefficient, in the sense that they are 
almost never exactly geared to internalizing the accurate cost of the externality into 
production. Regulation may prohibit an activity altogether, when in fact, there is 
sufficient demand for the products, that the cost of the negative externality could be 
included in the production costs, (the damage paid for) and the process would still be 
profitable. A tax would often be inaccurate in relation to the actual cost of the 
externality, which might vary from case to case. And if the cost of the tax was too high, 
it could stop productive activity from occurring in cases where the actual cost of 
internalizing was less than the tax (but the tax was enough to make it unprofitable). On 
the other hand if the tax was too low, uncompensated harm would still be generated 
from the activity (this is the situation when companies consider the fines they get for 
breaking regulations to be a cost of doing business). In each of these situations there is 
inefficiency occurring, because either usable resources are not being used in production, 
or there are harms occurring that are not being compensated for. Coase took the 
position that the best way to address this efficiently was to give someone the property 
rights to whatever was being harmed. In Coase’s first example, it is the harm caused 
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when the cows belonging to a rancher whose property is adjacent to a farmer, wander 
onto the farmer’s property and destroy the crops. Coase assumes wandering cows are 
unavoidable without a fence. The crops are obviously the property of the farmer, and he 
has a legal right to be compensated for the crops the cows destroy. If the rancher had 
no obligation to compensate the farmer, he would have no motivation to control the 
cows in any way. Since the crops destroyed belong to the farmer, and the rancher must 
compensate for their destruction, he must take the cost of doing so into consideration. 
If the cost of paying the damages is less than the cost of fencing the cows in, and less 
than his profit from raising the cows, he will compensate the farmer, and not build 
fencing. If the cost of fencing is less than compensating the farmer, and less than his 
profit from raising the cows, he will build a fence to keep the cows in. If the profit he will 
receive from raising the animals is less than the cost of fencing or compensating the 
farmer, he will decide not to raise cows.56  
 This is a simplification, but illustrates Coase’s position on the efficiency of 
property rights over regulation. If there is simply a blanket regulation that cows be 
fenced to avoid damage to crops, it would in many cases be less efficient than the 
situation where the rancher must pay the costs incurred by the damage to the holder of 
the property rights. Regulation calling for fencing, would create a situation where the 
raising of cows was less efficient, because in many cases, fencing would have to be paid 
for even when it might be less expensive just to compensate the farmer, or the rancher 
                                                          
56 Coase, R.H. “The Problem of Social Cost” Journal of Law & Economics 3 (Oct. 1960): 2-8. 
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would abandon ranching altogether, if fencing was more expensive than the profit of 
raising the cows. Also in a situation where there was no property rights the rancher 
might elect just to pay the fine for not fencing and allowing the damage to occur, if the 
fine was less than the cost of fencing (and less than the expected profit). 
 Coase made the argument that assigning property rights was much more 
efficient than regulating or taxing, as it allowed the externality to be internalized as a 
market transaction, which would set the price of the use of the right, at the level of its 
utility to each of the parties. Interestingly, Coase takes the position that, as far as 
efficiency is concerned, it really doesn’t matter who owns the property right, whether 
the person who would experience the cost owns it, and the producer must compensate 
(or avoid the damage) the owner, or whether the producer owns the right, and the 
person who experiences the harm decides to pay the holder of the right not to use it. He 
explains it doesn’t matter for efficiency, if the farmer owns the property the crops grow 
on and the rancher must compensate or fence, or whether the rancher owns the right 
to have the cows wander, and the farmer must offer him enough compensation that he 
doesn’t use the right (fences or doesn’t raise cows). That it doesn’t matter for efficiency 
(a deal will be made according to the value of the right to both parties) is one thing, but 
it definitely ends up having a serious impact on distribution.  
 Coase`s position was very convincing for many neo-classical economists, and has 
become one of the foundations for environmental economics. It had a surge of 
popularity from the late 1990s until about 2010, in the form of a drive towards carbon 
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emissions trading. The Tragedy of the Commons by ecologist Garret Hardin in 1968, did 
quite a lot to focus Coase`s conception with respect to environmental issues. The 
Problem of Social Cost considers environmental issues only as they apply to specific 
harms to individuals, whereas Hardin`s The Tragedy of the Commons deals directly with 
the issue of overexploitation of natural resources.57 The actual tragedy of commons is 
Hardin`s explanation of the individual incentives to overexploit open access common 
resources, in a way that ends up harming the interests of all, in the long term. Hardin 
sees two ways to stop the incentive to overexploit: breaking the commons up with 
individual property rights or regulation by a central authority (similar to Coase vs. 
Pigou). In general those that favor market approaches have seized on the economic 
efficiency of the private property approach as being preferable because of its perceived 
efficiency. This is important for international trade, because the conception that free 
markets and growth are the best way to address poverty often carries with it the 
concern that, attempting central regulation of externalities breeds inefficiency.  
 In general, environmental economics, which applies the paradigms of orthodox 
neoclassical economics to environmental issues, has been the main, but not only, 
approach taken by international economic institutions to environmental issues and their 
relation to trade and development. This has meant that the assumption of unlimited 
                                                          
57 Much of Hardin’s work reflects a concern about human overpopulation. To get a sense of how his 
position on human overpopulation affects his views on global justice and extreme poverty, see: Lifeboat 
Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor. (The Garret Hardin Society) accessed at: 
http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_lifeboat_ethics_case_against_helping_poor.html 
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economic growth (and unlimited resources) has often been applied to international 
trade. The application of the assumption of unlimited growth (and unlimited resources) 
to international trade, can lead to a lack of concern regarding whether, economic 
growth is based on the trade in non-renewable energy resources that involves serious 
externalities in the production process, and often promotes concentration of wealth in a 
few economically powerful and politically connected hands,58 or whether this is trade 
that uses resources efficiently, and creates wealth that is shared widely in the society.  
Herman Daly and the Ecological Economic Critique of Free Trade Model 
 Herman Daly is an economist at the School of Public Policy of the University of 
Maryland. He was senior environmental economist at the World Bank from 1988 to 
1994. It seems fair to say he was a voice of dissent during his time at the World Bank. 
Daly has been influential in making ecological economics into a recognized field of 
economics, he has made some serious critiques of orthodox economic thinking about 
problems of poverty and the environment, and he has a well thought out position on 
international trade and global economic integration. To simplify Daly’s position, his 
understanding of economics is different from orthodox neo-classical conceptions of 
economics, because Daly conceives the economy as existing inside the ecosystem that 
supports life on the planet, and considers the economy to be bounded, or limited by the 
ability of the earth’s ecosystem to provide the resources we need to survive and thrive. 
                                                          
58 An example of the first, is the Canadian oil and gas industry which has a production process with 
massive negative environmental externalities, some of which cause direct short term harm (health effects 
to some of the least powerful members of Canadian society (aboriginal people who live near the projects).  
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Daly believes there is a human carrying capacity for the planet, and that we must live 
within that, or like any other species, run out of resources. 
 Daly is very concerned about the concepts of economic growth and 
development. He argues that contemporary mainstream economists, neo-classical 
economists, in general use the terms growth and development interchangeably in 
economics, while they should in fact be separate concepts. Daly takes the position that 
we should understand economic growth as an increase in the overall size of the 
economy in relation to the ecosystem that contains it, or growth as increasing 
throughput of resources to produce more goods and services, while on the other hand, 
we should understand development, as improvements in process in the economy, that 
allow us to use resources more efficiently, producing more goods and services, without 
increasing the input of resources and output of waste. He argues that the idea of 
sustainable development has been co-opted into the phrase sustainable growth. Daly 
critiques this because, it ignores the reality that economic growth is constrained by the 
limits of the environment. Growth achieved through increasing the throughput of 
resources is growth at the expense of the future. Daly argues that trickle-down theories 
of fighting poverty, which suggest that wealthy developed countries must focus on 
growth to support the growth of impoverished developing countries with markets, 
capital and technology, are problematic, because they assume unlimited growth. He 
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argues that the issue is, we do not actually know how big the subset of the economy can 
get inside the larger ecosystem before it cannot be sustained.59 
 Daly considers that the assumption of unlimited growth, based on the 
assumption of infinite resources, illustrates some of the problems with the abstraction 
from the actual physical / historical economic world, and reliance on mathematical 
modelling that are features of neoclassical economics. He explains that models of the 
circular flow of the factors / resources of production in the economy contribute to this, 
showing raw materials, capital and labor flowing to producers, being transformed into 
products, and flowing back to the factor providers, in a continuing cycle, with only vague 
arrows leading in and out, connected to nothing. Daly explains that the flow of 
resources and counter flow of money, abstract from the fact that neither the resources 
input into the system, nor the products, actually move in a circular flow. Resources are 
input into the system, and are output as waste at various points. In no case, do high 
entropy wastes from the process ever actually substitute for new inputs of low entropy 
resources or energy in the cycle.60 
                                                          
59 Daly, Herman. Beyond Growth (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996)5-7. 
 
60 Low entropy resources are resources, energy or raw materials which are structured in their usable 
state, examples include: oil, coal, or wood, or metals or minerals. They become high entropy (and are 
usually waste) through use in a production process. Complex hydrocarbon molecules are broken down 
into a variety of less complex compounds (such as CO2 and H2O) which are no longer a form usable for 
energy. Wood might not break down chemically, but its organized structure of linked cells is disassembled 
(cut), making it less usable as a structural material in building (without new inputs). Low entropy equals 
high structural organization. High entropy equals lower structural organization, or more disorganization of 
the structure. 
In the case of recycling, high entropy wastes are input into the cycle again but are accompanied 
by low entropy energy. Most recycling is not very efficient ecologically (or economically much of the 
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There is much confusion about what, precisely, is supposed to grow as GNP 
grows. Many people speak of the “dematerialization of the economy” and the 
possibility that GNP can grow forever without encountering physical limits, 
because it is measured in value units rather than in physical units. [T]he notion 
that we can save the “growth forever” paradigm by dematerializing the 
economy, or “decoupling” it from resources, or substituting information for 
resources, is fantasy. We can surely eat lower on the food chain, but we cannot 
eat recipes!61 
 
 Daly notes that, the infinite resources assumption is often maintained in 
orthodox economics,62 even though there is a growing understanding of the importance 
of resource use and environmental concerns among economists, because most poverty 
reduction and development schemes are tied to continuing unrestricted economic 
growth. He explains that, the usual argument in support of this assumption is the 
presentation of possibilities of technology, and resource substitutions, as a dynamic 
force, which constantly counters depletion and degradation. One flaw in this position is 
that, another low entropy resource is always substituted for a depleted low entropy 
resource, Daly explains that we never, under any circumstance, substitute high entropy 
                                                          
time,) some is fairly efficient, requiring reasonably low energy inputs (aluminum cans) and technological 
development may make more types of recycling ecologically feasible. 
 
61 Daly, Beyond Growth, 28. 
 
62 The infinite resource assumption is a position that works with the assumption that there are no 
effective limits to economic growth, that economies can keep growing infinitely. The infinite resources 
assumption is the idea that resource availability will not be a limiting factor in economic growth because 
technology will always allow us to find substitutes when scarcity forces the price up enough to make it 
profitable to work on it. This is obviously to some extent true, this does happen, but also very obviously 
there are limits.  
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wastes for low entropy resources in net terms, and the pool of low entropy resources is 
finite and diminishing.63 
 He explains that it is often claimed reproducible capital is a near-perfect 
substitute for resources. Daly argues that this makes no sense, for it assumes capital can 
be produced independently of resources, and is in opposition to the concept of the 
coordination of factors in production. Capital is a necessary component of transforming 
resources into products; it can’t substitute for fewer resources, except in a limited 
margin. Daly argues that the abstraction from actual economic activity in models, leads 
to the error of considering the problem of resources in economics to be a problem of 
human social ingenuity, which is basically limitless, rather than a problem of the laws of 
nature. He understands the problem of resource scarcity or depletion, as belonging 
exclusively to neither category, and that it requires consideration from both 
perspectives.  
 Daly’s critique of the free trade model of international trade is based on his 
concerns for ecological sustainability, and bringing economic practices in line with the 
carrying capacity of the environment, but he is also very concerned about other issues 
of justice such as inequality and poverty. Daly’s position is that free trade, and the 
economic growth it promises will not end poverty in the short term, and in the long 
term will make us all worse off. He does believe free trade may bring economic growth, 
but he feels that it will not benefit all, and the distribution will, for the most part, not 
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take poverty reduction into account. He also believes that the focus on growth alone, 
rather than satisfying as many human needs as possible, will mean the resources used 
lavishly now, will not be available to satisfy human needs in the future, increasing 
poverty in the long term. 
 Daly makes note that free trade is the default position for almost all orthodox 
economists. He explains it is, for the most part, the unquestioned belief of economists 
that free trade is desirable and brings benefit to all. He notes that it was also his belief, 
and he required considerable accumulated evidence before abandoning it. He explains 
that, the reason that most economists hold this belief is their faith in the theory of 
comparative advantage.  
Daly’s Critique of Comparative Advantage 
 In order to consider the possible benefits and costs of free trade, Daly suggests it 
is important to understand the theoretical assumptions it is based on. He explains that, 
absolute advantage is fairly simple and doesn’t take much explaining to make sense. He 
credits Adam Smith for first laying it out as a clear argument against mercantilism. 
Absolute advantage can be exemplified as a situation, where there are two countries, 
both producing cheese and oranges. Country 1 is much more efficient at producing 
oranges than country 2, and country 2 is much more efficient at producing cheese than 
country 1. They each have an absolute advantage in one of the products. And they could 
benefit by specializing in the product they are the best at producing, and trading for the 
product the other country produces more efficiently. Daly says no one needs an 
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economist to point this out, but he explains, David Ricardo’s theory of comparative 
advantage changes this because it means that you don’t have to be the most efficient 
producer of anything, to benefit from trade. 
 Daly breaks down how Comparative Advantage works, and uses an example of 
coal and wheat between two countries, country A and country B. Ricardo uses units of 
labor, but Daly uses a total inputs cost, which he calls unit cost.64 This makes sense, as 
the model has been shown to function similarly (assuming similar assumptions) even if 
other factors are included.65 The unit cost in Daly’s example is expressed as “a” and “b” 
for each of the countries.  
 Country A: requires 1a to produce a unit of coal (C), and 1a to produce a 
unit of wheat  (W); it  has a total of 2a (units of resources), and uses them to 
produce 1C and 1W 
 Country B: requires 1b to produce a unit of coal (C), and 4b to produce a 
unit of wheat  (W); it  has a total of 5b (units of resources), and uses them to 
produce 1C and 1W 
 The total aggregate production of both countries is 2C and 2W.66 
 
Daly explains that while country B produces nothing more efficiently than 
country A, it does produce coal 400% more efficiently than wheat. According to 
comparative advantage, country B could specialize in coal and import wheat. Country A 
produces coal and wheat equally efficiently, and produces both as efficiently as Country 
                                                          
64 Daly, Herman and Farley, Joshua. Ecological Economics. (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2011), 356-8. 
 
65 The Hecksher - Ohlin Model includes multiple factors, it was developed by Eli Heckscher and Bertil 
Owen in 1919, and refined by Paul Samuelson in the 1950s. See also Giancarlo Gandalfo, International 
TradeTheory and Policy (New York: Springer, 1998), 65. 
 
66 Daly, Herman and Farley, Joshua. Ecological Economics.  
227 
 
B produces coal. According to comparative advantage they can each specialize and 
enjoy more total goods with the same resources.  
If Country B specializes in coal, it can use its total of 5b (5 resource units) to 
produce 5C and no W. Country A can specialize in wheat and use its total of 2a (2 
resource units) to produce 2W and no C. 
 
 The total world production will have increased from 2C and 2W to 5C and 2W. 
Countries A and B can then work out between them what the ratio of exchange 
between C and W will be based on demand. Daly says that Ricardo explains that in the 
situation, although it is not possible with this information to know the exact distribution, 
it is certain that both countries will be better off, or they would not engage in trade. 
 Daly notes that this is an impressive result, more than doubling coal production, 
with no sacrifice in wheat production. He suggests that it is necessary to examine the 
assumptions to bring to light the complications the theory doesn’t consider. Some of the 
costs and problems are veiled by the assumptions. 
 He argues that claiming the coal is produced with no additional resources input 
is misleading. The increased production of coal means that the reserves of coal are 
depleted 500% faster in country B, and 250% faster worldwide, and that an additional 
250% more pollution is created, as the extra coal is burned. Daly claims that the 
problem is that conventional or neo-classical economists normally do not count costs 
outside of capital and labor. He argues that a reasonable form of accounting would 
include some factor based on the depletion of non-renewable resources. 
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 He also explains that, transport costs are missing from the calculation; Wheat 
must be shipped from A to B, and Coal from B to A. Daly points out if the cost of 
transport is near 3C, then even without any other concerns, the world gains nothing. He 
argues that in general energy is subsidized, in many countries it is subsidized directly, in 
most cases it is also subsidized because many of the negative external costs of energy 
are not internalized into the cost of producing it. Daly claims that international trade, 
which relies heavily on energy intensive transportation, is indirectly subsidized by 
energy prices that do not reflect the full price of actually producing them.67 
 Daly points out a third assumption to be considered. This third assumption is 
that, the cost of specialization is negligible, but it turns out there are costs that must be 
considered. Each of the countries loses an entire economic sector; in one all farmers 
must give up their occupations and become coal miners, and in the other all miners are 
forced into farming. In each country, the loss is the loss of a lifestyle and choice of 
occupation. Daly claims that, while it is fairly widely understood in societies, that people 
derive a considerable portion of the satisfaction in their lives from the way they earn 
their living, economists identify welfare with the range of consumer choices, and say 
little about it in respect to choice of occupation.68 
 The second part of the cost of specialization is very powerful. After specialization 
countries lose the freedom to choose whether or not they will engage in trade. Daly 
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points out that one of Ricardo’s fundamental assumptions, that trade will always be 
beneficial, assumes that trade is voluntary, and we can reject an exchange if it is not to 
our benefit.  
The voluntariness of “free trade” is compromised by the interdependence 
resulting from specialization. Interdependent countries are no longer free not to 
trade, and it is precisely the freedom not to trade that was the original 
guarantee of mutual benefits of trade in the first place.69 
 
 Daly explains that once committed to specialization, the freedom in free trade 
becomes much more problematic, particularly for countries with a large portion of their 
economies specialized in nonessential commodities. In this situation countries are 
particularly vulnerable to market conditions for those products. They may be forced into 
very bad terms of trade to supply basic needs, if the market conditions are such that 
quantity supplied exceeds quantity demanded.70 
Capital Mobility Negates Comparative Advantage 
 Ricardo makes it clear that comparative advantage assumes immobility of 
capital. Daly argues that mobility of capital in international trade shifts the situation of 
comparative advantage to one of absolute advantage. Capital will be moved by its 
owners to wherever there is an opportunity for it to produce more with less input, and, 
instead of moving between industries within countries, owners of capital move it to 
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more productive industries in other countries. This means there will be less total 
production of all types, in countries that do not have an absolute advantage.  
Comparative advantage is a clever second-best adaptation to the constraint of 
international capital immobility. But without that constraint, it has no reason to 
be, and absolute advantage is all that counts.71 
 
 Daly argues that, the reality of the situation in free trade is that capital today is 
vastly more mobile than goods.72 He claims comparative advantage is completely 
irrelevant in our contemporary international trade regime.73 
 Daly explains that it is possible in situations of comparative advantage for 
everyone in a country to benefit from specialization in particular products, but it is not 
automatic. It requires that the winners compensate the losers. In Daly’s example, it 
means that in Country B, as resources shift from farming to mining, in order for 
everyone to benefit, it is necessary that, the benefits from the winning mining sector 
compensate the losses in the losing farming sector, otherwise, although there is still 
aggregate benefit, those that lose their livelihood and are scrambling to engage 
successfully in the new industries will be harmed, even though the total benefit for the 
society is increased. Within countries there are sometimes institutions and policy 
mechanisms that compensate losers (although Daly says it is not common for there to 
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72 Daly, Beyond Growth, 153. 
 
73 As explained earlier, Jagdish Bhagwati a strong pro free trade economist, agrees that current free trade 
must be based on absolute advantage.  
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be effective compensation), but internationally there are no structures which 
compensate losers when capital is moved from one production process to another.74 
 Interestingly, Daly points out that the move ends up being from a situation 
where all countries will benefit, (none will be made worse off) to a situation where 
there will be winners and losers, but there is still an aggregate benefit. Winners could 
compensate losers, if they chose to, and still be better off.75 
The nice thing about the comparative advantage argument is that both countries 
benefit from free trade, and gains are mutual—at least in theory, if not always in 
fact. The problem with absolute advantage is that both countries do not 
necessarily gain. If one country has an absolute disadvantage in both 
commodities, it will lose jobs and income as capital moves abroad. But under 
absolute advantage, world production will still increase. In theory, it would 
increase by more than under comparative advantage.76 
 
 Daly explains that absolute advantage is less politically convenient to promote, 
because it doesn’t have any guarantee of mutual benefit. He comments, “All countries 
still could be better off if there were a regulatory institution whereby winners could 
compensate losers. But then it would no longer be ‘free’ trade.”77 Daly does not feel 
that, the comparative advantage justification for free trade always being the best 
choice, holds in our current world economic order. He thinks that, absolute advantage 
can definitely produce growth, but it comes at a cost, with winners benefitting while 
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75 Daly and Farley, Ecological Economics, 362. 
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losers see little compensation. He argues outright that, Adam Smith and David Ricardo 
looking at the actual conditions in today’s world, would not support a policy of free 
trade.  
In the presence of capital mobility, money will logically flow to wherever there is 
an absolute advantage of production and away from countries where this is 
none. The world’s poorest countries may be poor precisely because they are 
inefficient at producing nearly everything. If this is true, then resources are likely 
to flow away from the poor countries, and the countries most likely to suffer 
from globalization are in fact the very poorest.78 
 
 Daly argues that, there is some empirical support for this. He explains that while 
in the last 40 years the poorest quintile of the world’s population has seen increases in 
income, when measuring from 1995 (founding of the WTO) to 2003, eight of the twenty 
poorest countries, for which data is available, actually experienced a loss in real per 
capita income.79 Daly notes for contrast that the wealthiest 20 countries averaged an 
increase of 17.6% 
 A problem with this, explains Daly, is that the gains of the wealthy developed 
countries are fueled by non-renewable resource consumption (including unsustainable 
depletion of renewable resources). Once consumed, these resources will not be 
available in the future to improve the well-being of the poorest. He also comments that 
the resource use generates waste that harms ecosystem services that could otherwise 
benefit the poorest countries.80  
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Most of these poorest countries were involved in international trade in the one 
area where they might have an absolute advantage: the extraction and export of 
natural capital. The revenue they received from both export and domestic sales 
of these resources counted as part of their income. Without this revenue, 
income as measured by GDP would have fallen even more. Yet as you will recall, 
we earlier defined income as the amount you can consume in one period 
without affecting your ability to consume in subsequent periods. Thus, revenue 
from non-renewable natural resource extraction cannot be counted entirely as 
income, and the situation of these poorest countries is even worse than it 
appears.81 
 
 Daly considers that countries competing on the basis of low cost labor will have a 
very difficult time under free trade conditions, breaking out of poverty, because 
competition under conditions of absolute advantage will prevent increasing the rock 
bottom wages, and maintain a pressure to externalize social and environmental costs. 
He takes the position that, most countries that have successfully fought poverty with a 
focus on trade, such as Korea, Taiwan and China, have not actually done this under 
conditions of free trade. 
Trade in Financial Capital 
 Daly takes the position that, the free trade in financial capital, which is an 
important part of our current international trade regime, is destructive to the 
environment, exacerbates poverty, and worsens inequality by increasing the 
concentration of wealth already held by the wealthiest elites. He does not support free 
trade in international capital, even aside from the negation of comparative advantage 
(which he thinks would cause many problems even if it held).  
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  He argues that, historically financial assets have grown faster than the economy 
as a whole over the long run, as they are not constrained by any of the physical limits of 
the real economy.82 Many financial investment firms earn most of their profits using 
computers to detect small discrepancies in international exchange rates, buying and 
selling very large amounts of currency very rapidly, which produces huge profits, but 
does absolutely nothing to increase real wealth. It is an exercise in using financial capital 
power to redistribute real wealth in the favor of those who are already wealthy. These 
situations give huge information advantages to the extremely wealthy; leaving the 
average investor at a major disadvantage, and leaving the majority out of a huge 
positive sum game. Daly claims that, these very large funds capture the gains from very 
risky gambles, and society pays the costs.83 
 Daly also holds a position in many ways similar to Pogge’s International 
Borrowing Privilege. He focuses on the problem of free trade in financial capital, as a 
root of the problem of corrupt, incompetent, or simply kleptocratic governments in 
poor developing countries, taking on debts that their population will be forced to repay.  
The consequence of free international finance (a necessary complement to free 
trade) has been the running up of unrepayable debts. Large surplus 
accumulations of money resulting from trade imbalances sought ways to grow 
exponentially and to recycle back to the deficit country to finance further trade 
deficits. Banks pumped money into Third World countries at a rate much greater 
than the ability of those governments to build wisely or to administer honestly. 
Government officials and associated elites wasted or stole large amounts of the 
borrowed funds, which consequently generated no increase in wealth. Yet these 
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loans must be paid back at interest not by those few who benefited, but by the 
general public, who received none of the benefits. The benefits were privatized, 
and the costs socialized.84 
 
 Daly sees the international debt problem for poor countries to be consistent 
with the problem of focus on growth as a solution to poverty. The practice of giving new 
loans to poor developing countries to pay the interest on loans that they already cannot 
repay causes a massive increase in debt, with the idea that it will stimulate economic 
growth, in the hope growth will increase faster than debt. Daly considers that this is 
often near impossible, as debt has no physical limits to growth, but the actual physical 
production of goods and services, to pay the debt, is limited by its physical dimension.85 
He argues that, even when financial assets do contribute to real growth of market goods 
and services, even in wealthy developed countries, the marginal costs of the growth 
often outweigh the benefits.86 
 Daly believes free international trade in financial capital is a source of many 
more problems than it solves. He is in favor of limiting the trade in financial capital,87 
and instead suggests a trade account clearing house of the type proposed by Keynes at 
Bretton Woods for the IMF.88 This would allow trade to occur without the need for 
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87 Daly recognizes the relationship between free movement of financial capital internationally, and free 
trade as explained by Friedman.  
 
88 Explained in chapter four.  
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floating exchange rates which encourage speculation. Daly is also in favor of very high 
reserves for banks, and tight regulation of financial instruments, and the trade in them. 
 Daly has critiqued the free trade model for international trade, from the 
perspective of both, concern for sustainability of the economy within the carrying 
capacity of ecological systems, and also out of concern that it causes massive inequality, 
and is ineffective in addressing concerns about poverty. He feels that the conception 
that free trade creates growth, and that economic growth is the solution to poverty, is 
mistaken. While he agrees that free trade should create growth, the costs of growth 
have been, and are likely to continue to be, very high considering the resources used 
and environmental degradation caused, when compared with its poverty reducing 
effects for the worst off. Daly also argues that resources used inefficiently now, in a 
growth at any cost style approach to poverty reduction, will make the situation worse 
for the worst off in the future.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ALTERNATIVES 
Strategic Protective Tariffs and National Interest: Fletcher 
 Ian Fletcher advocates a protectionist trade model based on strategic tariffs to 
protect the development of desired industries. This model is a contemporary 
protectionist model, addressing the negative issues stemming from the push to free 
trade, with a strategy for implementation.  In his book, Free Trade Doesn’t Work: What 
Should Replace It and Why, Fletcher spends considerable time explaining why his 
strategic tariff model is the best alternative to free trade. In doing so, he looks at the 
weaknesses of free trade models and the way the assumptions that support them, are 
at best problematic, and in some cases just not true.1 He attempts to refute key claims 
of the free trade model and also points out weakness he feels are often ignored. He is 
concerned, in the same way Gomory is, about the lack of sustainability in a situation 
where we are not exporting enough high-end products to cover what we spend to 
import goods that, under free trade, can more cheaply be produced elsewhere.  
Fletcher explains the problem of having a long term trade deficit. Trading is an 
exchange, and Fletcher notes, we must pay for the goods we receive from other 
                                                          
1 Fletcher, Ian. Free Trade Doesn’t Work: What Should Replace It and Why. (US Business and Industry 
Council, 2010). 
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countries.  There are three ways we can pay for goods we receive: with goods we 
produce today (his example: jet planes), goods we produced yesterday (his example: 
office buildings), or goods we will produce tomorrow (debt). Fletcher explains that since 
we are already in a position, where we are unable to pay for the goods we consume 
with present or past goods, there are going to be problems paying the debt incurred by 
our trade deficit.2 
Fletcher also considers it problematic that the free-trade model tends to put 
strong downward pressure on the wages of laborers, while maximizing the returns to 
capital. He sees this to be bad for society in the long term, and not a just path for the US  
economy. Contrary to views such as Bhagwati’s, which consider inequality a reasonable 
price to pay for economic growth, Fletcher is concerned about inequality. 
Even if it expands our economy overall, it could still increase poverty. In a word: 
Brazil, where an advanced First World economy exists side-by-side with Third 
World squalor, the rich live behind barbed wire, and shopkeepers hire off-duty 
policemen to kill street children.3 
 
 Fletcher also points out that there is also a problem with assuming any 
comparative advantage is worth exploiting. He argues that there are some industries 
that are good to focus on, while others are bad for the economic and social 
development of a country. He explains that good industries have continuing returns to 
investment, and are susceptible to continuing improvements, both to product and 
                                                          
2 Fletcher, Free Trade, 37-38. 
 
3 Fletcher, Free Trade, 35. 
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process. Product improvement is particularly important, as it breaks away from the 
pressure to compete strictly on price.4 Good industries also tend to have what are 
known as “ladder” externalities, which are basically positive externalities of a 
production process that stimulate other industries, or create virtuous circles of 
industrial development and innovation (Fletcher uses RAM chips in the semiconductor 
industry as his example5). 
Examples of bad industries include resource industries and agriculture, because 
there is little possibility of product innovation, and the concern that process innovation 
usually develops from outside industries, rather than from the industry itself.  He also 
notes that resource industries tend to foster a parasitic elite that contribute little of 
value to society at large. 
 At this point Fletcher is ready to describe his alternative model. A first concern is 
that the model not be too complicated. Complicated strategies for organizing a 
protective system of tariffs would be difficult to implement and, more importantly, 
would be beyond reasonable democratic accountability.6  What we need, he says, is 
“some simple rule for imposing a tariff which will produce the complex policy we need. 
All the complexity will be on the ‘economy’ side not the ‘policy’ side.”7   
                                                          
4 Fletcher, Free Trade, 193. 
 
5 Fletcher, Free Trade, 187. 
 
6 Fletcher, Free Trade, 231-233. 
 
7 Fletcher, Free Trade, 232. 
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Fletcher advocates a “natural strategic tariff”—a 30% flat-rate import tax.8 This 
proposal might seem simplistic, because it is a blanket policy that would not necessarily 
target important industries, but Fletcher claims that it would actually do the work of 
steering the US economy towards the industries that will provide the most long-term 
benefit. He argues that a flat 30% tariff would do little to protect industries competing 
on the basis of cheap labor, as it would not begin to compensate domestic workers. It 
would also not be enough of a barrier to protect industries that have exhausted their 
potential for improvement through innovation. However Fletcher claims, for industries 
where there is still a strong potential to build an advantage that will allow economies to 
scale, 30% would confer a strong competitive advantage in the part of the development 
curve where costs to produce each unit are still very high.9  
Fletcher considers this the ideal model for the US, since it would favor industries 
where highly trained workers produce high value per unit of labor, and tend not to 
compete on labor costs. A model focusing on development of this sort of industry would 
tend to produce goods with high demand in other markets, since they would generally 
be the main players in these industries. (His examples include jet airplanes from Boeing 
and Airbus and watches from Switzerland.)  Such industries would also tend to support a 
larger proportion of the profits from industry returning to labor, which increases 
aggregate effective demand. 
                                                          
8 Fletcher, Free Trade, 233-236. 
 
9 Fletcher, Free Trade, 233-235. 
241 
 
Interestingly, Fletcher thinks this model would only work well for the US, 
because it has the size (GDP) and industrial productivity to support a large number of 
retainable industries (what he refers to as “good” industries). For other countries, 
Fletcher considers a targeted tariff rather like Infant Industry Protection, where selected 
good industries are focussed on, and much of his concern is with the need for these 
countries to have the control over trade and flows of financial capital to allow this.10 His 
concern with this approach, however, is that, unlike the Natural Strategic Tariff, 
targeted strategy requires an effective bureaucracy to be successful at picking winners, 
whereas the flat import tariff takes advantage of the fact that some will spot market 
opportunities that bureaucracies would miss.  
Fletcher suggests that the US will benefit if other countries also effectively 
develop retainable good industries, because then there will be other countries with 
effective demand for the products of US industries.  Moreover, as far as industries not 
considered “good” industries, the US will actually benefit from a laissez-faire race to the 
bottom on the part of countries engaged in them, since the cost of these imports will be 
lower, and the US would not be interested in competing in those industries anyway.  
Fletcher`s protectionist model swims against the current of the last thirty years 
of economic orthodoxy in thinking about international trade, and is one of very few 
arguments by economists that openly call their model protectionist.  However Fletcher`s 
argument is well-supported in many ways, with reasoned economic analysis of Gomory 
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regarding flaws in the theory of comparative advantage, which, as we have noted, has 
been used indiscriminately as a trump argument for free trade. Fletcher offers 
considerable empirical evidence regarding the importance of government involvement 
in industrial development, both in the sense of creating and supporting new industries, 
and also in ensuring they have a protected environment in which to develop.  
Chang`s breakdown of the actual history of Industrial development, supports 
Fletcher`s argument that protection and sound industrial development policy are 
required to maintain and build the types of industries he categorizes as “good,” or 
“retainable,” and that free market models for trade are not the models that brought the 
US and other wealthy developed countries to their current positions.  
Fletcher is supported in some ways by Stiglitz’s analysis, particularly in the 
concern that the current trade regime has allowed developed economies to be 
weakened by the shifting of a considerable proportion of the returns from the 
production process from labor to capital. 
Although Fletcher`s argument, in many ways, seems very strong, there are also 
concerns with the position he takes. Fletcher`s protectionist model of a natural strategic 
tariff largely ignores any international concerns for justice. It is a nationalist argument 
which pays little attention to international obligations. Fletcher`s model is meant to 
reduce a trend towards greater inequality in US society, a worthwhile goal, but it 
ignores the concern for inequality in international relations, which many commentators 
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have noted, is highly influential in determining the terms of trade relations (these would 
include Pogge, Bhagwati, and Chang explicitly). 
Fletcher’s strategic protectionism is explicitly oriented towards improving the US 
economy and is not focussed on global poverty in any way. He mentions that it is 
important for some trading partners to be successful enough to provide a market for US 
industries, but he also suggests that a laissez-faire race to the bottom for some goods 
would in fact not be problematic for the US Essentially Fletcher takes a nationalist, IR 
realist position, which ignores the concerns of other countries, except when they might 
be beneficial to the US These concerns do not necessarily invalidate his protectionist 
model completely, but do indicate that it would need to be reviewed from a global 
perspective, in order for it to be useful in addressing the concerns for global poverty and 
inequality. 
Strategic protectionist models for international trade are well supported by 
historical evidence that they have served as an effective tool for economic development 
in many cases. The proponents of strategic protectionist models make it clear that free 
trade models do not generally lead to development of lesser developed countries, and 
very likely create long run sustainability and inequality problems, even for wealthy 
countries. The greatest apparent weakness of the strategic protectionist model, 
according to the criteria being used to evaluate international trade in this project, is that 
they are focussed on effective trade strategies for individual countries. This is 
problematic when considering international trade from the perspective of global justice.  
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While Fletcher’s perspective may support abandoning the goal of having the IMF and 
World Bank enforce trade liberalization, as conditions required to achieve development 
and economic stabilization assistance, and might allow developing countries to choose 
their own trade strategy, which would be of benefit to them, it does little to address the 
obligation of citizens of wealthy developed countries to actively work towards reducing 
extreme global poverty.  
The strategic protectionist model is argued by such proponents as Fletcher, to be 
a useful tool in reducing inequalities among the citizens of states that are using it.  This 
is an important consideration from the perspective of justice, but as its orientation is 
nationalist, concern for reducing inequalities among states at the international level is 
not addressed at all. Fletcher suggests that it would be advantageous to have some 
economically successful trading partners, but that extreme competition among the 
states competing based on labor price in products from “bad” industries is in the 
interest of the countries that are well positioned in “good” industries. Fletcher definitely 
sees international trade from the point of view of international relations realism, where 
if the US doesn’t use its economic power to shape its position in the world in its own 
benefit, others will shape it in theirs. 
Another concern of the nationalist perspective of the strategic protectionist 
model is that, there is no mechanism specified that would work to limit the ability of 
producers to benefit from using production processes that generated negative 
externalities that are mostly felt in other countries. 
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Strategic protectionist models have considerable potential to produce economic 
development that could lessen domestic poverty and reduce inequalities, but they will 
need to be combined with a global justice perspective in order to eliminate some of the 
problems that arise from their generally nationalist orientation. 
Stiglitz and Charlton: Fair Trade for All 
Joseph Stiglitz has made forceful claims about problems in the current 
international trade regime, and with the current focus of international bodies tasked 
with facilitating international trade (WTO) and supporting international economic 
stability and development (The IMF particularly). 
Stiglitz is critical of unrestricted free market approaches to free trade, 
particularly in the case of impoverished developing countries. In his recent book, co-
authored with Andrew Charlton, a Research Officer at the London School of Economics, 
he points out, “To date not one successful developing country has pursued a purely free 
market approach to development.”11  
A first major concern for Stiglitz and Charlton, in the case of developing 
countries, is that the assessments of the unrestricted free trade model on welfare in 
developing countries assume a model where there is full employment. They argue (as 
did Keynes eighty years earlier) that this assumption is problematic, and clearly not 
reflective of the economy of most poor developing countries. They argue that the 
theory of comparative advantage, which works on the assumption that resources which 
                                                          
11 Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 17. 
246 
 
are committed to less efficient types of production will quickly shift to new areas where 
they will be used in more efficient types of production when they face more efficient 
international competition, rarely holds in developing countries. This is because most 
developing countries have vast reserves of resources, particularly labor, so there is no 
need to free up labor for use in new more efficient industries.  It is already available, 
awaiting any type of opportunity to be put to use. When a developing-country’s industry 
is outcompeted by a more efficient international competitor, often the workers move 
from low productive inefficient employment to zero productive employment rather than 
moving from low production inefficient employment to employment in a more 
productive enterprises.12 
However Stiglitz and Charlton definitely view increasing trade as an important 
part of long run plans for economic development and decreasing poverty. They view 
trade liberalization as an important tool for economic development, but see it as 
something that needs to be managed and achieved cooperatively, in conjunction with 
appropriate development strategy for each countries situation.  
The alternative to the current international trade regime suggested by Stiglitz 
and Charlton is one that would generally be based on the current WTO structure, but 
refocused to create a true “development round” of negotiations, which would be 
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conducted in such a way as to actually promote poverty reduction and economic growth 
in developing countries.13  
Stiglitz and Charlton argue that within the WTO, bargaining has been conducted 
almost exclusively from the position of self-interest, whereas to be successful, a 
development round would require a set of cooperative principles. They suggest that 
negotiations should be based on several largely self-evident principles:  
1. Any agreement should be assessed in terms of its impact on development; items 
with negative impact on development should not be on the agenda. 
2. Any agreement should be fair. 
3. Any agreement should be arrived at fairly. 
4. The agenda should be limited to trade-related and development friendly 
issues.14 
 
Stiglitz and Charlton acknowledge any general definition of “fairness” is likely to 
be disputed.  They suggest several more concrete principles: 
Fairness 1: GDP growth—Any agreement that differentially hurts developing 
countries more or benefits developed countries more should be viewed 
presumptively as unfair. 
 
Fairness 2: Trade disputes—Since, given the costs to bringing a claim against 
another country are high, developed countries should, at minimum,  provide 
financial assistance to less developed countries involved in such legal disputes so 
as to level the playing field. 
 
                                                          
13 It is worth noting that Stiglitz and Charlton laid out this proposal for a true “development round” of 
negotiations at the WTO in 2005, while the Doha development round of negotiations, which began in 
2001, was underway. Those Doha negotiations met with strong resistance and suspicion on the part of 
developing countries, and were stalled completely from 2008 to 2013. There is currently (July 2014) a 
proposal that is a very watered down version of Stiglitz’s Market Access Proposal under consideration. 
While at the same time a new agenda for a Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) formulated by wealthy 
developed countries has just been made public. It contains conditions regarding control over banking and 
investment. It will be interesting over the next year or so what happens with these. 
 
14 Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 68. 
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Fairness 3: Initial conditions—Even though developing countries in general have 
higher tariffs than developed countries, reducing them should be gradual, so as 
not to be disruptive.  Moreover, developed countries should not, as they often 
do now, impose higher tariffs on goods imported from developing countries that 
products imported from other developed country. 
 
Fairness 4: Historical considerations—Fairness should also take into account 
economic conditions in a country that are the result of colonial relationships or 
unfair previous trade agreements.15 
 
Stiglitz and Charlton suggest that in order to keep a true development round on 
track, and not subvert its purpose as a tool for promoting economic development and 
reducing poverty, a principle of conservatism should be adopted regarding what goes on 
the agenda at negotiations. Issues ought to be included in a development round only if 
they score highly in the following: (1) the relevance of the issue to trade flows, (2) 
development friendliness, (3) the existence of rationale for collective action (i.e., nations 
should not be forced to undertake certain actions unless their actions have effects on 
the trade of others that require collective action to resolve).16  The main purpose of 
these restrictions would be to limit the inclusion of the types of issues, which developing 
countries often felt were included so as to tip the scales in favor of developed countries  
A problematic issue for developing countries in trade negotiations has been 
“Green” (environmental) and “Blue”(Labor) regulatory tariffs. Developing countries 
often claim that strong regulations are forced on them to protect developed countries.  
Stiglitz and Charlton feel that standards should not be included in a trade agreement—
                                                          
15 Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 76-78.  
 
16 Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 86.  
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with three exceptions: (1) international negative externalities—trade policy should 
recognize that not forcing firms to pay the true social costs of their environmental 
damage is a subsidy which other countries should have the right to take action against; 
(2) matters of human rights—human rights violations that are reducing the costs of 
operating should be susceptible to countervailing duties (example forced labor, 
expropriation of land); (3) restrictions on collective action on the part of labor that 
results in lowered production costs.17 
The biggest single part of the Stiglitz-Charlton proposal, although it has many 
other important facets, is their Market Access Proposal.  The Market Access Proposal 
consists of the fairly simple idea that all member countries would commit themselves to 
providing free market access to all goods from all countries with both a smaller per-
capita GDP and a smaller overall GDP than they do.18   
Stiglitz and Charlton suggest that there would be several important benefits to 
this proposal. Firstly, there would be very significant liberalization of trade in goods that 
were important to developing countries. The agreement would also tend to increase the 
amount of trade between developing countries, opening markets of somewhat 
developed countries (mid-level GDP) to very impoverished countries (South–South 
trade). Another strong point of the proposal, according to Stiglitz and Charlton, is that 
its obligations are progressive. The poorest will not be forced into much liberalization; 
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18 Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 96-97. 
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middle-income countries will have to liberalize significantly, and developed countries 
will need to open to developing countries generally. 
This proposal seems reasonable in the sense that it is progressive, and should, in 
the long run, fulfill both the concern for reduction of poverty in international trade, and 
to reduce inequality, at least between countries if not within them. A proposal like this 
would require that countries take the position that they are cooperating to assist 
developing countries and promote poverty reduction, which is consistent with Stiglitz 
and Charlton’s insistence that, a true development round would require adopting 
cooperative bargaining, instead of bargaining only in national self-interest. 
Another important area that this proposal would address is the concern over 
escalating tariffs. Escalating tariffs are tariffs which tend to restrict the level of 
processing of exports, by increasing the level of tariff applied as the product is more 
processed.  This means a lower tariff on raw materials and a higher tariff on 
manufactured goods. Such escalating tariffs tend to lock developing countries into 
exporting raw materials with little value added, which produces little skilled 
employment, thus limiting industrial development.  
TRIPS the agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, is another 
area that Stiglitz and Charlton think should be a focus for a true development round of 
negotiations. They argue that if the goal were actually to support development and 
poverty reduction, the TRIPS agreement would need to largely exempt poor countries.19  
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They argue that in many cases, the basic research behind most innovations is publicly 
funded, and that material reward provides little of the motivation for this sort of 
intellectual activity. “There is little evidence,” they say, “that stronger patent protection 
would generate greater flows of basic ideas.”20  
Private-sector intellectual property rights should be understood as an innovation 
tax on the difference between marginal cost and selling price of a product.  Stiglitz and 
Charlon think it is unfair to charge this innovation tax to some of the poorest people on 
earth, who desperately need the assistance that could be made readily available.  If the 
international community feel that more basic research is necessary, this research should 
be funded directly, and not by levying a tax on the poor.21 
The TRIMs agreement (Trade Related Investment Measures) is another matter of 
concern for Stiglitz and Charlton.  TRIMs, when enacted by many members of WTO (and 
previously GATT), opened their banking system and financial services to purchase by 
foreign banks. This created a situation where governments lose much of their power to 
support or motivate lending to underserved and riskier sections of the population, 
which they might choose to do in an attempt to promote economic development of 
those sectors and reduce poverty.  
 Stiglitz and Charlton see little point insisting on general rules to regulate capital 
flows: 
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There does not seem to be a compelling rationale to force national governments 
to adopt a uniform multilateral agreement.  Idiosyncratic national regimes are 
often more sensitive to national development priorities than one-size fits all 
multilateral disciplines.22 
 
 They are also concerned that some aspects of TRIMS create a situation, known 
as “hot money,” where foreign investment flows into and out of countries very rapidly, 
and can create a “race to the bottom” type of situation, as investors rapidly shift money 
in and out of countries looking for slightly better investment terms.  They see a strong 
link between this type of investment and financial instability.23  Stiglitz and Charlton are 
generally concerned to avoid any investment services liberalization that would 
exaggerate financial instability in developing countries. Despite this concern, they feel 
that one of the areas that should be included in a pro-development round of 
negotiations would be the liberalization of labor-intensive services, as this is an area 
that they feel would strongly benefit developing countries:  
Facilitating the free mobility of capital is far less important for global efficiency 
or for the developing countries themselves than facilitating the movement of 
labor, particularly that of unskilled workers.  Indeed there is a strong case that 
capital market liberalization may actually lower global economic efficiency.24 
 
Stiglitz and Charlton also feel that not only the content of negotiations will need 
to change to support development and poverty reduction in international trade, but 
also that the WTO itself will need to undergo some significant changes. They suggest 
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24 Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 150-51. 
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institutional reform will be required in the WTO to support a focus on supporting 
development and reducing poverty. 
A first concern here is representativeness and openness of negotiations, Stiglitz 
suggests that the current negotiating practices are problematic; they occur to an extent 
behind closed doors and end up with agreements that contain portions many 
governments would not have included if they had not been forced to as part of a 
package.25 (Here one can think of Pogge’s comment that trade has been beneficial, but 
could have benefited the least well off much more than it has.) Stiglitz calls for an end to 
“Green Room” bargaining, where only a select fraction of countries represent 
developing countries at the actual negotiations. Stiglitz says that while the practice has 
been formally abolished, is still largely how negotiations are conducted.26 
Another area of concern is admission to the WTO.  The process has become 
increasingly lengthy and requires more and more liberalization as a price of entry.  
Stiglitz and Charlton advocate clear rules that are manageable by least developed 
countries, a shortened and simplified process, as well as a halt to forcing unfair levels of 
liberalization on developing countries seeking admission.27 
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26 Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 169. An example of this practice continuing though formally banned 
would be the blueprint for negotiation of the Trade in Services Agreement, released by Wikileaks on June 
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discredit it. https://wikileaks.org/tisa-financial/press.html 
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There will need to be a body developed to assess what measures are best 
adopted to support countries facing economic crisis. There is also a strong need to 
develop a fair resource at the WTO to assist developing countries in assessing the real 
costs and benefits of various proposals, (for trade agreements to be included in the 
WTO) as many developing countries lack the technical resources to do this effectively 
before agreeing to or rejecting proposals. 
Another area where reform is suggested is in the WTO dispute settlement 
system. The WTO dispute settlement system favors wealthy developed countries, both 
in the costs of successfully making a claim, and in the ability to assure that a successful 
resolution will be followed up with action.28 (Bhagwati also gives extensive support for 
this measure in his defence of free trade.) 
An effect that developed countries do not normally consider for implementation 
of trade liberalization proposals, but should, is the fiscal cost of the loss of tariff 
revenues to government. In developed countries tariffs are not usually a very important 
form of revenue for government operations, but in lesser developed countries tariff 
revenue can be a significant form of revenue.29 This is because in many such countries, a 
very significant portion of the economy is underground and not taxable. Many 
governments in such countries lack effective tax revenue collection systems, and tariff 
revenues are relatively easy to collect. (Stiglitz and Charlton suggest that a value-added-
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tax (VAT) system can be welfare-enhancing as compared to tariff revenues, but admit 
this fails in developing countries with substantial underground economies.)  
Another cost Stiglitz and Charlton think it is important to consider, is the 
implementation costs of particular proposals.  Implementation costs from the Uruguay 
Round for the parts of the agreement that required regulation changes were costed at 
an average of $150 million for twelve sample developing countries. In eight of those 
twelve this exceeded the total budget for development spending. Stiglitz and Charlton 
point out that the extensive non-compliance on this point indicates that many 
developing countries felt the price was too high, and that the money was better spent in 
areas such as basic education.30  They recommend that regulatory proposals with 
extensive implementation costs be left out of a development round.  
While Stiglitz and Charlton support trade liberalization in general, as a source of 
long run benefits to developing countries, they are concerned that the extremely poor 
will not be able to sustain themselves through even small short run drops. They insist 
that assistance must be rendered for the development of social safety nets and 
insurance. Stiglitz and Charlton, in fact, argue that employment insurance can be 
economically efficient, because it allows displaced workers to search longer for a job 
that makes effective use of their skills, rather than accepting a drop in employment 
standard.31 
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Stiglitz and Charlton comment that even with fair trade liberalization, there will 
be a problem of supply constraints; that developing countries may still not be able to 
benefit from new favorable access to markets: 
 In the context of low productive capacity, a deficient policy environment, poor 
infrastructure, poor access to technology, and missing/imperfect markets 
(especially financial markets), liberalized markets will not stimulate the required 
development  to take advantage of new trading opportunities.32 
 
They suggest that technical assistance, technology transfer, and the 
development of functional financial markets will need to be negotiated into the 
agreements, if international trade is to be effective in supporting economic 
development and reducing poverty.   
The Stiglitz and Charlton proposal for a more just approach to international trade 
is important in that it generally relies on existing international institutions, and does not 
depart radically from some of the ideas already being considered in international society 
to assist developing countries. However Stiglitz and Charlton make clear that their 
proposal would require a change in the spirit of negotiations, from individual national 
interest to a cooperative attempt to aid in the economic development of the least 
developed countries.  
Schweickart: Socialist Protectionism 
David Schweickart, a philosopher working in the area of political economy and 
economic justice, offers a proposal for an alternative to the current international trade 
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regime as part of his project to articulate and defend an economically viable, ethically 
desirable alternative to capitalism, which he calls “Economic Democracy.”  His proposal 
is formulated in response to the question, “How would a country structured as an 
Economic Democracy conduct trade relations with other countries?”   
When his answer is examined, it becomes clear that the policy he proposes for 
an economy that has gone “beyond capitalism,” might also be suitable for a capitalist 
country committed to a just system of international trade. Schweickart proposes that 
international trade should be based on fair trade rather than free trade.  He labels his 
proposal “fair trade,” for it stems from, as he explains: 
[T]he moral conviction that one should not, in general, profit from, or be hurt by, 
the exploitation of the cheap labor of others... Consumers should not benefit 
because workers in other countries work for lower wages than domestic 
workers, nor should home country workers be put at risk by these low wages.33 
 
Schweickart means fair trade in the actual sense of trade that is fair, rather than 
in the sense of the Fair Trade marketing strategy. He also calls his proposal “socialist 
protectionism”: 
Free trade is fine so long as the trading partners are roughly equal in terms of 
worker incomes and environmental regulation. However when trading with a 
poorer country or one whose environmental regulations are lax, Economic 
Democracy will adopt a policy of socialist protectionism.34  
 
Schweickart embraces protectionism as a strategy to prevent race to the bottom 
competition on worker wages and environmental regulations, and as a strategy to allow 
                                                          
33 Schweickart, David. After Capitalism (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield, 2002), 79. 
 
34 Schweickart, After Capitalism, 78. 
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the development of strategic industries.  As we have seen, such protectionism has 
considerable support as a useful tool for all three of these purposes, both from strategic 
protectionists like Ian Fletcher, and also economists who are generally in favor of trade 
liberalization such as Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton. As Schweickart points out, 
protectionism is not a radical position, given that every economically successful country 
has employed protectionism at some point; a claim supported by others already 
considered in this work.35   
Schweickart proposes a two-part trade policy. The first part is protectionist: the 
imposition of a Social Tariff, on imported goods, designed to compensate for low wages 
or lack of commitment to social goals regarding the environment, worker health and 
safety, and social welfare on the part of the exporting country.  The second part of the 
policy is where Schweickart’s alternative differs from other proposals. It states that all 
tariff proceeds will be rebated back to countries of origin of the goods on which tariffs 
were placed.36 
The first part of the policy is fairly straightforward: in a situation where imported 
goods (or services) are coming from a country where they are being produced through 
the use of labor paid at wages lower than the domestic rate, a tariff would be imposed 
to compensate for the difference in wages.  This is intended to eliminate international 
competition driving down wages, avoiding a “race to the bottom” in the area of wages.  
                                                          
35 Schweickart, After Capitalism, 78. 
 
36 Schweickart, After Capitalism, 79. 
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The same approach would be taken in the case of negative environmental or 
health and safety externalities. Any time a product was imported that was produced in a 
way that evaded paying the full environmental or health and safety costs of its 
production, it would be assessed a tariff that would effectively be equal to the 
estimated value of environmental or health and safety costs that were evaded in its 
production. Again the purpose is to avoid competition based on unjust production 
practices.  
The second part of Schweickart’s proposal takes a different approach than that 
taken by other proponents of protectionism.  The assessed tariffs are rebated back to 
the country, whose goods they are assessed on, to be used in development activities.  
They aim at providing these countries with resources to work towards developing 
industries that do not operate based on unjust relations of production. 
It is noteworthy that Schweickart’s proposal says nothing about international 
capital flows; a concern of most trade theorists.  This is because a country practising 
Economic Democracy will generally not have significant international flows of capital.  
Virtually all funds for investment are generated publicly (via a capital-asset tax on all 
business enterprises), and are reinvested in the domestic economy.  These funds are the 
property of the society in general, and are used to support productive enterprises in the 
domestic economy, rather than speculative investment. This arrangement avoids the 
downward pressure on wages and environmental standards that occurs when a country 
needs to attract foreign investment capital, or counter threats to move capital 
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offshore.37 (Schweickart claims that not relying on foreign investment capital may well 
be an important benefit, even for relatively poor developing countries.38)  
Schweickart’s model also addresses the issue of IP (Intellectual Property). 
Intellectual Property has been a contentious issue during the discussions around 
implementation of the Uruguay round of GATT, and currently in the WTO (TRIPS).39  In 
many cases developing countries are forced into agreeing to very stringent IP 
agreements as a cost of entry into trade agreements, that leave them unable to afford 
medications and technologies that would facilitate important improvements in welfare. 
As we have seen, Stiglitz and Charlton in general want to avoid forcing IP agreements on 
developing countries, as they tend to be costly to implement and slow economic 
development.  
Schweickart’s proposal suggests that once the motivation to avoid international 
competition based on low wages is removed (and hence the worry that low-cost 
production abroad would displace domestic workers), there would be no reason to 
protect IP internationally at all, and in fact, it would be easy for a country practising 
Economic Democracy to promote free technology transfer to developing countries and 
exemptions from patent restrictions for less developed countries (which is impossible to 
build support for under the current international trade regime).  
                                                          
37 Schweickart, After Capitalism, 77. 
 
38 Schweickart, After Capitalism, 77. 
 
39 Stiglitz, Joseph. Globalization and its Discontents (Norton, 2002);  Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade. 
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Schweickart’s proposal focuses on avoiding trade competition based on 
exploitative labor or environmental practices.  It is based on the assumption that 
relative economic self-sufficiency is an important value, but addresses the need for 
international trade in many situations.  The proposal is intended to promote 
international cooperation on development, as opposed to facilitating a race to the 
bottom in wages and both social and environmental standards, which is something the 
current trade regime often receives criticism on. 
Daly: Ecological Economics Proposal 
 Herman Daly has a proposal for an approach to international trade that is more 
just than the current regime. He suggests thinking about his proposal in terms of empty 
world versus full world economics. He explains that the contemporary free trade model 
develops from classical economics, and in Adam Smith’s time, compared to today, the 
world was empty.40 Free trade economics, and a belief that least developed countries 
can simply grow their way to a similar standard of living to the now developed 
countries, are “empty world” thinking. Daly’s proposal is based on “full world” 
economics. His proposal is known as the steady state economy (SSE). Daly notes that he 
doesn’t pull his ideas out of thin air, that the concern for the ability of the environment 
to sustain the economy, is as old as the study of political economy, he is influenced by 
Mill, and his conception of a stationary state economy.  
                                                          
40 This is empirically true, various population estimates put the world population between approximately 
450 million and 650 million (Those are World Bank and UN), with the 1st Billion being reached about 1804. 
So today’s world is 10-14 times fuller than it was in the time of Adam Smith. 
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 His proposal for a steady state economy is based on two main concerns. The first 
is, ensuring that the size of the economy, or the size of the resource throughput of the 
economy, is sustainable within the limits of the ecosystem that supports us. The second 
is a concern for distributing the benefits of that sustainable economy in a way that 
provides a decent standard of living for all. Since we do not actually know the limit of 
our ecosystem, to sustain our economy, and many people who study ecology and 
biology believe we are already past its carrying capacity, Daly suggests we must adopt 
precaution as our principle. This means we must begin to limit, and work towards 
reducing, the quantity of natural resources we use up in our economy, and the wastes 
we put out into natural sinks. Daly`s steady state economy defines the concept of 
economic development as, the efficient use of a steady or fixed quantity of natural 
resource and energy inputs in an economy, to satisfy more needs of human beings, 
through improvements in technology and distribution. 
 Daly claims that economists are always concerned with efficiency and the 
maximization of something. He explains that what is maximized in SSE is life. The 
maximand is measured in cumulative person-years of life lived at a standard sufficient 
for a good life. Daly does not go into particular depth about what a good life ought to be 
defined as, but explains that it is possible to tell that it is a life that allows individuals to 
pursue their interests and potentials, rather than just absolute bare minimum.  
 Daly rejects a strictly free trade model for international trade, because adjusting 
the national economy, including labor markets, natural resources and capital to 
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international markets, makes it difficult to control negative environmental and social 
externalities, and manage monetary policy in a way that ensures prices reasonably 
reflect full social marginal opportunity costs, in interest of public welfare.41 
International free trade conflicts sharply with the national policies of (1) getting 
prices right, (2) moving toward a more just distribution, (3) fostering community, 
(4) controlling the macroeconomy, and (5) keeping scale within ecological 
limits.42 
 
Daly argues that free trade really only maximizes efficiency in one of the areas where 
efficiency should be maximized in an economy. Free trade maximizes the efficiency of 
allocation of resources to the most productive uses, but it does nothing for concerns of 
efficiency in distribution, in order to satisfy the needs of the most people with the 
resources available, and it completely ignores, what the efficient sustainable scale of the 
economy should be, in relation to the environment that sustains it.43 His proposal for 
trade is really more of a proposal not to trade.  
There is clearly a conflict between free trade and a national policy of 
internalization of external costs. External costs are now so important that the 
latter goal should take precedence. In this case there is a clear argument for 
tariffs to protect not an inefficient industry, but an efficient national policy of 
internalizing external costs into prices.44 
 
 Daly`s proposal, when considered as an economic model, is a form of import 
substitution industrialization, based on tariffs. 
                                                          
41 Daly, Beyond Growth, 158-9. 
  
42 Daly, Beyond Growth, 159. 
 
43 Daly, Beyond Growth, 159-60. 
 
44 Daly, Beyond Growth, 161. 
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 Daly’s proposal, keeps national and international economics separate, he rejects 
cosmopolitan conceptions of global citizenship, and does not welcome the idea of a 
global government without individual nations. He suggests reform is needed at the 
international level, the national level and the regional level within countries. 
[A] "community of communities," an international federation of national 
communities cooperating to solve global problems under the principle of 
subsidiarity. The model is not the cosmopolitan one of direct global citizenship in 
a single integrated world community without intermediation by nation states.45 
 
 His concern is based on the concern that “cosmopolitan globalism” weakens the 
power of national communities (and subnational communities) to control negative 
externalities and financial capital, and increases the power of transnational corporations 
to resist this control. He feels that capital must be made less global and more local. He 
describes the buzzwords he would like to see as “renationalization of capital”, and 
“community rooting of capital for the development of local economies.”46 He quotes 
Keynes, explaining that he would like to see goods be produced nationally as much as 
possible, and that capital being national was important above all.  
 Daly in general, advocates self-sufficiency for nations, not isolation, and not 
complete trade barriers, but self-sufficiency for the most part. He says for the US, self-
sufficiency is industrial self-sufficiency, and argues that de-industrialization of the US 
means that American labor will experience a drop in standard of living. He explains that 
                                                          
45 Daly, Beyond Growth, 92-3. 
 
46 Daly, Beyond Growth, 93. 
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if US workers want to compete with workers in developing countries, to produce the 
highest return on capital to production, free trade is fine. Daley argues that if the US 
does not want to compete in a race to the bottom on wages and environmental 
standards, the appropriate tool is the tariff.  
Tariffs would protect now-endangered industries from further erosion and allow 
them to begin to recover lost ground. Tariffs would also encourage new 
enterprise in areas where the United States has become dependent on imports. 
With the assurance that these industries could be profitable while paying 
suitable wages, capital would flow to these opportunities. The operation of the 
free market, within national boundaries reinforced by tariffs, would lead to the 
industrial self-sufficiency that would make possible truly free trade, that is, trade 
in which the nation is free to engage or not.47 
 
 Daly explains that the use of a tariff system would carry a cost. It would probably 
slow overall economic growth in the sense of GDP, and would lower the purchasing 
power of a particular wage, but wages could be set high enough to assure a desirable 
standard of living for working people. It would also lower returns to US capital, which 
would not be able to profitably use low wage foreign labor to produce goods for the US 
market.48 Daly is concerned not just with the harmful effects of free trade in general, 
but also about free trade in financial capital. He feels the most effective way of ending 
the harmful effects of the international trade in financial capital, is a tariff system set 
high enough to protect domestic production from competition in the form of domestic 
                                                          
47 Cobb and Daly, For The Common Good, 285. 
 
48 Cobb and Daly, For The Common Good, 285. 
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capital being invested in foreign production, and the products being imported to 
domestic markets.   
 In fact Daly is critical of the power of financial capital in the economy generally,49 
and in his proposal for a steady state economy he argues for both a minimum income, 
which he explains has fairly strong political support, and a maximum income, for which 
he says there is virtually none. He assumes this is because there is a belief that there is 
no limit to total possible increase of wealth.50 He argues for a progressive tax that, 
above the accepted income differential, would have a very high marginal rate in order 
to minimize accumulated inequality in wealth. 
 Daly suggests that while labor would likely see the value in buying local, and 
would be willing to accept higher costs, holders of financial capital would provide 
powerful resistance to the proposal, as it restricts their ability to seek the highest rate of 
return. And retailers and large corporations that make most of their profits from selling 
low priced imported goods would also resist the proposal. He suggests that the impact 
on retailers would be lessened if the proposal was phased in slowly. He feels that low 
wage service workers, which have become a large sector of the workforce, might also 
                                                          
49 Daly, Herman. “A Steady-State Economy: A failed growth economy and a steady-state economy are not 
the same thing; they are the very different alternatives we face.” (Sustainable Development Commission, 
UK, 2008), 6-9. 
 
Daly would like to see the ability to accumulate wealth limited and believes the role of financial capital in 
a steady-state economy would be much reduced from its current situation.  
 
50 Daly, Beyond Growth, 201. 
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suffer from the proposal, as prices for goods in the economy would rise, and their 
already limited purchasing power would diminish.51   
 Daly is also concerned about intellectual property rights. He argues that many 
forms of knowledge should not be converted into property rights with a market value. 
[K]nowledge, unlike throughput, is not divided in sharing, but multiplied. Once 
knowledge exists, the opportunity cost of sharing it is zero and its allocative price 
should be zero. 
Sharing knowledge costs little, and does not create unrepayable debts, 
and it increases the productivity of the truly rival and scarce factors of 
production. Existing knowledge is the most important input to the production of 
new knowledge, and keeping it artificially scarce and expensive is perverse.52  
 
 Daly feels that the benefits to everyone from sharing knowledge, far outweigh 
the possible benefits to innovation of costly (both to spread of innovation, and to 
implement) intellectual property regimes. 
 While Daly`s proposal is for protectionist tariffs at the national level, he is also 
concerned about institutions at the international level. He claims that it is necessary to 
rethink how balance of trade accounts are calculated. Daly argues that the World Bank 
(and in fact national governments) need to begin to use measures of economic growth 
that separate growth, in the sense of increasing use of resources, from the ability of an 
                                                          
51 Daly has extensive plans for domestic reforms to address this but they are not really a direct part of his 
position on trade. He outlines proposals for decentralizing industry into regions and local areas where it 
can be done so efficiently, and considers schemes to promote worker owned cooperative production. He 
also considers a negative income tax and how to align that concept with a desire for as near full 
employment as possible. He recommends depletion quotas on natural resources which would strictly limit 
their rate of use and motivate their more efficient use. Daly also considers that human population must 
be managed within the limits of the planets carrying capacity (which we don`t actually know), to address 
the problem of population control, his suggestion is birth licences, which would be fixed in number but 
transferable. See Daly, Beyond Growth, 31-63. 
 
52 Daly, “A Steady-State,” 6-7. 
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economy to satisfy human needs.  He considers that the export of non-renewable 
resources should not be classified solely as income, that a portion of this value needs to 
be registered as sale of a capital asset, rather than income from production. He 
considers that if this were done accurately, it would change some countries’ apparent 
trade surpluses, under current accounting, to deficits resulting from foreign sale of 
capital assets. The IMF recommendations and actions for those countries would then 
change to reflect this. Daly suggests this shift in balance of trade accounting would be 
an excellent initial focus for the IMF in sustainable development.53 Daly is concerned 
that GNP (or GDP) is a poor economic indicator, as far as measuring how efficiently an 
economy is using a limited stock of resources to satisfy human needs. He suggests an 
indicator, the Measure of Economic Welfare (MEW), which separates categories of 
consumption and production, as well as recognizing investment in several types of 
capital.54 Daly`s main concern here is that traditional measures such as the GNP or GDP, 
tell us very little about the sustainability of an economy in use of resources or the 
distribution of its benefits, which are crucial concerns for both national governments 
and international institutions in Daly`s proposal. 
  In his critique of international trade, Daly suggests he would like to see an 
international currency clearing house, to manage currency and balances of trade. He 
explains that this was the proposal Keynes initially developed for the IMF, but it was 
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54 Cobb and Daly, For The Common Good, 76-78. 
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rejected at Bretton Woods.55 The strength of it would be that it would allow 
international trade in goods to be paid for over time without requiring an immediate 
balanced exchange, and avoid the necessity of developing a speculative market for 
currency. Countries would maintain accounts with the institution in a currency that only 
existed as accounting numbers at the clearing house. Interest of a sort would be 
charged on both positive and negative balances, to provide for an incentive for 
countries to adopt policies which would favor a neutral balance of trade over the long 
term.  
 Even though Daly`s proposal is based on tariffs, it is quite different from 
Fletcher`s tariff based protection proposal, as Fletcher`s proposal is focussed on 
maximizing economic growth in strategic industries that will also target international 
markets. Daly`s proposal differs from other proposals, because its specific focus is 
development of an economy that can provide a good quality of life for all people in the 
long term, while recognizing the finite nature of the world`s resources. There are many 
strengths to Daly`s proposal, but its weakness is that it fails to effectively address the 
concern for alleviating extreme poverty in least developed countries. Daly does not 
ignore this he suggests that developed countries should work through international 
institutions to promote self-sufficiency for developing countries. He makes a strong 
argument that least developed countries are often failed by the current free trade 
                                                          
55 For full details see: Horsefield, Keith. “`The International Monetary Fund, 1945-1965: Twenty Years of 
International Monetary Cooperation.” (International Monetary Fund, 1969) Accessed at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=334.0 (surprisingly interesting) 
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regime, but his proposal, while probably an effective option for most people in wealthy 
developed countries, doesn`t seem to acknowledge very much ethical obligation on the 
part of wealthy powerful countries in the current regime. It seems like an effective 
alternative to the current international trade regime would need to take Daly`s concern 
for long term sustainability into account and would need to consider the arguments 
Daily makes about the problems of free trade, and particularly his concern about the 
unrestricted mobility of financial capital in relation to the ability to achieve just 
distributions and manage negative externalities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A COSMOPOLITAN PROPOSAL FOR JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
I came into the project of applying philosophical conceptions of social justice to 
the problem of injustices occurring in, and resulting from, international trade, which I 
perceived in many ways to be a worthwhile problem in the field of social justice that had 
received only passing attention from philosophers, with the plan that I would attempt to 
apply principles of justice, derived from Rawls’ two basic principles in ATOJ to 
international trade. In ATOJ Rawls very specifically lays out how the principles would 
require economic institutions of a society to be structured, and what would be required 
of their basic functions. I thought that his extensive discussion of institutions and social 
structures, a part of his conception of justice, as structuring the social processes to 
produce just results from the interactions of members of society in pursuing their own 
interests, made it a useful approach. My project was to understand the problems with 
the current international trade regime, and develop a proposal for an alternative 
scheme for international trade, based on principles of justice.  
The proposal is the end result of a process of several steps. The first was 
examining some of the philosophical literature on global justice, in order to illuminate 
and critique positions taken on international trade and international economic 
interdependence. The second was evaluating the current free trade model for 
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international trade and the main alternative model, which is protectionism. And then, 
finally, I looked at several alternative models for international trade to consider how 
they fit with the principles of justice with which I was working, and attempted to 
evaluate them against the commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of the free 
trade and protectionist models, by economists with a normative concern for justice in 
global society (although their conceptions of this varied strongly). In the end, all of the 
proposed alternatives that I worked with seemed to fall short. 
 I will now outline the main features of a proposal for a just alternative model for 
international trade and global economic interaction and explain each of the features in 
reasonable detail. I will explain the basic argument supporting the choice of each, and 
address some of the possible counter arguments. The proposed model is a cosmopolitan 
conception of a new regime of international trade, including most features of 
international economic activity that are currently covered under various international 
trade agreements and the WTO, and several which are not. It is based on principles of 
justice that could be used in building just global economic institutions to support a 
global economic environment that promotes vibrant economic activity within a 
background framework of fairness. These would be global institutions in the 
cosmopolitan sense, with a focus on effectively inclusive democracy that represents the 
interests of all members of global society. The proposal would make sense within the 
context of a larger liberal cosmopolitan project, but I will proceed as if the proposal is to 
stand alone. 
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 My approach is heavily influenced by Rawls’ contractarian understanding of the 
reasons that justice is appropriate within a society. The principles put forward in this 
proposal are derived from the goals of the principles Rawls’ puts forward as coming out 
of his 1st Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance. Rawls did not think that these 
should apply to global society, but the position I take is that there is enough support for 
the idea that Rawls’ principles of justice are reasonable, but his conception of 
international relations and global society, are not in line with his own position on the 
obligations that develop as a result of being a member of a society, or the value of 
individuals within society. I conceive the principles of fair trade to be similar to what 
Rawls suggests would arise as the structure of the fair background framework for 
international trade, agreed upon in the 2nd Original Position. It is important to 
remember that this is a proposal for a framework for fair trade, not a comprehensive 
proposal for a just global society.  
 The proposal embraces Rawls’ conception of social justice as procedural, that is, 
that justice in a society is about creating an institutional framework that enables 
individuals to pursue their own particular interests in a way that is fair to them and to 
the rest of society. This is a conception supported also by Iris Young in her description of 
the social justice obligations of individuals as an obligation to work towards 
establishment of just institutions,1 and by Charles Beitz, who argues that Rawls’ position 
in A Theory of Justice on the role of institutions in social justice also makes sense at the 
                                                          
1 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 249. 
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international level.2 It is also supported by Thomas Pogge in his discussion of the unjust 
institutions of the current trade regime, and the reforms needed.3 
Principles for a Just International Trade Regime 
 My proposal requires the creation of new global economic institutions that 
would be put in place to ensure that trade would be conducted in accordance with the 
principles of justice in international trade. The principles of justice in trade represent 
what I feel is required to structure international trade, and economic activity in global 
society reasonably considered trade related, in a way that supports a just global society. 
My proposal is inspired by Rawls’ discussion of the economic institutions of a just 
society, but because it is a proposal with a scope limited for the most part to trade, not 
all the concerns Rawls has in structuring the economic institutions of a just society show 
up as principles in the trade proposal. Briefly, there are three principles, each with a 
different focus:  
1) Whenever possible international economic activity ought to be conducted in 
such a way that it works to reduce absolute poverty in global society.  
2) International economic activity ought to be conducted in such a way that it will 
contribute to a reduction of harmful inequality in global society, both between 
states and within them.  
                                                          
2 Beitz, Political Theory, 170. 
 
3 Pogge, Politics as Usual, location 923. 
275 
 
3) International trade ought to be conducted in such a way that international 
economic activity does not produce negative externalities, that is, impose costs 
or harm on parties who have not consented to the exchange, including present 
and future generations.  
These principles should not generally be considered to have a particular order of 
priority. Each one is a basic principle that independently, directly or indirectly, works to 
support justice in global society. 
 The first principle, that international economic activity ought to be conducted in 
such a way that it works to reduce absolute poverty, is fairly simple to defend. Absolute 
poverty is harmful, in the sense of causing death and illness, and is also understood to 
make it impossible for individuals to pursue their interests in society. Even those that do 
not support extensive obligations to address justice in global society, accept that there is 
an obligation to act to mitigate the effects of extreme poverty, regardless of causes. 
 Although the principle is non-controversial for anyone concerned at all with 
global justice, it is less clear how elimination of severe poverty should be achieved, and 
what a suitable economic status, below which one is considered to be experiencing 
unacceptable poverty, should be defined as. This is a proposal for justice in international 
trade, and in general, the mechanism for working to eliminate poverty will be using 
trade to facilitate economic development that can sustainably lift people out of poverty. 
However, because extreme poverty is a very serious harm that should not be tolerated 
in a world where we can afford to end it, the proposal also includes the proposition that 
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some of the funds raised through controls on financial capital and energy use, would be 
directed to support sustainable economic development in societies which are 
experiencing extreme poverty. These societies may lack resources to easily develop 
efficient productive economies, and it seems reasonable to use a portion of the 
aggregate benefits of economic cooperation in global society to address this, until 
avoidable extreme poverty is eliminated. As discussed in the positions of Rawls, Pogge, 
and Daly, there may be situations in which the governments of societies experiencing 
extreme poverty may, through bad planning and decision-making, inefficiency, 
corruption or explicit criminal behaviour, make it very difficult to assist the members of 
some societies. Resolving these situations is beyond the scope of this proposal, but the 
reasonable approach would seem to be extending the level of assistance possible 
through international government organizations, and non-government organizations, 
which would be able to work with the people.  
 Determining a poverty cut-off would also require consideration. Two concerns 
seem immediately obvious, what the cut-off would be, and how to measure it. Setting 
the cut-off at a low level, such as the World Bank $1.25 /day USD (PPP),4 makes 
elimination of poverty very clear and very quickly achievable. This is different than the 
type of cut-off envisioned by Rawls for the “duty of assistance” in The Law of Peoples, 
which is described by Rawls as the level at which a country can sustain the institutions 
                                                          
4 Purchasing Power Parity. 
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and social structure of a decent or liberal society.5 He does not specify a particular 
figure. Rawls says that it would not need to be particularly high, although I assume, it 
would likely need to be higher than $1.25/day.  
 It is also worth considering how this would be measured. The proposal has been 
considering wealthy and impoverished countries, but there can be important 
differences in the structure of wealth and income within countries that have very similar 
levels of per capita GDP. This would require research both in defining groups within 
countries that required special attention, and also in considering how projects and 
assistance would reach those most in need within a society. Both the UN and World 
Bank currently do research in this area, and would be useful partners. Another side of 
the measurement that is of concern is what statistics should be used. Income is 
commonly calculated from GDP, but there are concerns that Gross Domestic Product 
may have drawbacks for sustainability and actual satisfaction of human needs.6 Herman 
Daly is particularly concerned that measurements of income should not include the sale 
of non-renewable resources (which should instead be discounted from income as the 
sale of capital assets,) and that addressing this concern may require retooling whatever 
indicator is chosen. The UN has done considerable work with a variety of versions of the 
                                                          
5 Rawls, The Law, 118. 
 
6 See Daly in chapter three in this dissertation, but Amartya Sen is well known for his concerns about 
measuring economies in society.  
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Human Development Index (HDI), which measures, health education and income.7 A 
version of the HDI, combined with an effort to assess differences between groups within 
states, would be an effective approach. 
 The second principle, that international economic activity ought to be conducted 
in such a way that it will contribute to a reduction of harmful inequality in global society, 
requires a more complex argument to justify. The inequality principle is based on the 
concern that great inequalities are harmful to fair decision making, and the 
maintenance of effective and inclusive democracy. Rawls, Schweickart, Stiglitz, Pogge, 
and Beitz all take the position that, extremes of inequality harm people’s interests by 
tending to lead to diminished ability for individuals to effectively participate in 
democratic decision-making and weakening their position in agreements and 
exchanges. The proposal takes a concern for political equality in institutions seriously, 
and requires democratic political equality in the functioning of the Global Trade 
Organization (GTO) as an institution, but the goal of the proposal is not absolute global 
economic equality. 
 Following Rawls, the principle is not a trump which requires total economic 
equity, but rather a concern that equality is a high value for effective democracy, and 
inequality ought to be limited, in keeping with the concern that economic efficiency 
cannot be permitted to overrule the ability of members of society to participate 
                                                          
7 United Nations Human Development Programme, Human Development Reports. Accessed at: 
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effectively in democratic decision-making processes. The inequality principle will be 
focussed on addressing harmful inequalities, where large differences in economic power 
translate into political inequality or difficulty in addressing human rights concerns and 
environmental issues.  
 The inequality principle is limited, in that it does not consider active 
redistribution of the background wealth of countries or individuals in a direct manner, 
accepting some level of differences in wealth, but seeking to create a structure of 
economic interaction that supports equality, by requiring it in terms of trade, except in 
cases of trade where the poverty principle would apply, and in some situations concerns 
for equity. It might be considered that the inequality principle would be a presumption 
of actual free trade, in the sense of an equal absence (or presence) of barriers to trade 
between partners. In situations where a country was below a poverty cut-off, or where 
the ratio of difference in wealth between states was beyond a specific ratio, it would 
arranged that terms of trade could shift to favor the expected returns towards the 
poorer party.  
 One model for this would be something like the “Market Access Proposal” 
suggested by Stiglitz.8 In the proposal he suggests that in an effort to economic 
development for developing countries, that all countries would eliminate barriers to 
their markets for countries with lower GDPs and lower per capita GDPs than 
themselves. The Global Trade Organization proposal would take an approach that was 
                                                          
8 Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 94. 
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similar in principle, but not exactly in structure. This proposal does take the position that 
a long term levelling down of levels of consumption of non-renewable resources is 
desirable, and Stiglitz’s proposal does seem likely to likely to lessen inequality, but it 
lacks a mechanism for ensuring that economic development will be sustainable. Because 
it will likely encourage competition based on low wages rather than efficiency, it may 
actually lead to generally less efficient use of resources in the global economy. Leveling 
up of developing countries to a level of throughput of non-renewable resources that is 
similar to the current level of wealthy developed countries, would be disastrous 
ecologically, and for the quality of life on the planet.  
 This proposal would be similar to Stiglitz’s, in that it would have a basic principle 
that trade agreements ought to work towards ending economic inequalities that limit 
people’s ability to participate, and effectively pursue their interests in global society and 
its institutions. Market access would be facilitated, but there would also be a focus on 
ensuring that this was accompanied by effective regulation, to ensure that this did not 
encourage competition based on externalizing social or environmental costs. (This 
would include competition based on labor exploitation or unsustainable environmental 
practices. And the proposal would, almost certainly, require assistance in developing 
capacity to support the regulation and developing industries.) In many cases, it might 
prove that support for strategic economic development would be preferable in the long 
term to simply opening all markets, and allowing poorer countries to use an absolute 
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advantage they might have in production costs, because their impoverished citizens will 
work for very low wages.  
 Another concern with a blanket policy like Stiglitz’s Market Access Proposal is 
that if not managed carefully, (with controls on financial capital) it may create a 
situation where holders of financial capital in wealthy countries, could use it to benefit 
from cheap factors available in poor countries, to the disadvantage of labor in wealthy 
developed countries. This might lower the inequality between states, but would worsen 
inequality within developed countries, which is already becoming a source of political 
and social injustice for many of them. So the proposal will embrace the general spirit of 
the Market Access Proposal, which is for wealthy developed countries to assist 
developing countries with economic development opportunities through trade, but will 
not adopt a complete open market policy for less developed countries, without 
consideration of environmental and social impacts.  
 The inequality principle is included in the proposal, with the goal of reversing the 
trend of rapidly increasing inequality between states and within states. Its goal is not 
complete global economic equity, but is focussed on ensuring that conditions which 
support fair agreements and exchange are promoted and maintained, rather than 
continually eroded by the natural effects of markets and free exchange over time. 
 The third principle is that international trade ought to be conducted in such a 
way that international economic activity does not produce negative externalities. This 
principle in a sense is fairly non-controversial, as all societies accept it in principle, and 
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all wealthy developed societies enact more or less effective and comprehensive sets of 
laws and regulations to prevent negative externalities, or provide for sanctions or 
damages when they occur. As we have seen, Rawls suggests that this as an important 
function of the economic institutions he proposes in ATOJ.9 Singer suggests that 
effective regulation of negative externalities is, in general, considered vital in the legal 
systems of developed states, but is effectively absent in international society.10 Pogge 
considers the lack of effective measures to restrict the ability of international economic 
actors to impose uncompensated costs and burdens on third parties, to be a cause of 
important harms in the current international trade regime.11  
The reason that the ability to restrict negative externalities is absent in the 
current structure of international economic interaction is the result of a combination of 
two factors. One is the focus of the WTO on reducing barriers to trade, which means 
that its Appellate Body finds almost all claims to harmful 3rd party effects to be less 
important than reducing barriers to increased trade.12 And a second is the structure of 
contemporary world order, where there is very little agreement on standards of 
regulation for many concerns between countries, and virtually no capacity for consistent 
                                                          
9 Rawls, A Theory, 244. 
 
10 Singer, One World, 93-94. 
  
11 Pogge, Politics as Usual, location 962. 
 
12 Singer, One World, 57. This is also the position taken by Bhagwati, who, as discussed in chapter 3, 
doesn’t actually see it as much of a problem. 
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enforcement of what regulative agreements exist, particularly in the case that the 
negative effects are experienced by members of poor countries.  
 Another particularly thorny concern is for the effect of negative externalities 
where the costs or harms created are placed onto future persons. There is some 
regulation aimed at reducing this in wealthy developed countries, but it is very much an 
emerging concern. There are basically no effective measures to address this in the 
current international order, as evidenced by the inability to come to grips with powerful 
environmental issues such as climate change.  
 The externalities principle will be addressed in general by the global nature of 
the institutions that regulate the global economic activity. Fair regulation should be 
achievable through the inclusive democratic and global nature of the Global Trade 
Organization institution, in the sense that reasonably effective representation of most 
interests in global society is the goal, and under those conditions regulation should 
generally reflect the interests of all to avoid being on the receiving end of negative third 
party effects from international economic activities. Since this is a stand-alone proposal, 
enforcement is likely to be much more of a problem in some ways. Issues brought 
before the institution that is charged with this regulation, in general, can be expected to 
be dealt with fairly, as the institution would have a focus on just economic interactions 
rather than economic efficiency as its highest value. However, there would be a concern 
with how to actually enforce the decisions once made. One structure might be the 
imposition of fines or damages on parties that engage in practises that result in 
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recognized negative external social or environmental costs, but in some situations these 
may be difficult to enforce, as WTO judgments of this type, when they have occurred, 
have often been. In the stand -alone proposal the most effective enforcement would 
likely have to be membership in the institutions of global society itself. There would 
likely be enough benefit for all members of the economic agreement in global society 
that the costs of being left out are greater than the benefits of behaviour that will cause 
a party to lose its membership. This is the current strategy of the WTO, but it is 
weakened at the WTO by the ability of some members to just ignore issues that don’t 
suit them because of their economic power in global society.  
Functions of Institutions 
 The functions of institutions of a fair system of global economic interaction, as 
mentioned, would include most of the areas covered in the current regime by the WTO, 
as well as several others that are currently outside the WTO. The institutions would 
need to structure trade agreements, focussing not on removing barriers to trade at any 
cost, but on facilitating conditions that increase trade and economic activity in 
international society in ways that are consistent with the principles of justice.  
  As we have seen, the long-time, widely purported, theoretical basis for making 
the elimination of barriers to unrestricted free trade the focus of international trade 
regimes is very problematic. Comparative advantage appears to be much more limited 
in the conditions to which it applies than has been argued. We should encourage the 
reduction of barriers to trade under conditions where analysis showed that there would 
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beneficial returns from comparative advantage, absolute advantage or efficiencies 
produced by free markets that in general would be distributed in accordance with the 
principles of justice. In other cases the function of the Global Trade Organization 
institutions could be to structure tariffs or duties and restrictions or limits, in ways that 
supported the three principles. Ideally the institution opens its doors to a clean slate of 
historic agreements, as many existing ones have been negotiated under conditions that 
were far from just. The institution would take free trade to be desirable as a starting 
assumption for many types of trade, and the function of the institution would be to 
fairly determine when it was, and was not, the best option for supporting the principles 
of justice. This position can only be just when it is assumed that the decisions would be 
fairly based on the principles of justice, rather than power and self-interest. It is a 
position that requires the institution to be inclusively democratic and transparent in its 
decisions. 
Regulation of Trade in Financial Capital 
 The WTO currently has the TRIMS (Trade Related Investment Measures) 
agreement, which concerns the flow of international capital (which came into the WTO 
as part of GATT,) with a focus on trying to ensure that there is as little restriction as 
possible on the ability of those who hold capital to move it freely around the world in 
search of the highest returns. Many commentators, even those who in general support 
a free trade model for international trade, consider that the unrestricted trade in 
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international capital contributes more harm than good to global society.13 Unrestricted 
flows of capital from country to country, or market to market in search of short term 
profit has proven to both promote instability, sometimes provoking acute financial crisis 
in countries where capital flows out very rapidly, and to be of little use in supporting the 
types of economic activity which permit stable development and lift people in poor 
countries out of poverty.14 Managing this situation will be one of the functions of a new 
global institution for international trade. The goal of the financial capital section will be 
twofold: first, it will be to ensure that trade in financial capital does not create injustices 
in global society, in the sense of creating economic instability or forcing poor countries 
to make choices that ignore the basic needs and concerns of their people in order to 
secure capital or avoid capital flight; second, it will be to try to ensure that global 
financial capital is put to constructive uses, where it will do the most good in reducing 
poverty and harmful inequality. Thomas Friedman suggests that international capital 
can be thought of as “the herd.”15 In this sense the role of a just institution for 
international trade would be that of a thoughtful shepherd, knowing the value of the 
animals, but aware of the hazards of stampedes and overgrazing.  
                                                          
13 Baghwati, In Defense, 203-5 Joseph Stiglitz also specifically argues that it is unjust to force developing 
countries to accept TRIMS as a condition of a development round of the WTO. See Stiglitz and Charlton, 
Fair Trade, 144. 
 
14 Stiglitz and Bhagwati, both cover this concern in chapter 3. 
 
15 Friedman, Thomas. The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor, 1999). 
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 The tools the institution would use would be regulatory. One would be a tax on 
transfer of financial capital. The regulatory role would be to ensure that the trade in 
financial capital did not violate the principles of just trade or any specific regulations 
which were developed to support these principles. The tax tool would be similar to a 
“Tobin tax,”16 but with modifications specifically formulated to support the principles of 
justice in trade. The tax would take the form of a tax on the trading of stocks, bonds and 
other forms of financial capital. It is possible that a straight tax on financial capital would 
in a sense be more effective at reducing inequality, but one of the concerns is to support 
stability, so a transfer tax would seem to be more likely to reduce very rapid shifts in 
flows of financial capital that occur to take advantage of small, short term differences in 
the rate of return.17 A straight tax on capital could serve the purpose of redistribution 
but would seem to do little to reduce the rapid speculative activity and its effect on 
capital markets.18 
 There would be a transfer tax on global financial capital of the type generally 
known as a Tobin tax. The rate would be set at a level that was determined to restrict 
                                                          
16 For more detailed explanation of source and concept of Tobin Tax idea see: Tobin, James. World 
Finance and Economic Stability. (Edward Elgar, 2005). And ul Haq, Mahbub, Inge Kaul, and Isabelle 
Grunberg, eds. The Tobin Tax: Coping with Financial Volability. (New York: Oxford, 1996). 
 
17 Piketty, Thomas, Capital In the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Belknap, 2014), 515-36. 
 
18 Keynes suggested that very liquid markets which allowed speculation to dominate investment 
strategies over enterprise or the development of productive business were against the best interests of 
society. Keynes, John M. “The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money,” In The Real Price of 
Everything” ed. Michael Lewis (New York: Sterling, 2007) Chapter 12, section VI: “It is usually agreed that 
casinos should, in the public interest, be inaccessible and expensive. And perhaps the same is true of 
Stock Exchanges.” 
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the profitability of short term speculation, but was still in keeping with financial capital 
having a global role in economic activity. How high the rate would be set could be 
decided in keeping with the democratic opinion of the representatives guiding and 
managing the institution, on the role international financial capital ought to have in 
international economics. They may decide that the role of international capital should 
be very limited and set the rate very high, or they may decide to set it lower, 
encouraging international investment in the real economy, but high enough to reduce 
short term speculation or gambling. Setting the particular rates would likely require 
economic expertise, careful thought concerning the desired outcomes, and possible 
side-effects, as well as some trial and error.  
 An important possible role for the global transfer tax on investment capital 
would be as a source of revenue to provide capital for agreed upon economic 
development projects to assist societies in developing sustainable economies that 
would help to lift their members out of absolute poverty. This would be a separate 
branch of the Global Trade Organization. Raising revenue in this way seems very much 
in keeping with the idea that the aggregate benefit of international economic activity 
ought to accrue, in a fair way, to members of the global society. 
Intellectual Property 
 Another important area of function for an institution that is charged with 
promoting just international economic activity would be the area of intellectual 
property. In the current international trade regime intellectual property is an area of 
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contention between wealthy and poor states on several levels. Poor countries are 
required to accept the protocols (TRIPS: Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) 
concerning intellectual property in order to ascend to membership in the WTO. As 
several commentators have pointed out, while it is a voluntary commitment, the extent 
of international economic interdependence and the importance of international trade 
mean that in many senses the choice ends up being the selection of the least bad option 
rather than a free decision. Accepting the intellectual property protocols means, for 
developing countries, several different types of costs. On one level it means the cost 
upfront to developing a regulatory regime that is capable of recognizing intellectual 
property rights and assessing and collecting royalties imposed on the use of those rights 
that are owed to their owner.19 The second is the actual cost of the royalties to 
developing economies, which are essentially rents, and are for the most part, held by 
corporations operating out of wealthy developed countries, which transfer the returns 
from production in the economy from poor societies to rich societies. A third cost, which 
is potentially even more problematic for developing countries, is what the current 
                                                          
19 Bhagwati, In Defense, 182 Bhagwati said, when IPP became TRIPS, trade related was added to turn the 
WTO into a royalty collecting agency. “A prime example of such harmful lobbying by corporations in 
recent years has involved intellectual property protection (IPP). The damage inflicted on the WTO and on 
the poor nations has been substantial.”  
Stiglitz, J; Charlton, A. “The Right to Trade: A Report for the Commonwealth Secratariat on Aid for 
Trade. (2012), 3. Stiglitz claims that implementation costs for Uruguay round, for IPR, customs, and phyto-
sanitary regulations would be $150 million as an average for developing countries.  
Finger, Michael,J; Schuler, Phillip. “Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: The 
Development Challenge (World Bank E Library, 2000), 25 accessed at: http://elibrary.worldbank.org/ 
Finger and Schuler note that the cost for Mexico’s Intellectual Property reforms to meet Uruguay Round 
commitments was $30 million, they also note Mexico already had a reasonably well developed system, 
compared to many developing countries, which can expect it to cost much more. 
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system of rents on intellectual property means for the quality of life and health of the 
poorer majority of persons in global society. The rents on intellectual property mean 
that many drugs to fight diseases that are considered curable or manageable in wealthy 
societies are priced beyond the reach of most of the population. Governments must in 
general act to restrict or eliminate the availability of cheaper generic versions, which do 
not pay IP rents, in order to comply with the IP portion of the trade agreements. The 
other side of this is that because drug manufacturers recognize that poor persons in 
developing countries will be unable to pay high prices for drugs they develop, very little 
is spent on research for drugs effective against diseases which affect mostly poor people 
in developing countries. A well-known example is malaria, which has had the most 
documentable impact of any disease throughout human history, and continues to take a 
very high toll of deaths as well as long term incapacitating illness, in many developing 
countries. Little concerted research has been done on this disease by for-profit 
pharmaceutical companies.  
 A just approach to intellectual property rights would require different strategies 
to address the different concerns. In an economic system where it is conceived that 
innovation and research are, at least partially, driven by private for profit interests, it 
seems necessary that some effective system of intellectual property rights must exist in 
order to provide incentive for research and innovation. A system where any successful 
innovation, idea, design or product of research, is immediately copied and marketed by 
others who can undercut on price, as they do not have to include the amortization of 
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the research costs in their costs of production, is a system where the types of research 
and innovation will be limited. There are two ways of approaching this: one is to ensure 
there is a system of intellectual property rights that is reasonably enforceable and 
balanced between cost and protection for research and innovation in place; the other is 
to assume that some types of research can be understood to be a form of public goods, 
which will provide benefit to all or many in society, and therefore are worth paying for 
as a society.  
 If a society is committed to both forms, it influences the way that each of the 
types of systems can be structured. A society where some forms of research and 
development are considered public goods, in a sense will alleviate some of the sources 
of concern in intellectual property.20 The remaining concerns for a justice in intellectual 
property would for the most part be a balance between allowing producers who are 
involved in research and innovation sufficient protection of their intellectual property to 
amortize their research, and avoiding intellectual property rights becoming a rent in the 
                                                          
20 The question of whether intellectual property developed in a society, that considered it a public good, 
would be freely shared internationally is an interesting one. In a sense, as a public good it might be free 
only to members of the society that supported its development. Ideally many cases could be resolved 
through negotiation. A country paying the costs to develop a particular product would not be happy to 
face competition on price in that industry from someone from a country which hadn’t had those costs to 
pay for. The Development Branch would likely be a way to negotiate this. A country might be able to 
negotiate tariffs against a competitor who had violated an agreement not to compete in certain markets 
(any agreed upon) using IP that had been taken without compensation for the cost of development. Again 
this a complex issue. It would not seem very just, for a rich country specializing in products needed to 
provide basic or essential services to impoverished people, to negotiate a level of compensation for IP 
they develop that would limit the ability of poor persons whose lives can be improved to a relevant 
degree to access it. This is where a global institution working to balance justice in distribution of the 
benefits of research with ensuring the needed research and development actually occurs would be most 
valuable. 
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economy, where, once gained, they provide a protection from competition that allows 
holders to raise prices beyond a reasonable return on investment costs (even 
considering recouping the investments in research ) and reduce a continuing research 
effort to develop new products or technologies.  
 It is my position that a reasonably efficient system of just international trade 
would best be a combined system of intellectual property. In the combined system, 
some agreed upon areas of research or even particular projects would be considered 
public goods, where an effort to fund research that was in the general interests of 
society, or that which served a particular purpose in interests of justice, would be 
publicly funded (through the transfer tax on capital or the energy dividend). Projects 
would be funded by an international public research funding body, which would 
delegate funding grants to research proposals based on perceived value of the research 
project as a public good. It would probably be necessary to have several international 
research funding bodies, as it would be necessary for funding bodies to have sufficient 
expertise in the area to judge the value of research proposals in both applied and basic 
research areas. These could be similar to institutions which exist within states (such as 
NSF in the US, and NSERC, CIHR and SSHRC in Canada), but they would exist at the global 
level and be concerned to fund projects that were valuable to global society, both 
generally and specifically aimed at reducing harms of poverty and disease. They could 
also become part of international bodies that already exist, in which case the existing 
international research bodies would have access to a larger pool of resources to provide 
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grants and support research, which would come with a caveat of requiring transparency 
in the process for supporting research. Intellectual property resulting from research 
funded in this way, (with funds from capital transfer tax or Energy Dividend) would in 
most cases become public (in global society) and would focus on research that was 
concerned with solutions to the problems of the least well off, who otherwise, because 
of their extremely limited effective demand, would not be a focus of research by for-
profit companies.  
Resources to fund research could come from taxes levied on some types of 
international economic activity, including the global transfer tax on investment capital 
and a tax which would be a form of Pogge’s conception of a global resource dividend tax 
(to be discussed later).21 The amount of resources available would vary with the level of 
commitment in global society to the idea of research in various areas as a public good. 
International trade may not be reasonable as the only source of funding for all research 
that could be considered a global public good, and it would be possible for other 
schemes of contribution to supplement this.  
In a combined system there would still be a system of private intellectual 
property, but it would be different than the current regime in several important ways. 
One of the influential differences is that it would be managed by an effectively 
democratic institution in the interests of global society as a whole, with the principles of 
justice in international trade as a primary concern, rather than being something that 
                                                          
21 See chapter 2. 
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large wealthy corporations have lobbied the governments of rich and powerful 
countries to impose in trade negotiations. Because it is managed democratically 
according to the principles of justice in trade and in the interests of global society, the IP 
system will attempt to balance maintaining enough protection to promote research and 
innovation in a global economy with not permitting IP rights to become too powerful as 
rents in the global economy, a situation in which they function to funnel wealth from 
poorer members of international society to wealthier members. This will not be an easy 
balance to find, and would likely require different regulations negotiated for different 
types of industries.  
The Regulatory Branch 
The regulatory branch and its working groups would constitute a crucial part of 
the institutional framework of the Global Trade Organization, needed to support justice 
in international trade. A main focus of the regulatory branch would be attempting to 
prevent or correct negative externalities. It would do this in support of the principle of 
justice in international trade that states: international trade ought to be conducted in 
such a way that international economic activity does not impose costs or harm on 
parties who have not consented to the exchange, including present and future 
generations. Its role in doing this would include two distinct functions. These two 
functions would probably require two separate panels of representatives charged with 
decision making.  
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 The first would be to formulate a framework of regulations. Initially it would use 
existing international agreements on human rights, environmental regulations and 
other issues such as ownership or control of resources to formulate a framework of 
regulations that would apply to the standard sorts of externalities associated with 
international trade. All members of the organization would have representation on this 
panel. 
 A further part of this first function would be an ongoing effort to identify 
important areas for new or reformed regulations that might be needed to support the 
principles of justice in trade. Immediate examples that come to mind are the concerns 
Thomas Pogge has repeatedly articulated. These include the current accepted practise 
of permitting any government that can maintain control over a population and territory, 
regardless of its legitimacy, behaviour towards its citizens, or whether it can in any way 
be considered to represent their interests, to sell the resources of the country 
legitimately on the international market. He calls this the international resource 
privilege. And the similar ability of governments, regardless of their legitimacy, or 
whether or not they represent the citizens, to take on debt in the form of loans from 
wealthy-country financial institutions that the citizens of the country will be obliged to 
repay, even when the loans went into the pockets of dictators or their foreign bank 
accounts. He calls this the international borrowing privilege. These practises, as Pogge 
argues, permit wealthy developed countries to benefit economically at the expense of 
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some of the world’s worst off and are egregiously in violation of several of the principles 
of justice in trade.22 
 The second large function of the regulatory branch would be enforcement. For a 
stand-alone reform to international economic institutions, enforcement would be a 
considerable challenge. In the case of the regulatory panel, the response to cases 
brought before it that were determined to be infractions of the regulation, would be an 
order a stop to whatever action caused the infraction, and where appropriate levy a fine 
or damages. The authority to do so would derive from it being a result of the fair 
democratic process, inclusive of all members through which the institution was 
constituted. However, in many situations, where the power would come from to make 
the authority effective, would need to be explained. In effect the only real power the 
institution would possess would be the ability to expel members who violated its terms. 
This would constitute an effective power only if it was actually the case that 
membership provided greater benefits than those that could be acquired through 
breaking its terms, and would likely prove true for individual countries in relation to 
most issues. This requires a majority of members of global society to commit to the 
project. For the wealthy powerful countries of the current world order, this 
commitment cannot be completely self interested, but requires an actual desire to 
address issues of global justice in trade. For the current regime clearly shows that it is 
                                                          
22 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 146-167. See also “Economic Justice and National Borders,” 
27; and Politics as Usual, location 1040-93. Each of these texts considers these issues. 
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possible, for wealthy and powerful countries to arrange global order and international 
economic institutions in their favor if that is their goal.  
 It would be important to consider the process of adjudicating particular cases 
that were brought before the regulatory panel. Several features would need to be 
included. One crucial feature would be that the process be seen to be impartial. This 
would not be unreasonable to achieve, but would require a panel of sufficiently diverse 
adjudicators, selected in a manner that made it likely that the panel would not reflect a 
particular bias of interests. Mistakes and/or dissatisfactions with results are bound to 
occasionally occur, regardless of the efforts to ensure a fair process, so it will also be 
important to ensure that there is an appeals process in place that is also designed with 
fairness in mind. These panels would be subsets of the larger membership of the GTO, 
the exact size of which could be negotiated, but would need to be limited so that they 
could be relatively efficient, addressing cases in a reasonably timely process. The panels 
of both would need to be selected through a transparent process, agreed upon 
democratically by the representatives of global society participating in the Global Trade 
Organization, and could rotate regularly. It might be worthwhile to include a 
requirement that membership on the panels would always be composed of 
representative mix of countries based on their economic position and perhaps region.  
Another feature of the adjudication and appeals process that would be vital in 
relation to the principles of justice would be that the process not be such, that 
effectively representing one’s position required resources that were generally only 
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available to the wealthier and more powerful countries. This is a concern about the 
current process in the WTO, and is considered problematic even by some commentators 
who generally support the current free trade model of international trade, and the 
WTO’s focus on it. Issues in international economics can be complex and contentious, so 
a just process of dispute resolution would almost certainly need to include a component 
of support and capacity building for poorer and less powerful members of global 
society, in effectively representing their interests.  
Strategic Economic Development Branch 
 An important function of the proposed institution to support justice in 
international economics is strategic economic development. This is not a feature of the 
current WTO. The WTO is committed to a position that places the highest value on 
removing barriers to trade in support of achieving as close to unrestricted free markets 
in international trade as is reasonably possible. This position has long-standing support 
among many economists, and particularly came to dominate economic thinking, with 
important results for policy outputs, beginning in the 1980s. The focus on promoting 
unrestricted free markets in international trade, because of a conception of their being 
the most important factor in the successful development of economies that make use of 
international trade to lift people out of poverty, has turned out to be unjustified when 
the evidence is examined. The “Asian Tigers” are often cited as the defining example of 
the success of free trade, but in fact, when their cases are examined, as we have seen, 
they turn out to have actually been examples of strategic industrial development and 
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careful protection of markets, up to the point when the chosen industries were no 
longer benefiting from it.23 The actual evidence supports the idea that effective trade-
focussed economic development that brings opportunities to people and diminishes 
poverty tends to occur when it is in industries that produce increasing returns to 
investment and technological improvement over the long term.24 The research also 
shows that the trade environment is also an important feature. The success of Korea, 
Japan and Taiwan appear to be not only because of a focus on development of 
particular industries for export, but also a result of the Cold War climate, where these 
countries received fairly open markets in the US and other developed western countries 
because there was a strong desire that they succeed economically, and not be drawn 
into the Soviet sphere.25 The strategic economic development branch of the Global 
Trade Organization will have the role of assisting societies that wish to develop 
particular industries that they see as desirable and sustainable pathways to economic 
development.  
 This branch would function at a level between individual countries or societies 
and the trade institutions that represent global society. It would consider proposals with 
                                                          
23 Chang, Ha-Joon. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. (London: 
Anthem, 2002). 
 
24 Fletcher, Ian. Free Trade Doesn’t Work (U.S. Business and Industry Council. 2010). 
 
25 See above for discussion of Chang and also Stiglitz in chapters three and four. It should also be noted 
that China benefitted from maintaining protection for its own markets, and ensuring its currency was kept 
artificially low so that imports were generally out of reach (and exports cheap), while taking advantage of 
the market liberalization occurring in developed countries since the 1980s. 
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development plans coming from individual countries or societies, and from the 
perspective of global society consider if the plan seemed, feasible, reasonable and fair. 
Because the panel reviewing proposals would be representative of as wide a cross 
section of interests in global society as possible, and also would be committed at the 
level of basic structure of the institution to equitable processes of decision-making, 
most of the time the proposal would be fairly reviewed to evaluate whether it was likely 
to be workable (which is always a guess, but would require a variety of economic 
expertise), and whether it was likely to be in line with the principles of just trade. 
Proposals for strategic economic development that were accepted would be analysed in 
order to determine how they could be supported. In many cases, it would be possible to 
arrange combinations of free access to important markets and protection at crucial 
early stages, which would allow industries to develop in an environment similar to infant 
industry protection, but without the barrier of reciprocal tariffs. This would be 
negotiated according to the principles of justice, but also in the expectation that others 
will assist you when necessary. The difference from infant industry protection as it was 
practised by now-developed countries historically would be that it could be structured 
as cooperation to assist everyone in enjoying the benefits of a vibrant economy in global 
society. Currently reciprocal trade concessions are often extremely adversarial, in a 
sense, acting as if international trade was a zero sum game (although most trade 
economists take the position that it is not) and by necessity, if one wins (by getting a 
concession in a trade agreement) the other loses. The conception of a fair, and 
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transparently inclusive and effective democratic institution for international trade is 
designed to create a structure where states can be sure they will not be unfairly taken 
advantage of, for the unjust benefit of others.26 In some cases wealthier societies will be 
asked to make concessions in terms of trade to poor societies that will make trade less 
profitable than maximal. Obviously it must still be beneficial for both or it wouldn’t 
occur, but again, following Rawls, the proposal for justice in trade assumes a disposition 
to live in a just society.  
 In many cases there might also be a loose coordination concerning which 
societies will choose to specialize in which industries. This would not be a tight planning 
of exactly who will produce what, but it would involve discussions over what industries 
were already highly competitive, (which isn’t necessarily bad) and which industries 
presented strong future possibilities. Certain characteristics make for more attractive 
industries, and those industries are the ones that everyone wants to be in, but the 
institution would provide a forum for strategizing in this way, in a setting that would be 
as non-adversarial as possible. Under these conditions, (and with some regulation of 
international flows of investment capital), comparative advantage in some situations 
                                                          
26 This situation, where no progress is made on important issues, which most agree should be addressed, 
because all actors feel if they give up anything, that they haven’t carefully ensured all others will also, 
verifiably do, at the exact same time, they will be taken advantage of (and they may be), is common to 
many areas of international relations. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and their inability to make progress on reducing 
carbon emissions, even when most players agree it is crucial, is a perfect example of the limitations of the 
anarchic nature of the current international order for resolving problems in a global society. 
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(probably not all because of the concerns for reduction of absolute poverty and harmful 
inequality) could be used to advantage. 
 In the case of very poor countries, the support for strategic economic 
development ought to go further. It could be well worthwhile in long term benefit, for 
there to be funding available for very poor countries to subsidize the development of 
industries that have the potential to transform the economic situation of the country. 
Development of technology, expertise, organizational capacity and a workforce 
sufficiently skilled to be effective, are often barriers preventing the poorest, least 
developed societies, from making the kinds of choices that pull them out of poverty. 
Developing these things is a cost that societies that are very poor are not able to pay. 
Borrowing money to support this development is problematic, for the poorer you are, 
the more difficult it will be to pay the loan, and because of the risk, the higher the cost 
of borrowing. High rates of interest can make servicing the debt crippling for 
governments trying to put programs in place that will effectively support developing 
industries, and in some situations conditionalities attached to the loans from 
international institutions may worsen the situation, particularly in the short term.27  
The proposal here is for funding to be made available, in the form of loans with 
repayment conditions tied to ability to pay. In cases where ending extreme poverty for 
the least well off in global society is involved, it would need to involve grants or loans 
where repayment is a long term expectation, based on the society eventually being able 
                                                          
27 Stiglitz, Joseph. Globalization and its Discontents (New York: Norton, 2003) 42-50. 
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to rise above extreme poverty, and assist in rebuilding the fund to aid others. In many 
cases, it might also involve training and transfers of expertise or technology that build 
capacity in less well-off societies.  
The strategic economic development branch may in some ways seem like a 
rehash of various institutions such as the World Bank and various UN agencies.28 
International agencies in the current world order may have a mandate to support 
economic development in less developed countries, but their structure and perspective 
is different. It is commonly pointed out that many foreign aid development projects fail, 
are enormously inefficient, or even cause dependency or harm. The proposed strategic 
economic development branch of the GTO has a structural difference that is designed to 
address these issues. There are two structural features of the institution as a whole that 
can work to make the proposed solution more successful than the current approach to 
supporting economic development. The first of these is very specific: current institutions 
in general, are either controlled by wealthy, powerful countries, who ensure that 
policies and activities focus on serving their own interests, or, as in the case of many UN 
agencies, pushed into the background in favor of institutions that more directly 
represent wealthy country interests.29 The proposed institution would be democratic 
                                                          
28 The UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) has had a focus on dialogue and 
strategic development for developing countries, but it became much less influential after the creation of 
the WTO, when developing countries, which for the most part, were not highly involved in GATT 
negotiations, became members as part of a Washington Consensus push to liberalize their economies. 
Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair Trade, 41-49. 
 
29 See chapters two and three for the positions of philosophers interested in global justice and 
economists. 
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and inclusively representative of global society. Its interests would be varied, but they 
would include those of the poor and those desperately in need of effective development 
assistance. Those interests would be represented in administering the policies and 
activities of the institution, in the strategic economic development branch, and in other 
parts of the Global Trade Organization.  
 The other structural difference would be a result of the basic principles of justice 
that motivate the creation of the Global Trade Organization. That is, that in a global 
society, we are all in a sense “in it together,” and it is unjust that some should suffer 
from terrible poverty when the resources are available to prevent it, even more so when 
we are all inescapably connected in a myriad of ways to the international economic 
interactions that bring immense wealth to some and leave others in desperate poverty. 
The institution’s purpose is to provide a background framework that allows individuals 
to interact and pursue their own interests in conditions which make those interactions 
fair and just. The function of the GTO in global society is to take away the need for all 
individuals to constantly check all their own actions against categorical imperatives or 
make a utilitarian calculation each time they put an item in their shopping cart. Because 
we are committed to sharing the benefits of economic activity in global society justly, 
we accept that the worst off will be assisted. Successful economic development projects 
in poor developing societies could mean lessened obligation to provide assistance and 
more for everyone in the long term. Because of this, all members of global society have 
an incentive to be sure that projects are well thought out, well organized and funds are 
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used wisely. Failed projects wouldn’t just mean an endless income stream going to 
western financial institutions from highly impoverished countries, servicing a debt load 
they may never be able to pay off. In the context of the proposal, they would represent 
a failed opportunity for all of society.  
Non-Renewable Energy Resource Dividend 
 The revenue needed for the fund will be derived from a form of Thomas Pogge’s 
proposal for a Global Resource Dividend and the Transfer Tax on Financial Capital.30 In 
the former case, the dividend would be paid on the use or sale of non-renewable energy 
resources.31 The dividend would be paid in recognition that the global store of non-
renewable energy resources is a finite pool in which all current and future persons have 
a stake, and that the harmful effects of burning carbon-based energy sources affect all 
members of the global society, regardless of their own use of the energy resources. 
(These effects have disproportionately been felt by poor persons in developing 
                                                          
30 The Transfer Tax on Financial Capital would be variable as a source of revenue. If it was applied at a 
fairly low rate, to dampen and stabilize, the very rapid speculative flow of financial capital it might 
produce quite a lot of revenue. On the other hand, it might also be applied at a higher rate, where it 
would function to keep capital domestic. In that case it would produce much less revenue if it was 
working effectively. 
 
31 This part of the proposal crosses the boundary of being strictly limited to trade. It might be considered 
that a tax on the international trade in non-renewable energy resources would be more appropriate for a 
proposal based on trade. The problem with this approach is that it would penalize countries with less 
domestic reserves of non-renewable energy resources, while permitting societies with large domestic 
reserves to use them imprudently. Pogge’s conception of the GRD is influenced by Rawls’ understanding 
that people have done nothing to deserve the assets and talents they are born with, that it is arbitrary. 
Pogge considers the same can be said about the distribution of natural resources between countries. A 
tax on the cost of non-renewable energy resources used in the production of goods and services traded in 
global society, would have the benefit of encouraging efficient use of energy resources but would be very 
complicated to administer. The same problem occurs with a tax applied to non-renewable resources in 
general.  
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countries.) Non-renewable energy resources seem the best choice for applying the 
dividend, as coal, oil and gas are finite resources, of which the global store is 
disproportionally used by wealthy developed countries, and the use of which produces 
carbon emissions that are understood to be the main factor driving climate change. The 
international community is in consensus that increasing levels of carbon in the 
atmosphere are leading to climate change that will be harmful to ecosystems that 
support human life. And there is also an international consensus that carbon emissions 
from using non-renewable (carbon based) energy sources must be reduced. However, 
there has been almost no effective progress towards reducing carbon emissions. Carbon 
emissions are an open access commons problem, which cannot be resolved unilaterally, 
as each individual country’s economic cost in reducing carbon based energy use will not 
reliably be compensated by the lessening of harms from climate change, if it can’t be 
assured that others will also reduce their emissions. The Non-Renewable Energy 
Dividend, paid on use of non-renewable energy resources, is an effective way of 
addressing this open access commons problem. The rate paid on the use of non-
renewable energy resources can be set high enough to strongly encourage conservation, 
and stimulate research and investment in alternative technologies. Therefore, it seems 
acceptable, in interests of fairness of process, to tax the use of energy resources 
generally, rather than just in international trade. I argue that although it isn’t’t 
necessarily a part of international trade, the use of non-renewable energy resources is 
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such an influential force in global economic interactions that it is drawn into the purview 
of a proposal for justice in international trade.  
 Because the harms of unrestrained consumption of non-renewable energy 
resources may be very high, we ought to apply the precautionary principle when we 
consider what level of consumption of non-renewable energy resources would be an 
appropriate target. In this situation the proponents of both environmental and 
ecological economics could probably agree that the level should be quite high.32 
Although even a rate that was too low to modify resource use behaviour quickly (and 
energy use has proven relatively inelastic), would likely produce a large amount of 
revenue. Setting the dividend at a high rate would have the benefit of beginning to 
modify resource use behaviour very rapidly, but it would come with the cost of 
economic impacts that could be quite powerful for countries that currently sustain their 
economies with very high levels of oil, natural gas and coal use. There has been 
considerable research on these economic costs. Before decisions were made on the 
rates, more would likely be necessary.  
 A further argument for the Non-Renewable Energy Resource Dividend pertaining 
to a proposal for a just trade regime, is the mechanism for ensuring compliance, 
suggested by Pogge in his GRD proposal. He argues that the most effective way to 
                                                          
32 They tend not to agree on very much, but if carbon emissions are recognized as main contributor to 
climate change, which is harmful externality that has resisted internalization, both would agree that 
making the price of using carbon based non-renewable energy reflect the real costs of using it would be a 
good thing. Environmental economists would see it as a way to stimulate research into less expensive 
resource substitutes, and ecological economists consider reducing throughput of non-renewable 
resources in the economy a key goal of sustainable development.  
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ensure that countries were motivated to collect the dividend on resource use would be 
to tie it to international trade. Countries that had signed onto the agreement but did not 
pay the dividend would face tariff barriers to their exports, from countries that were 
members of the Global Trade Organization. This could be an effective method of 
ensuring compliance as long as the value of trade in the GDP of the country it was 
applied against was much higher than the dividends that were owed on non-renewable 
resource use. (Even a fairly high rate charged on non-renewable energy use would be 
very low compared to the value of trade in developed country economies.) This method 
would probably be reasonably effective for motivating compliance if the majority of 
countries normally complied and were willing to implement the tariffs against those that 
were not.  
Structure of the Institutions 
 The structure of the proposed global institution or institutions for justice in trade 
is a crucial question. What could a just institution look like in this context? I have 
suggested that they would be democratic institutions that were inclusively 
representative of global society, and I have also suggested that they would need to be 
transparent.  
 One way that the institutions would be radically different than the current WTO 
and other international economic institutions is that they would assume principles of 
justice in trade as part of their basic charter and framework, making them the most 
basic duties of the institution regardless of all other operating interests. This not to 
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suggest that mistakes, crooked dealings, corruption, and simply self-interested 
subversion of principles could not occur, but rather, that the basic expectation would be 
working towards economic justice. And when individuals or groups were found to acting 
in ways outside that expectation, action would be undertaken to hold them accountable 
and correct any resulting wrongs. This is markedly different than current international 
economic institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions 
are administered by representatives of the governments of states, who are expected, by 
the governments that appoint them, to make national interest a high priority. Although 
the creation of these institutions reflects a belief in the benefits of cooperation in 
international society, some of their activities and policies arguably reflect positions of 
international relations realism. 
 What would the organizational and representative structure of an inclusively 
democratic global institution for trade supporting a cosmopolitan conception of justice 
look like? A cosmopolitan conception of justice is one in which obligations of justice 
extend between all individual members of global society. Each individual has an 
obligation to ensure that his/her behaviour and pursuit of his/her own interests are 
consistent with permitting all others to do the same, regardless of cultural or political 
boundaries. Because the proposal for a Global Trade Organization is to function in global 
society as it actually exists, it must be structured to function effectively in the current 
international order, but also to take a commitment to cosmopolitan obligations of 
justice seriously. It is a daunting task, for there is no exact example of an institution that 
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is realistically comparable, although there are at least several that can provide insight 
into what would be required. 
  Institutions in general require several levels of decision making. There are First 
Order decisions about policy or particular actions. These are the types of decisions 
discussed in the previous section on functions. In this case they are the policies and 
actions taken in relation to the principles of justice in trade. Second Order decisions are 
those concerning who will make those decisions and under what conditions they will be 
made. And Third Order decisions are those concerned with how to decide who and how 
second order decisions will be made.33 Basically second-order decisions are the process 
of putting people into place in the institutions, the electing or appointing of first-order 
decision-makers, and third-order decisions are the process of deciding what process of 
selecting those persons is the best option in the particular situation. Looking at some 
examples of current international institutions and how the second- and third-order 
decisions affect outputs is useful before attempting to explain choices in the proposed 
model.  
  A first example is the current WTO. The World Trade Organization is designed to 
be a democratic international institution, with the goal of supporting reduction of 
barriers to international trade. The WTO is in some sense democratic. All member states 
are allowed representation in decision-making regarding adoption of new protocols 
resulting from trade negotiations, and the voting is based on consensus, with a 
                                                          
33 Pogge, Politics as Usual, location 4745. 
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requirement for unanimity. The representatives are appointed by the governments of 
member states.34 The WTO includes a very large body of trade agreements that set 
regulations and conditions for trade between member states, but this is largely the 
result of the majority of the body of agreements that had been concluded under the 
previous trade regime, GATT, being subsumed into the WTO on its creation in 1995. The 
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was, in general, not focussed on poorer 
developing countries, which had little involvement in most of the agreements. Wealthy 
developed countries, in general, under the GATT process were able to establish 
positions guaranteeing their ability to protect or subsidize particular industries, and 
carry those into the WTO. Developing countries ascending to the WTO were for the 
most part required to face new standards, both regulatory and then in the consensus 
process, which has made it basically impossible to protect their interests in the same 
way as was possible for developed countries, in earlier GATT negotiations.  
The WTO, compared with the IMF and the World Bank, which are 
administratively dominated by representatives from wealthy developed countries, has a 
form of global democratic structure. Its democratic structure, however, has some 
serious flaws, which, in the end, create a situation that is quite unjust. It uses a 
consensus system of decision-making, which creates a situation where it is possible for a 
                                                          
34 In general countries are represented at the WTO by the Trade Ministers of Member Countries at the 
highest level conferences, but countries appoint a delegation to participate in negotiations and working 
groups. The size of delegations varies widely, depending on the ability of countries to support delegations 
to represent them. The WTO is based on consensus decision-making, so in effect all countries have equal 
power to assent to or reject an agreement. 
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single member to block any decision that it sees as unfavorable to its interests. The 
consensus model effectively gives all members a veto. In general that has resulted in 
very little effective progress being made, either in new trade negotiations to create 
conditions more favorable to developing countries or in reforming very problematic 
agreements such as TRIPs and TRIM, in the fifteen years since 1999. (With the body of 
agreements that came into the WTO with GATT 1994 being a reflection of the interests 
of the wealthy developed countries, and agreements like TRIPS and TRIMs, which 
resulted from the efforts of corporations, lobbying the governments of wealthy 
developed countries, a form of governance that makes it very difficult to change the 
status quo, seems quite unjust.) 
 Another concern for the effectiveness of the democratic model of the WTO is the 
dispute settlement mechanism (appellate body). In a sense it is a democratic system, in 
that it is possible for all members to bring a case before it. The concern is that in many 
cases, because it is adversarial and both member states are allowed to present their 
cases, poorer countries are heavily disadvantaged. It appears to be the case that 
decisions of the appellate body of the WTO tend to reflect the ability of the state 
presenting the case to afford a very well prepared case.35 
 The United Nations, created in 1944, is another example of an international 
institution designed with some concern for a democratic structure. The General 
Assembly of the United Nations is made up of appointed representatives of the 
                                                          
35 Bhagwati, In Defense, 157. 
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government of member states. The United Nations General Assembly makes decisions 
according to a majority system, where representatives of all member states have an 
equal vote. The General Assembly is perceived by most to be fairly effectively 
democratic in its decision-making, although to some extent it is hampered by a 
combination of national interests and the realistic conception that most of its decisions 
will not result in effective action. Wealthy powerful countries often operate around it, 
and have a tendency to ignore the possibility of expending effort to build support for 
most of their projects within the UN.  
The structure of one-country, one-vote is democratic, in a sense, but is also 
problematic from a cosmopolitan point of view. Accepting the position that there is 
nothing about the status of a state that trumps other obligations of justice, makes the 
orders of magnitude differences in representation seem unfair when it comes to 
participating in decision-making in relation to factors that may have the potential to 
make an individual or group much better or worse off. One vote representing 300,000 
persons seems a very different type of representation than a vote which represents 
more than 1,000,000,000 persons. (These are all large numbers but there is a very 
serious difference between them.) A cosmopolitan position means taking obligations to 
all individuals seriously, and so, particularly when there are huge numbers of people, 
justice must involve fair institutional design. Although there are reasonable arguments 
for efficiency on several levels of representation by state, in a truly global conception of 
justice the ideal will need to be a form of representation based on population. 
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 The European Union is another example of a democratic international 
institution. It is not a global institution, but it operates over a large number of national 
borders, and in some situations, comes close to being a supranational institution. The 
part of the EU that is most interesting in relation to our proposal is the manner in which 
representatives are elected to the European Parliament. In the case of most 
international institutions, representatives are appointed by the government of the 
states they represent. In the European Union, however, representatives are elected 
separately from the governments of representative states. They are representatives of 
the state where they are elected, and of course act in their national interest, but they 
will not always reflect the exact same interests as the government of that state. This can 
be problematic but can also function to serve the interests of justice, in a similar way to 
the separation of powers within modern democratic states.  
  Exactly how to structure representation in the GTO is a complex concern. As 
noted, there is a tension between the demands of cosmopolitan obligations of justice 
and the pragmatic concerns of a proposal that could reasonably be implemented in the 
actually existing international society. The cosmopolitan position would seem to require 
a representation based on population that would allow each individual to select a 
representative with more or less equal power to represent her or him in relation to 
other members of global society. The problem with this is that international society is 
based on states as primary actors, and no proposal ignoring this would be viable. If even 
the smallest state was to have a representative, and states with larger populations were 
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to have additional representatives based on population, the number of representatives 
would quickly become unmanageable. In interests of practicality, the GTO would likely 
have to be similar to the WTO, with a single vote accorded to each member state.  
 There are of course problems with this. Indians or Chinese persons could feel 
that their voice is tiny compared to the extent of their needs. With such an arrangement 
it would be possible, if this was something that was a concern, to create a rotating panel 
of members selected through a process that took population into account.36 The single 
vote per state compromise is definitely a concern for fairness in a global institution, and 
countries with large populations may have concerns. 
At the WTO, the consensus requirement in decision-making, which is an effective 
veto, at least nullifies some of the problem of fairness in representation by population, 
or otherwise. No state has its interests outvoted and sacrificed to a majority. This is 
actually a valuable feature, and in theory compatible with Rawls’ position on the 
injustice of a utilitarian willingness to sacrifice some individuals interests for the benefit 
of the majority. As discussed, this hasn’t turned out to be particularly fair in the WTO.37 
A strict majority- rules decision-making structure could also be unfair, although in some 
                                                          
36 The rotating panel could be selected through the UN. (The only reason for choosing the UN would be 
that it is a reasonably democratic international institution that would be capable of establishing a process 
for selecting representatives that members might agree to.) The rotating panel of population could be 
fairly small, and still have effective power, if a fairly large super-majority was used for decision making.  
 
37 It has meant that developing countries have been unable to make changes to agreements that came 
into the WTO at its creation, that favor developed countries.  
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ways it would be mitigated by integration of the principles of justice in trade, providing 
a framework for interaction.  
 A compromise between a strict majority-rule format and the consensus model 
could be a super-majority system, where a high percentage of votes would need to be in 
agreement, to successfully pass a decision. This could be a fairly high percentage, 70% or 
more, to limit the ability of a single bloc of countries to push through terms that were 
unfair (The actual percentage required would need to be considered and evaluated.) A 
possible safeguard would be to include the option, available to countries, to appeal a 
decision to a separate panel that would judge only if the decision was valid in relation to 
the principles of justice in trade.  
 Even allowing for a large super-majority, this structure will shift considerable 
power away from wealthy developed countries, which currently dominate the 
international institutional order, as they are a fairly small group of countries. This is a 
fairly radical shift, and will likely incur powerful criticism. I believe, arguing from a 
position of justice in global society that these claims hold up. The argument starts from 
the same position as Rawls in A Theory of Justice: that accepting the proposal requires a 
desire to live in a just society. The criticism will be that poor developing countries that 
make up a large portion of the world’s countries will use their power to skew the 
policies and actions of the institutions in their favor, or at least make poor decisions 
through lack of knowledge and experience. In practise this may happen, but the 
institution is designed to be transparent, and its framework of guiding principles is to be 
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that of economic justice. In the current regime, as clearly and powerfully outlined by 
Thomas Pogge, the wealthy powerful countries have arranged the structure of the 
international economic order in their own interests and make little pretense to setting 
the basic operating principles of the most powerful international economic institutions 
to be fighting poverty and harmful inequality. In effect, many of the institutions are 
already weighted towards increased representation based on wealth. (For the WTO this 
is not meant to be the case but becomes so because of the costs involved in supporting 
large and effective delegations for poor countries.)  
This is also a concern that has arisen before in relation to representation and 
democracy. A couple of hundred years ago almost the same concern was being voiced 
by the elite of the today’s western democracies: what will happen if the poor, 
uneducated masses, who have no experience managing property and assets, are allowed 
democratic franchise? With their sheer numbers won’t they destroy effective 
government, voting for short-sighted, self-interested, unworkable policies? In the US, 
structures such as the Electoral College system are a reminder of this, in Great Britain 
the House of Lords, in Canada, the Senate. In a just democratic system there will likely 
be some weakening of the power held by wealthy, powerful countries in our current 
institutions. Their capacity to skew most international economic interactions strongly in 
their favor may diminish, as it ought to, but shifting the power in international economic 
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institutions towards a greater equality of representation will probably, like extension of 
universal electoral franchise in western democracies, lead to a more just society.38  
 Another concern might be, whether representatives would be appointed by 
governments in power in member countries, or ought to be elected independently of 
sitting governments. In terms of practicality it would seem that the system used by the 
WTO of representation by sitting governments of member countries has much to 
recommend it. A cosmopolitan approach could favor separate elections for 
representation at the GTO, particularly if it meant that populations of countries with 
heterogeneous interests could be more fairly represented. This is the situation of the 
European Union, and it does sometimes allow for a variety of political views to be 
represented, but it can also complicate relations between the EU parliament and the 
individual governments of member countries, so the results are somewhat mixed. 
However, with the practical consideration of limiting representation to a single 
representative per member state, the possibilities for representation of a diversity of 
interests through separate elections would be limited, in any event.  
 The proposal for the Global Trade Organization, up to this point has been 
somewhat unclear on whether one institution is required or several. This is because 
many of the functions could easily be separated out, and many of the functions would 
                                                          
38 The western democracies have their own problems with wealth and political equality. To a varying 
degree all of the wealthy developed democracies, while officially having representative democracy based 
on political equality of all citizens, the influence of wealth has crept into the systems and has been used to 
shape the political culture, and social consciousness of the citizens, to the extent that policy outputs 
generally represent the interests of the wealthiest sectors of society.  
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still be worth implementing even if they were the only part of the project that was 
considered. In the ideal situation, the proposal is for one larger institution, replacing the 
WTO and adding several functions. The ideal proposal again would be divided into 
branches or sections according to the main functions: a Regulatory Branch, a Financial 
Capital Branch, an Intellectual Property Branch, and a Strategic Economic Development 
Branch. It also seems like it is reasonable to separate the Energy Resources Dividend 
Fund from the Strategic Economic Development Branch in interests of transparency. 
How Would this New Institution for Global Economic Collaboration  
Come into Existence? 
 The proposal for principles of justice in international trade and a global 
democratic institution that would support them is something of an ideal conception of 
the form a just regime of international trade could take. It can be understood as 
something to aim for in reforming existing international economic institutions and 
designing new ones. The principles guiding the proposal are considered to be what 
could come out of a negotiation of a framework of a just system of international trade in 
the Original Position, as Rawls suggests even in TLOP. The proposal is a conception of 
what would happen if representatives of global society sat down to create a new 
institution for trade in the Original Position with the Veil of Ignorance, able to leave 
personal and national interest aside and work out an international trade regime that 
was in the best interests of all members of global society with a serious commitment to 
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justice based on rational self interest.39 Rectifying serious systemic economic injustice in 
our actual global society would probably require sitting down to a “new Bretton Woods” 
with a commitment to create new global economic institutions that were based on a 
desire to live in a just society, rather than on simple self-interest. 
 The proposal however isn’t altogether lost if that doesn`t happen, as many of its 
sections are also arguably good options for improving the international trade regime 
even if they are implemented on their own. The financial capital transfer tax is a well-
known concept, and on its own could be implemented to increase the stability of capital 
flows in many economies and reduce the “race to the bottom” pressure on wages that 
extremely mobile financial capital exerts. It would be possible, though not easy to 
implement a proposal similar to this in the context of the current international 
economic institutions.  
 The Intellectual Property proposal is not a radical idea on its own either. Joseph 
Stiglitz`s alternative for a development round of negotiations at the WTO contains part 
of it. He has suggested that in some cases intellectual property does need to be treated 
as a public good in the context of development.40 Radically reforming TRIPS in favor of 
                                                          
39 The results of the original Bretton Woods conference might also be understood to be much less unjust 
than what they have evolved into in the last 60 years in any event. Bretton Woods was the conference 
organized in 1944, as it became clear that the Allies would be victorious. It was a meeting of the Allied 
countries (there were 40 but the US and Great Britain were the most influential). The goal of the 
conference was to create a new framework for an international monetary system that would allow stable 
and productive international trade.  
 
40 Stiglitz, Joseph. Making globalization work. (New York: Norton and Company, 2007) 103-132.  
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an intellectual property system that did not ignore the needs of developing countries 
would be valuable even if no other reform was made. 
 The Strategic Economic Development proposal could also be adopted as a new 
focus for a more just trade regime, even in the context of the WTO. All it would take 
would be to back off from the combination of self-interest and ideological commitment 
that has made free markets at any cost the focus. There is strong evidence that the most 
effective trade for economic development is not always a completely free market. 
Promoting cooperative strategic development as a value even if it wasn’t backed up by 
an absolute commitment to poverty reduction, would constitute improvement over a 
commitment to imposing free markets on developing countries in situations where they 
possess little ability compete internationally, except in industries based on unskilled 
labor and in low wage agriculture.  
 A new regulatory focus on penalizing practises that are harmful to the 
environment or tend to cause social harm instead of making market liberalization a 
trump value would also be of value in any context. There are many clear cases where 
harms occur because there is no coordination of environmental and social regulations at 
the global level. The WTO could begin to take some of this on without radically 
reforming its structure or even its basic mission of promoting trade liberalization. Or it 
could collaborate with existing UN expertise on this and simply be a forum for imposing 
trade sanctions on those who are proven to be causing social or environmental harms. 
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At the very least this would delegitimize those types of trade, even if it did not halt them 
effectively. 
 Finally the WTO could be reformed to be more effectively democratic, which 
could be as simple as rethinking the consensus veto in favor of some sort of super 
majority. It would not solve all problems, but it would likely warm up stalled 
negotiations. The proposal to create a fund and provide technical assistance to build 
capacity among developing countries for both negotiating and implementation of 
required regulatory measures would also be an extremely valuable reform.41 
                                                          
41 See chapter four.  
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